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Abstract
We consider two canonical Bayesian mechanism design settings. In the single-item setting,
we prove tight approximation ratio for anonymous pricing: compared with Myerson Auction, it
extracts at least 1
2.62
-fraction of revenue; there is a matching lower-bound example.
In the unit-demand single-buyer setting, we prove tight approximation ratio between the
simplest and optimal deterministic mechanisms: in terms of revenue, uniform pricing admits a
2.62-approximation of item pricing; we further validate the tightness of this ratio.
These results settle two open problems asked in [30, 11, 4, 34, 32]. As an implication, in
the single-item setting: we improve the approximation ratio of the second-price auction with
anonymous reserve to 2.62, which breaks the state-of-the-art upper bound of e ≈ 2.72.
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1 Introduction
Consider two simple revenue-maximization scenarios: (1) one seller has n items to sell to a unit-
demand buyer; (2) one seller has a single item to sell to n potential buyers. In both cases, the seller
only knows the buyers’ valuation distributions {Fi}ni=1 (rather than their exact valuations for the
items), and thus would like to maximize his expected revenue.
The simplest mechanisms are to post a fixed price for the item(s). In the former case, the seller
can post a uniform price for all items, after which the unit-demand buyer will take his favorite item
(given that its valuation exceeds the price). In the second case, the seller can post an anonymous
price for the single item, and then the first buyer (in arbitrary orders), who values the item no less
than the price, will take the item.
In practice, the above simple pricing schemes are widely used. In terms of revenue, however,
they are not necessarily optimal. In the first scenario, the seller can increase his expected revenue
by posting item-specific prices1, hence the item pricing mechanisms in the literature [16, 17, 11,
18, 12, 20]. In the second scenario, the seller can even organize an auction, and therefore increase
his revenue by leveraging the buyers’ competition. To this end, it is well-known that the optimal
mechanism is the remarkable Myerson Auction [35].
Compared with the simple pricing schemes, how much extra revenues can the complicated mech-
anisms derive? This is a central question in the theory of Bayesian mechanism design, compiled as
the “simple versus optimal” program. As we quote from the survey by Lucier [34]: “an interesting
question is how well one can approximate the optimal revenue using an anonymous price, rather
than personalized prices.” In this paper, we settle the approximation ratios of both simple pricing
schemes mentioned above.
Theorem 1. To sell a single item among multiple buyers with independent regular distributions,
the supremum of the ratio of Myerson Auction to anonymous pricing equals to C∗ ≈ 2.6202.
Theorem 2. To sell heterogeneous items to a unit-demand buyer with independent regular distri-
butions for different items, the supremum of the ratio of optimal item pricing to uniform pricing
equals to C∗ ≈ 2.6202.
In statements of both theorems, we introduce constant
C∗ def= 2 +
∫ ∞
1
(
1− e−Q(x)
)
dx ≈ 2.6202,
where Q(p) def= ln
(
p2
p2−1
)
− 12 ·
∞∑
k=1
1
k2
· p−2k for all p ∈ (1,∞). Noticeably, the imposed regularity
assumption on distributions (whose formal definition is deferred to Section 2) is very standard in
economics, and is used in previous works as well. When we allow arbitrarily weird distributions,
by contrast, both gaps can be as large as n (see [4] for more details). Since such weird distributions
are uncommon in practice, these results might not be that informative.
The main body of this paper is devoted to proving Theorem 1. Given that, the upper-bound
part of Theorem 2 comes immediately, after we apply the so-called copying technique developed
in [16, 17, 18]. Further, the lower bound example for Theorem 2 follows from that for Theorem 1,
after re-interpretation and fine-turning. All analyses of Theorem 2 can be found in Section 6. As
another implication of Theorem 1, the ratio of Myerson Auction to the second-price auction with
anonymous reserve [35, 31, 3, 14, 32] is improved to C∗ ≈ 2.62. This is a main open problem left
1It is noteworthy, in the unit-demand single-buyer setting, that finding optimal item pricing is NP-hard [20].
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by Hartline and Roughgarden in [31], who proved an upper bound of 4, and a lower bound of 2.
Prior to our work, the known best upper bound is e ≈ 2.72 [4], and the known best lower bound is
2.15 [32]. Whether our upper bound of C∗ ≈ 2.62 is tight or not remains unknown.
1.1 Our Techniques
To conquer Theorem 1, like [4, 32], we represent the ratio by mathematical programming, and then
manually solve the optimal objective value. The variables of this programming are an instance of
the underlying mechanism design problem, which consists of n different distributions {Fi}ni=1 and
the number of n itself. Given a certain instance, (1) the constraint is, for any posted-price, that
the revenue from anonymous pricing is at most 1; and (2) the objective is to maximize the revenue
from Myerson Auction.
The revenue from anonymous pricing is relatively apparent (in terms of distributions {Fi}ni=1),
but the revenue from Myerson Auction is far more complicated. To escape from this dilemma, Alaei
et al. [4] relaxed Myerson Auction to the so-called ex-ante relaxation, and thus obtain a “handy”
upper bound of objective function. However, this relaxation incurs an inevitable cost: although
the exact ratio of e was caught (between ex-ante relaxation and anonymous pricing), this bound is
no longer tight for the original programming.
One can infer from the above, we must investigate Myerson Auction directly, and acquire its
revenue (in terms of distributions {Fi}ni=1). To do so, a main obstacle is that Myerson Auction is
stated in terms of virtual valuations [35]. We introduce the virtual value distributions {Di}ni=1 in
Section 2, hence the desired objective function. Throughout our analysis, three different formats
for a certain distribution are involved: value CDF Fi, virtual value CDF Di and revenue-quantile
curve ri(q). There are one-to-one correspondences among these formats. In different parts of the
proof, we use the format that is best for our analyses. To this end, another challenge occur – how
to relate these three formats – which is quite non-trivial. For this, we observe several interesting
identities (among the formats), which enables our proof.
In both [4, 32], a very first step (towards their programming) is to show, that a worst-case
instance is reached by the so-called triangular distributions – a subset of regular distributions.
Regularity of a distribution requires its revenue-quantile curve to be a concave function. By con-
trast, that curve of a triangular distribution is basically a triangle, which lies in the boundary
between concavity and convexity. In other words, triangular distributions are in the boundary of
regular distributions. As a salient feature, describing a triangular distribution requires merely two
real numbers. In this, the programming in both [4, 32] is greatly simplified, after the reductions
(to triangular distributions) mentioned above.
Unfortunately, our programming seems not to admit such a reduction. In fact, what enables
reductions in [4, 32] is that both objective functions2 therein contain a fantastic structure: given
an instance {Fi}ni=1, they only depend on a specific set of value-probability pairs
{(
vi, Fi(vi)
)}n
i=1
,
rather than any other details. Therefore, we can push the instance to “extreme”3, while keeping the
pairs
{(
vi, Fi(vi)
)}n
i=1
fixed, and keeping the distributions regular. This is exactly the reductions
in [4, 32]. Back to our objective function, the revenue from Myerson Auction depends on all details
about instance {Fi}ni=1; this is why the desired reduction seems hopeless.
Despite of annoyance from regularity, we can still calibrate a worst-case instance from different
angles. We notice that a (worst-case) revenue-quantile curve must be a triangle/quadrangle with
2In specific, the objective function in [4] is the aforementioned ex-ante relaxation, and the objective function in [32]
is the so-called sequential posted-pricing mechanism.
3This “extreme” is indeed a triangular instance: as mentioned before, triangular distributions are in the boundary
of regular distributions; besides, each pair
(
vi, Fi(vi)
)
refers to the two real number needed to specify the distribution.
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one curved-edge. It is this curved-edge that makes the revenue-quantile curve difficult to handle.
With a concave revenue-quantile curve (namely a regular distribution), the curved-edge is upper-
bounded by each tangent line of it, and is lower-bounded by the line connecting its two ends. In
our analysis, we often exploit these two lines (rather than the original curved-edge) to measure a
revenue-quantile curve. These two lines respectively serve as upper and lower bounds, which results
in certain properties of a worst-case distribution.
For all programming in [4, 32] and in this paper, a worst-case instance is reached when there are
infinite buyers (namely when n → ∞), and each buyer’s buying-probability is infinitesimal. Such
instances refer to what we call continuous instance. In such a instance, conceivably, the revenue
from Myerson Auction is given by an integration. This explains why constant C∗ ≈ 2.62 (in our
main theorems) comes from an improper integration. To settle our programming, it remains to
show that a continuous instance does give the best revenue. We adopt a direct proof plan: given
a fixed number n ∈ N and a feasible instance {Fi}ni=1, we gradually transform it to a targeted
continuous instance, without hurting the object value.
In both [4, 32], a similar philosophy is adopted. Another salient feature of triangular instance
simplifies those proofs once again: there is a natural total-order4 in a triangular instance. In other
words, a set of triangular distributions can be transformed one by one in that order (to a target
continuous instance), without introducing interface in each step.
However, generic regular distributions do not follow such total-order. Therefore, (locally) each
distribution has to be modified piece by piece; (globally) all distributions have to be modified
simultaneously; which incur many technical challenges. To conquer these issues, potential function
comes to the rescue: we find a natural potential to indicate status of the current instance; in each
step of our transformation, the potential declines by a pre-fixed amount. Hence, the transformation
will terminate after finite steps, left with a continuous instance (as desired). In some sense, this
potential function is the fourth representation of a distribution; in this term, the constraint of the
programming becomes simple enough to deal with.
1.2 Related Works
Both of anonymous pricing and uniform pricing mechanisms are widely studied in literature [25,
10, 9, 30, 4, 11, 26, 24, 32]. In the single-item setting, another important family of pricing schemes
is the sequential posted-pricing mechanisms [16, 27, 15, 17, 37, 30, 2, 24, 1, 22, 34, 5, 8, 32], which
allows buyer-specific pricing strategies, and thus dominates anonymous pricing in revenue. Tight
ratio between sequential posted-pricing and anonymous pricing is known to be 2.62 [32].
In the single-buyer unit-demand setting, item pricing schemes cover all deterministic mecha-
nisms, among which finding the optimum is NP-hard [20]. When randomization is allowed, the
seller can further improve revenue by employing lottery [29, 19, 18, 12]. Chen et al. [19] settled the
complexity of finding/describing optimal randomized mechanism.
In broader multi-item settings (with single or multiple buyers having unit-demand and other
utility functions), optimal mechanisms are even far more complicated. In these setting, the last
two decades have seen a number of works on proving intractability of optimal mechanisms, and
even more abundant works on proving that simple mechanisms approximate the optima within
constant factors. In this amount of space, evaluating so extensive literature would be impossible.
As a guideline, readers can turn to hardness results in [28, 23, 19, 36, 6, 20, 21], and approximation
results in [16, 17, 11, 7, 18, 38, 12, 13], and the references therein.
4As mentioned before, a triangular distribution (1) has a triangular revenue-quantile curve; and (2) can be entirely
defined by using two parameters. One of the two parameter is exactly the slope of a specific edge (namely the tangent
of a specific angle) of the triangle. In both [4, 32], the total-order refers to the decreasing-order of the slopes.
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2 Notations and Preliminaries
In most part of the paper, we mainly focus on the simplest single-item environment. One seller
has a single item to sell, among n potential buyers. Each buyer i ∈ [n] has valuation drawn from
distribution Fi. Therefore, an instance is described by a n distributions {Fi}ni=1. We would study
these distributions in great detail. In particular, we make use of three mathematically equivalent
formats to describe the distributions. In the following three subsections, we will introduce them
and some related notations one-by-one.
2.1 CDF and PDF
The most natural way to describe distributions is their cumulative density function (CDF) and
probability density function (PDF).
• Fi: cumulative density function (CDF) of a distribution. For convenience, we would as-
sume that cumulative density function Fi is left-continuous
5 (rather than right-continuous,
as usual). When without ambiguity, we also use Fi to denote the corresponding distribution.
• fi: probability density function (PDF) of a distribution. By assuming that distribution Fi is
regular, soon after we will see (1) the support is a single closed interval; and (2) there exists
at most one probability-mass (which must be the support-supremum, if exists). Hence, we
can safely assume that probability density function fi is well-defined and left-continuous.
We introduce some more useful notions for distribution Fi as follows. (see Figure 1(a) for demon-
stration).
• ui ∈ (0,∞]: support-supremum of distribution Fi. Note that ui can be infinity.
• vi ∈ argmax
{
p · (1− Fi(p)) : p ∈ (0,∞]} ∈ (0,∞]. If there are multiple alternative vi’s, we
break ties by choosing the greatest one. Clearly, vi can also be infinity, yet cannot exceed ui.
• qi
def
= 1− Fi(vi) ∈ [0, 1].
To interpret these notions intuitively, consider a single-item auction: the seller posts price p for
the item, and a single buyer with value drawn from distribution Fi decides whether to buy. Since
then, ui is the greatest possible value (of the buyer); vi is the revenue-optimal price (posted by the
seller), termed the monopoly-price; qi is the selling probability corresponding to monopoly-price vi,
termed monopoly-quantile. We can easily check that qi = 0 iff vi = ui =∞.
2.2 Regularity and Virtual Value
Conventionally, regularity is elaborated by the notion of virtual value: given CDF Fi, suppose that
its PDF fi is well-defined on p ∈ (0,∞), and further define virtual value function6
Φi(p)
def
= p− 1− Fi(p)
fi(p)
∀p ∈ (0,∞].
5That is, with random variable x drawn from the underlying distribution, Fi(p) = Pr
{
x < p
}
.
6When Fi(p) = 1 and fi(p) = 0, we let
1−Fi(p)
fi(p)
= 0. When Fi(p) < 1 and fi(p) = 0, we let
1−Fi(p)
fi(p)
=∞.
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Denote by Reg the set of regular distributions. By standard notion [35], distribution Fi is regular
(namely Fi ∈ Reg) iff its virtual value function Φi is non-decreasing on p ∈ (0,∞]. As a result, for
a regular distribution Fi ∈ Reg, we know7
(a): The support must be a single closed interval;
(b): There exists at most one probability-mass (which must be the support-supremum, if exists).
Given the monotonicity of virtual value function Φi, we define its inverse function as follows:
Φ−1i (p)
def
= argmax
{
x ∈ (0,∞] : Φi(x) ≤ p
} ∀p ∈ (0,∞].
One may notice that this function is supported on positive virtual values. Indeed, to compute the
revenue from Myerson Auction, only positive virtual values are involved (see Fact 1 in Section 2.4),
due to which we adopt this way of definition.
Further, we introduce virtual value CDF Di of this distribution:
Di(p) = Fi
(
Φ−1i (p)
) ∀p ∈ (0,∞].
By definition, we know that8 Φi(v
+
i ) ≥ 0 and Di(p) = 1 − qi for all p ∈
(
0,Φi(v
+
i )
]
, which are
illustrated in Figure 1(b). Clearly, an equivalent condition for regularity is that the virtual value
CDF is well-defined.
Essentially, value CDF Fi can be transformed to virtual value CDF Di, and vice versa. The
above arguments capture one-side transformation (since virtual value function Φi is given by Fi).
The other-side transformation is relatively unintuitive, and is deferred to Fact 6.2 in Appendix A.
Fi(p)
p
vi
1
0
1− qi
(a) value CDF
Di(p)
p
Φi(v
+
i ) Φi(ui)
1
0
1− qi
(b) virtual value CDF
ri(q)
q
0 1qi
viqi
ri(0)
(c) revenue-quantile curve
Figure 1: Demonstrations for value CDF, virtual value CDF and revenue-quantile curve.
2.3 Revenue-Quantile Curve
Equivalently, to depict the whole distribution, one can use revenue-quantile curve ri(q) that takes
a quantile q ∈ [0, 1] as input, and outputs corresponding revenue (see Figure 1(c) for illustration).
Formally, we have ri(0) = lim
p→∞p ·
(
1− Fi(p)
)
and
ri(q) = q ·max
{
p ∈ (0,∞] : Fi(p) ≤ 1− q
} ∀q ∈ (0, 1].
7For Fact (a), assume to the contrary that the support contains two closed intervals [p1, p2] and [p3, p4], where
0 < p1 < p2 < p3 < p4 <∞. When p ∈ (p1, p2), definitely Φi(p) is finite. When p ∈ (p2, p3), we have Fi(p) < 1 and
fi(p) = 0, which means Φi(p) is negative infinity. This violates the monotonicity of Φi. Similarly, Fact (b) can be
verified by contradiction (respect the monotonicity of Φi).
8Throughout the paper, for any function g, we use g(p+) to denote the right limit of g at p, i.e., lim
x→p+
g(x).
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For brevity, we might interchange notations Fi, Di and ri(q) to denote an underlying distribution.
By standard notion, an equivalent condition for regularity is that revenue-quantile curve ri(q)
is continuous and concave on q ∈ [0, 1]. Clearly, both properties together imply that
• ri(q) is left-/right-differentiable at any q ∈ (0, 1), and is right-differentiable at q = 0, and is
left-differentiable at q = 1;
• By standard notion, the virtual value at p = ri(q)
/
q is precisely the right-derivative of ri(q).
Formally, Φi
(
ri(q)
/
q
)
= ∂+ri(q), for all q ∈ [0, 1);
• Respecting the semi-differentiability of ri(q), we can safely assume that PDF fi is well-defined
(recall that Φi(p) = p− 1−Fi(p)fi(p) ).
Later, we will interchange all equivalent definitions of regularity, whenever one is more convenient
for our use. In terms of revenue-quantile curve ri(q), support-supremum ui, monopoly-price vi and
monopoly-quantile qi can be re-defined as follows:
• ui
def
= lim
q→0+
ri(q)
q
: clearly, support-supremum ui =∞ when ri(0) > 0.
• qi ∈ argmax
{
ri(q) : q ∈ [0, 1]
}
: recall that qi is the quantile at monopoly-price vi. If there
are multiple alternative qi’s, we break ties by choosing the smallest one.
• vi
def
= ri(qi)
qi
: we know monopoly-price vi is the greatest one among the alternatives, because
ri(q) is concave, and qi is the smallest alternative one.
Clearly, a concave revenue-quantile curve ri(q) can be converted into value CDF Fi and virtual
value CDF Di, and vice versa. In Appendix A, we formalize this statement as Fact 5 and Fact 6,
and then obtain a structural result (i.e., Main Lemma 4) that will be useful in Section 5.5.
2.4 Mechanisms
Until Section 6, we always concentrate on single-item environment, where n buyers draw bids9
{bi}ni=1 independently from distributions {Fi}ni=1 ∈ Regn. Furthermore, we explore revenue gap
between the following two families of mechanisms.
Anonymous Posted-Pricing (AP). In such a mechanism, the seller posts the same price of
p ∈ [0,∞] for all buyers. The item is allocated if there exists a buyer i bidding bi ≥ p (and remains
unsold if no such buyers exist), and the buyer who gets the item pays the posted-price p. It is easy
to see that the expected revenue from such mechanism is
AP
(
p, {Fi}ni=1
) def
= p ·
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Fi(p)
)
.
Among all such mechanisms, we abuse AP
({Fi}ni=1) def= max{AP(p, {Fi}ni=1) : p ∈ [0,∞]} to
denote the optimal revenue. When term {Fi}ni=1 is clear from the context, we would drop that for
notational simplicity (the same below for OPT).
9The posted-price strategy (concerned here) and all other mechanisms studied in this paper are truthful, and
therefore each buyer always bids his true value.
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Myerson Auction (OPT). Given a regular instance {Fi}ni=1 ∈ Regn, Myerson Auction runs
as follows10: After receiving bids {bi}ni=1, the seller first calculates virtual values {Φi(bi)}ni=1, and
then allocates the item to the buyer with highest virtual value that is at least 0, and charges this
buyer with a threshold bid (for the buyer to keep winning). If no buyer has non-negative virtual
values, the seller would withhold the item, and charge nothing.
Indeed, an allocation rule and a payment rule compose a mechanism. For a truthful single-item
mechanism (e.g., Myerson Auction), it is well-known [35] that the allocation rule is monotone11,
and the payment rule satisfies the property from Lemma 1 in the below.
Lemma 1 (Myerson Lemma [35]). Given a monotone allocation rule x(·), there exists a unique
payment rule pi(·) such that the mechanism is truthful:
πi(b) =
∫ bi
0
z · dxi(z, b−i) ∀i ∈ [n], ∀b ∈ Rn+.
Equipped with this structural result, we capture the revenue from Myerson Auction in Fact 1
(whose proof is deferred to Appendix A.1), in the concerned setting with regular distributions12.
Fact 1 (Characterization). Given a regular instance {Fi}ni=1 ∈ Regn,
OPT
({Fi}ni=1) = n∑
i=1
ri(0) +
∫ ∞
0
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx.
Thus far, we can easily formulate the revenue gap between OPT and AP as Program (P0) in
the below: the constraint on p ∈ [0, 1] always holds, and thus is dropped.
max
{Fi}ni=1∈Regn
OPT =
n∑
i=1
ri(0) +
∫ ∞
0
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx (P0)
subject to: AP(p) = p ·
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Fi(p)
)
≤ 1 ∀p ∈ (1,∞] (C0)
2.5 Lower-Bound Instance
As a subset of regular distributions Reg, the family of triangular distributions Tri (introduced by
Alaei et al. [4]) is also used in this paper, serving to construct worst-case instances. Previously,
with a triangular instance (i.e., Example 1), Jin et al. [32] gave a lower bound of Program (P0)
that matches to our Theorem 1. In the following, we present these notion and example.
10For a general instance, Myerson Auction can be more complicated, and randomization can be necessary.
11That is, in the specific mechanism, the winner keeps to win after unilaterally increasing his bid.
12For general distributions, all Di’s in Fact 1 should be replaced by the virtual value CDF’s after ironing [35].
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ri(q)
q
1qi
viqi
0
(a) Revenue-quantile curve
Fi(p)
p
vi
1
0
1− qi
(b) Value CDF
Figure 2: Demonstration of triangular distributions
Triangular Distributions. Parameterized by ui = vi ∈ (0,∞] and qi ∈ [0, 1], a triangular
distribution Tri(vi, qi)’s CDF is defined as:
Fi(p) =
{
p·(1−qi)
p·(1−qi)+viqi ∀p ∈ [0, vi]
1 ∀p ∈ (vi,∞)
Intuitively, as Figure 2(a) conveys, the revenue-quantile curve of Tri(vi, qi) looks like a triangle.
Notice that the lower-bound instance by Jin et al. [32] involves a special triangular distribution13
F0(p) =
p
p+1 , for all p ∈ (0,∞). For brevity, we denote this distribution by Tri(∞).
Lower Bound. For triangular instances, Jin et al. [32] obtained an alternative formula for com-
puting the revenue from Myerson Auction (see Fact 2). With a sophisticated triangular instance
(i.e., Example 1), they established a lower bound of C∗ ≈ 2.62 for Program (P0) (see Theorem 3).
Fact 2 ([32]). For any triangular instance {Tri(vi, qi)}ni=1 that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn,
OPT
({Tri(vi, qi)}ni=1) = n∑
i=1
viqi ·
i−1∏
j=1
(1− qi).
Example 1 ([32]). Given ǫ ∈ (0, 1), let a def= Q−1 (ln 8
ǫ
)
> 1, b
def
= 8
ǫ
and δ
def
= b−a
n
. Define triangular
instance {Tri(∞)} ∪ {Tri(vi, qi)}n+1i=1 as, for each i ∈ [n+ 1],
vi = b− (i− 1) · δ qi = R(vi)−R(vi−1)
vi +R(vi)−R(vi−1) .
Theorem 3 ([32]). Consider the triangular instance in Example 1. When n ∈ N+ is sufficiently
large, AP
({Tri(∞)} ∪ {Tri(vi, qi)}n+1i=1 ) ≤ 1 and further,
C∗ ≥ OPT({Tri(∞)} ∪ {Tri(vi, qi)}n+1i=1 ) = 1 + n+1∑
i=1
viqi ·
i−1∏
j=1
(1− qi) ≥ C∗ − ǫ.
3 Proof Overview: Reductions and Optimizations
Our main result is obtained by solving Program (P0). In this section, we would outline the proof
of Theorem 1, and more details are deferred to Section 4, Section 5 and appendices.
13CDF F0(p) =
p
p+1
corresponds to revenue-quantile curve r0(q) = 1− q, for all q ∈ [0, 1].
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3.1 Transforming Program (P0) into Program (P1)
We first propose several reductions among feasible instances of Program (P0). As a consequence,
the optimal objective value of Program (P0) is upper-bounded by that of Program (P1).
max
{Fi}ni=1∈Regn
OPT = 2 +
∫ ∞
1
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx (P1)
subject to: vi > 1 and Φi(v
+
i ) ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ [n] (C1)
n∑
i=1
ln
(
1 + p · 1− Fi(p)
Fi(p)
)
≤ R(p) def= p ln
(
p2
p2 − 1
)
∀p ∈ (1,∞) (C2)
Special Buyer {Tri(1, 1)}. Given a feasible instance {Fi}ni=1 of Program (P0), we would enroll
a special buyer Tri(1, 1), that is, Fn+1(p) = Dn+1(p) =
{
0 ∀p ∈ (0, 1]
1 ∀p ∈ (1,∞) . Afterwards,
• The objective value of Program (P0) increases to 1 +
n∑
i=1
ri(0) +
∫ ∞
1
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx;
• Constraint (C0) still holds, since adding Fn+1 has no effect on constraint (C0).
With this special buyer being recruited, each other buyer can contribute to the objective of
Program (P0) only if his virtual value strictly exceeds 1. Using the idea developed in [4] to “tailor”
distributions, we formalize this statement as Lemma 2 (whose proof is deferred to Section 4.1).
Clearly, Lemma 2.1 corresponds to constraint (C1). For notational brevity, we will not explicitly
mention this special buyer Tri(1, 1) from now on.
Lemma 2. In a feasible instance {Tri(1, 1)}⋃{Fi}ni=1 of Program (P0), w.l.o.g. for all i ∈ [n],
1. If qi > 0, then ∂+ri(q) > 1 for all q ∈ [0, qi), vi = ri(qi)qi > 1 and Φi(v
+
i ) = lim
q→q−
i
∂+ri(q) ≥ 1;
2. ri(q) is increasing on q ∈ [0, qi], and ri(q) = ri(qi)1−qi · (1− q) when q ∈ [qi, 1].
Special Buyer {Tri(∞)}. We continue to explore worst-case instances of Program (P0), and
thus obtain the following lemma (for which we will give a sketched proof in Section 4.2). From now
on, we will not explicitly mention this special buyer Tri(∞) anywhere except for Section 4.
Main Lemma 1. In a worst-case instance {Fi}ni=0 of Program (P0), w.l.o.g.
1. F0(p) =
p
p+1 for all p ∈ (0,∞), that is, r0(q) = 1− q for all q ∈ [0, 1];
2. ri(0) = 0 for all i ∈ [n].
Getting Program (P1). Equipped with Main Lemma 1, to investigate a worst-case instance
{Fi}ni=0, we can safely rewrite Program (P0) as follows:
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• The objective value of Program (P0) becomes 2 +
∫ ∞
1
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx, which is exactly
same to that of Program (P1);
• Constraint (C0) becomes p ·
(
1− p
p+1 ·
n∏
i=1
Fi(p)
)
≤ 1, or equivalently,
−
n∑
i=1
lnFi(p) =
n∑
i=1
ln
(
1 +
1− Fi(p)
Fi(p)
)
≤ ln
(
p2
p2 − 1
)
∀p ∈ (1,∞). (C3)
We would use a trick exploited in [4] to relax constraint (C3). Clearly, ln
(
1 + x
p
)
≥ 1
p
· ln(1+x)
for all p > 1 and x ≥ 0. Applying this to constraint (C3), we acquire constraint (C2). Hitherto, it
suffices to conquer Program (P1) instead of Program (P0).
3.2 Continuous Instance
Our next step is to solve Program (P1). In fact, we have an optimal solution for that. We first
introduce this solution and then prove its optimality. Besides, a guiding notion here refers to what
we call continuous instance: the worst-case instance of Program (P1) also falls into this family.
Before defining continuous instance, let us recall two functions (appeared in Program (P1) and
Theorem 1, respectively): R(p) = p ln
(
p2
p2−1
)
and Q(p) = ln
(
p2
p2−1
)
− 12Li2
(
1
p2
)
. It turns out that
these two functions are naturally correlated, based on the following mathematical facts (the proofs
are deferred in Appendix B.2).
Lemma 3 (partially proved in [32]). For R(p) = p ln
(
p2
p2−1
)
and Q(p) = ln
(
p2
p2−1
)
− 12Li2
(
1
p2
)
,
1. R′(p) = p · Q′(p), R′(p) < Q′(p) < 0 and R′′(p) > 0, for all p ∈ (1,∞);
2. R(∞) = Q(∞) = 0 and R(1+) = Q(1+) =∞;
3. 1
p
≤ R(p) ≤ 1
p−1 and
1
p2
≤ |R′(p)| ≤ 1
p2−p , for all p ∈ (1,∞).
Next, let us define a continuous instance Cont(γ), with parameter γ ∈ [1,∞). Intuitively, it is
defined to be an instance with infinitely many triangular distributions where the constraint is tight
for all choices of p ≥ γ. A formal definition is shown in Definition 1, from which we know Cont(γ)
satisfies both constraints in Program (P1). In particular, constraint (C2) is tight in the range of
p ∈ (γ,∞).
Definition 1. Given γ ∈ [1,∞) and m ∈ N+, triangular instance {Tri(vi, qi)}n2i=1 satisfies that
• vi = γ + n− i−1n , for all i ∈ [n2]. For notational simplicity, let v0
def
= ∞;
•
i∑
j=1
ln
(
1 + viqi1−qi
)
= R(vi), that is, qi = e
R(vi)−R(vi−1)−1
vi+e
R(vi)−R(vi−1)−1 , for all i ∈ [n
2].
When n approaches to infinity, {Tri(vi, qi)}n2i=1 converges to Cont(γ).
The following lemma calibrates the objective function (i.e., the revenue from Myerson Auction)
for continuous instances, and the proof is deferred in Appendix D.
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Lemma 4. OPT(Cont(γ)) = 2 +
∫ ∞
1
(
1− e−Q
(
max{x,γ}
))
dx is decreasing for all γ ∈ [1,∞).
Notably, by assigning γ ← 1 in Lemma 4, we capture the formula in Theorem 1.
3.3 Catching Optimal Solution
A high level idea to prove the optimality of Cont(1) is, that we can covert any a feasible instance
of Program (P1) into some continuous instance Cont(γ̂), without hurting the objective function.
Potential Function. A crucial ingredient used in deriving optimal solution is the potential
function defined as follows. For a regular distribution Fi ∈ Reg, define its potential function
Ψ
(
p, {Fi}
) def
= ln
(
1 + p · 1− Fi(p)
Fi(p)
)
∀p ∈ (0,∞).
For simplicity, we abuse notations as Ψ
({Fi}) def= ln(1 + viqi1−qi) and Ψ(p, {Fi}ni=1) def= n∑
i=1
Ψ
(
p, {Fi}
)
.
As shown in Lemma 5, potential function Ψ
(
p, {Fi}
)
is strictly decreasing on p ∈ [vi, ui], and
remains maximum Ψ
({Fi}) when p ∈ (0, vi], and inherently remains 0 when p ∈ (ui,∞).
Lemma 5. Potential function Ψ
(
p, {Fi}
) def
= ln
(
1 + p · 1−Fi(p)
Fi(p)
)
is strictly decreasing on p ∈ [vi, ui],
and remains ln
(
1 + viqi1−qi
)
when p ∈ (0, vi].
Ψ
(
p, {Fi}
)
p
uiuivi0
Ψ
({Fi})
∆i
(a) Potential function of the existing Fi
Ψ
(
p, {F i}
)
p
ui ≤ uivi = vi0
Ψ
({F i})
(b) Potential function of the new F i
Figure 3: Demonstration for potential-based construction of {F i}ni=1 from {Fi}ni=1
We note that the potential function for a triangular distribution is simply degenerated step
function, and thus the potential argument was not needed in previous papers [4, 32].
Recursive Construction. We adopt the most natural proof plan: construct a list (finite se-
quence) of instances, where the head is the given feasible instance {Fi}ni=1, and the tail is a contin-
uous instance Cont(γ̂). In the middle of the list, we have “hybrid” instances with both continuous
and discrete components. For brevity, in an iteration of the recursive construction, re-denote by
Cont(γ) ∪ {Fi}ni=1 and Cont(γ) ∪ {F i}ni=1 the existing and new instances, respectively. The new
instance Cont(γ) ∪ {F i}ni=1 is acquired as follows:
Discrete-component : The new discrete-component {F i}ni=1 is derived from the existing discrete-
component {Fi}ni=1 in a “uniform” fashion.
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Local-uniformity : As Figure 3 demonstrates, for each i ∈ [n], the new distribution F i is
constructed by uniformly “diminishing” the existing distribution Fi as follows:
Ψ
(
p, {F i}
)
= Ψ
(
p, {Fi}
)−∆i ∀p ∈ (0, ui],
where ∆i ≥ 0 is potential-decrease contributed by this distribution, and ui is support-
supremum of the new distribution F i;
Global-uniformity : Let u and u be support-supremum of {Fi}ni=1 and that of {F i}ni=1, re-
spectively. In fact, the above ∆i’s and ui’s are carefully chosen:
• Each distribution Fi is “strictly diminish” (that is, ∆i > 0) when ui = u; and if so, each
such new distribution F i conformably satisfies that ui = u;
• Support-supremum u of {F i}ni=1 is carefully chosen, so that total potential-decrease
∆
def
=
n∑
i=1
∆i “usually”
14 equals to pre-fixed step-size ∆∗ > 0.
The local-uniformity w.r.t. support-supremum will be formalized as Lemma 16.1 in Sec-
tion 5.3. Moreover, the global-uniformity w.r.t. potential-decrease means that the iteration
terminates in finite iterations. Soon after, we will see these uniformities are crucial for proving
the feasibility and optimality.
Continuous-component : The new continuous-component Cont(γ) is obtained by “augmenting”
the continuous-component existing Cont(γ), so as to “offset” influences (on the constraints
and objective value of Program (P1)) caused by “diminishing” the discrete-component.
Main Remarks. The benefit from such recursive and potential-based construction (refer to the
involved “uniformities”, in particular) is twofold. To see so, let us first rewrite constraint (C2) for
the existing instance Cont(γ) ∪ {Fi}ni=1:
R(max{p, γ}) +Ψ(p, {Fi}ni=1) ≤ R(p) ∀p ∈ (1,∞) (C2)
Observe that “augmenting” continuous-component is just to “offset” the slack of constraint (C2)
caused by “diminishing” discrete-component. Based on the local-uniformity and global-uniformity,
it is not hard to see that the new instance Cont(γ) ∪ {F i}ni=1 also satisfies constraint (C2).
Additionally, the global-uniformity w.r.t. support-supremum (cooperated with other details)
allows us to decompose an iteration into n simpler processes: In the k-th process,
We only transform one existing distribution Fk into another new distribution F k, and then “aug-
ment” the continuous-component correspondingly.
Afterwards, we can exploit standard tools from mathematical analysis to verify, in each of these
n processes, that the objective value of Program (P1) monotonically increases. By induction, we
conclude that OPT
(
Cont(γ) ∪ {F i}ni=1
) ≥ OPT(Cont(γ) ∪ {Fi}ni=1).
4 Main Proof: Reduction Part
In this and the next section, we will implement the aforementioned proof plan. We will describe most
proof ideas and proof steps with sufficient details. To improve the readability, however, verifications
14When potential-decrease ∆ (in a specific iteration) is less than step-size ∆∗, at least one Fi will become vanishing
(that is, Ψ
(
{F i}
)
= 0). Clearly, this special case happens at most n times. More details will be provided soon after.
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of a few lemmas (those extremely technically involved ones) are postponed to appendices. This is
why we call these two sections “Main Proof”.
4.1 Proof of Lemma 2
[Lemma 2]. In a feasible instance {Fi}n+1i=1 of Program (P0), w.l.o.g. for all i ∈ [n],
1. If qi > 0, then ∂+ri(q) > 1 for all q ∈ [0, qi), vi = ri(qi)qi > 1 and Φi(v
+
i ) = lim
q→q−i
∂+ri(q) ≥ 1;
2. ri(q) is increasing on q ∈ [0, qi], and ri(q) = ri(qi)1−qi · (1− q) when q ∈ [qi, 1].
Proof. For each i ∈ [n], the regularity of Fi implies that revenue-quantile curve ri(q) is concave on
q ∈ [0, 1] (see Section 2.2). As Figure 4 demonstrates, we would “tailor” Fi as follows: In term of
revenue-quantile curve, let15 qi
def
= min{q ∈ [0, qi] : ∂+ri(q) ≤ 1}, and define
ri(q)
def
=
{
ri(q) ∀q ∈ [0, qi]
ri(qi)
1−qi · (1− q) ∀q ∈ (qi, 1]
.
Clearly, ri(q) is also concave on q ∈ [0, 1], and satisfies both claims in the lemma.
ri(q)
q
0 1qi
ri(qi) = viqi
ri(qi)
ri(0)
(a) Original ri(q)
ri(q)
q
0
ri(0)
1qi
ri(qi) = viqi
(b) ri(q) after tailoring
Figure 4: Demonstration for reduction in Lemma 2.
It remains to confirm the feasibility and optimality of {F i}ni=1
⋃{Fn+1}. Recall the reductions
between a CDF and its revenue-quantile curve (see Fact 5). For each i ∈ [n], the concavity of ri(q)
implies that ri(q) ≤ ri(q) for all q ∈ [0, 1] and thus, F i(p) ≥ Fi(p) for all p ∈ (0,∞). Therefore,
AP(p, {F i}ni=1
⋃
{Fn+1}) ≤ AP(p, {Fi}n+1i=1 ) ≤ 1,
for all p ∈ (0,∞). On the other hand, we surely have ri(0) = ri(0), and can infer from Fact 5.2
that Di(p) = Di(p) for all p ∈ (1,∞). Hence,
OPT
({F i}ni=1⋃{Fn+1}) =1 + n∑
i=1
ri(0) +
∫ ∞
1
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx
=1 +
n∑
i=1
ri(0) +
∫ ∞
1
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx = OPT
({Fi}n+1i=1 ).
This completes the proof of the lemma.
15We know ∂+ri(qi) ≤ 0 < 1, in that qi = argmax{ri(q) : q ∈ [0, 1]}. Therefore, qi = min{q ∈ [0, qi] : ∂+ri(q) ≤ 1}
must be well-defined in [0, qi].
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4.2 Proof Plan of Main Lemma 1
The proof of Main Lemma 1 consists of the following three parts.
[Main Lemma 1]. In a worst-case instance {Fi}ni=0 of Program (P0), w.l.o.g.
1. F0(p) =
p
p+1 for all p ∈ (0,∞), that is, r0(q) = 1− q for all q ∈ [0, 1];
2. ri(0) = 0 for all i ∈ [n].
Step I: Special Buyer {F0}. Our first step is to show, in the worst-case instance, that w.l.o.g.
there is at most one buyer with monopoly-quantile of 0.
Provided with a feasible instance {Fi}ni=1, let Ω def= {i ∈ [n] : qi = 0}. Based on Lemma 2, for
each i ∈ Ω, we can assume w.l.o.g. that
ri(q) = ri(0) · (1− q) ∀q ∈ [0, 1] Fi(p) = p
p+ ri(0)
∀p ∈ (0,∞).
Define r0(0)
def
=
∑
i∈Ω
ri(0), and F0(p)
def
= p
p+r0(0)
for all p ∈ (0,∞). Now consider {F0} ∪ {Fi}i∈[n]\Ω:
• Optimality : OPT
({F0} ∪ {Fi}i∈[n]\Ω) = OPT({Fi}ni=1), since r0(0) = ∑
i∈Ω
ri(0), and
Di(p) = 1 ∀p ∈ (0,∞), ∀i ∈ {0} ∪ Ω;
• Feasibility : AP
(
p, {F0} ∪ {Fi}i∈[n]\Ω
) ≤ AP(p, {Fi}ni=1) for all p ∈ (0,∞), in that
F0(p) =
(
1 +
r0(0)
p
)−1
=
(
1 +
1
p
·
∑
i∈Ω
ri(0)
)−1
≥
∏
i∈Ω
(
1 +
1
p
· ri(0)
)−1
=
∏
i∈Ω
Fi(p).
By Lemma 2 and the above reduction, w.l.o.g. in a worst-case instance {Fi}ni=0,
1. With some r0(0) ∈ [0, 1], we have r0(q) = r0(0) · (1− q) for all q ∈ [0, 1];
2. For each i ∈ [n], we have qi > 0, ∂+ri(q) > 1 for all q ∈ [0, qi), vi = ri(qi)qi > 1.
Step II: Auxiliary Property. The second and third steps are devoted to showing that r0(0) = 1
(i.e., F0 = Tri(∞)) in a worst-case instance. Towards that, we prove certain technical properties
of a worst-case instance (in a straightforward way): Assuming a given instance violates a certain
property, we explicitly construct a new instance that (1) satisfies the property; and (2) keeps the
revenue gap between OPT and AP.
Alaei et al. [4] studied the revenue gap between ex-ante relaxation and anonymous pricing, and
the special buyer F0 = Tri(∞) also appears in a worst-case instance of that problem. Compared
with their proof, however, ours is significantly more involved and technical16.
To offer intuitions, we illustrate several most important constructions here, and leave rigorous
proofs to Appendix C. The following property is a major ingredient of our proof.
16Alaei et al. [4] also modeled the “ex-ante relaxation vs. anonymous pricing” problem as a program. Observing
special structures of that program (i.e., special structures of ex-ante relaxation), they proved that the worst case
must be a triangular instance. As mentioned before, provided with two parameters vi and qi, it suffices to present
a triangular distribution Tri(vi, qi). By contrast, to define a regular distribution Fi pointwisely (interpreted as an
abstract function), infinity parameters are required.
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Lemma 6. There exists a worst-case instance {Fi}ni=0 of Program (P0), such that for all i ∈ [n]
with ri(0) > 0,
∂+ri(0) > 1 + r0(0).
Proof (Sketch). Assume to the contrary: ∃k ∈ [n] such that rk(0) > 0 and ∂+rk(0) ≤ 1+ r0(0). We
would construct two new distributions F 0 and F k (in terms of revenue-quantile curves r0 and rk),
to replace the original distributions F0 and Fk.
• Define r0(q)
def
=
(
r0(0) + rk(0)
) · (1− q) for all q ∈ [0, 1];
• Define qk
def
= qk and rk(q)
def
=
{
rk(q)− rk(0) ∀q ∈ [0, qk]
rk(qk)−rk(0)
1−qk · (1− q) ∀q ∈ (qk, 1]
, as Figure 5 illustrates.
rk(q)
q0
rk(qk)
qk
rk(0) > 0
1
(a) Original rk(q)
rk(q)
qrk(0) = 0
rk(qk)
qk = qk 1
(b) rk(q) after reduction
Figure 5: Demonstrations for the construction in Lemma 6
The feasibility of the new instance, i.e., AP
(
p, {F 0}
⋃{F k}⋃{Fi}i∈[n]\{k}) ≤ 1 when p ∈ (1,∞],
is provided in Appendix C.1. Besides, we have OPT
({F 0}⋃{F k}⋃{Fi}i∈[n]\{k}) = OPT({Fi}ni=0).
• The integration part of OPT remains the same: “Chop” rk(0) from the k-th revenue-quantile
curve – this has no affect on the k-th virtual value CDF, in whole integrating range of (1,∞)
(refer to all positive virtual values, as Figure 5 suggests);
• The summation part of OPT also remains the same: The loss of rk(0) incurred by “chopping”
the k-th distribution is precisely compensated by “filling up” the special 0-th distribution.
We shall emphasize, after such reduction, that
n∑
i=0
ri(0) remains the same, whereas r0(0) increases
strictly. These facts will be useful for later proofs.
Step III: Case Analyses. In the rest of Section 4, we always assume the property from Lemma 6.
Towards Main Lemma 1, our final step refers to case analyses, based on the value of r0(0). Specif-
ically, we provide different construction schemes when r0(0) ≤ 1√3 and when r0(0) ≥
1
2 .
Lemma 7. There exists a worst-case instance {Fi}ni=0 of Program (P0) such that r0(0) > 1√3 .
Lemma 8. Given a feasible instance {Fi}ni=0 of Program (P0) that r0(0) ≥ 12 , there exists another
feasible instance {F i}ni=0 such that OPT
({F i}ni=0) ≥ OPT({Fi}ni=0), and
r0(q) = 1− q ∀q ∈ [0, 1] ri(0) = 0 ∀i ∈ [n].
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Note that 1√
3
> 12 , combining both lemmas together leads to Main Lemma 1 immediately.
Assuming the property from Lemma 6, we will outline how to settle the first case (i.e., Lemma 7)
in Section 4.3. Furthermore, the proof of the second case (i.e., Lemma 8) is of the same spirit as
that of Lemma 6, and is deferred to Appendix C.3.
4.3 Proof Plan of Lemma 7
To conquer Lemma 7, we shall define a useful parameter17:
β
({Fi}ni=0) def= max{p ∈ (1,∞] : AP(p, {Fi}ni=0) = 1}.
For brevity, we often drop the term {Fi}ni=0, when there is no ambiguity from the context. Recall
Lemma 2.1 that vi > 1 for all i ∈ [n]. The following lemmas are proved in Appendix C.2.
Lemma 9. AP
(
p, {Fi}ni=0
)
is strictly increasing, when 1 < p < min
{
vi : i ∈ [n]
}
.
Lemma 10. lim
p→∞AP
(
p, {Fi}ni=0
)
=
n∑
i=0
ri(0).
In a worst-case instance {Fi}ni=0 of Program (P0), definitely max
{
AP(p) : p ∈ (1,∞]} = 1, as
otherwise we can always scale up all distributions. Based on Lemma 9, max
{
AP(p) : p ∈ (1,∞]}
is reached when p = β ≥ min{vi : i ∈ [n]} > 1 (notice that the maximizer β can be infinity).
Hence, β must be well-defined (can be infinity). By definition we have AP(β) = 1 and further,
• When β ∈ (1,∞), the feasibility to constraint (C0) ensures ∂+AP(β) ≤ 0 and ∂−AP(β) ≥ 0;
• When β =∞, it follows from Lemma 10 that
n∑
i=0
ri(0) = AP(∞) = AP(β) = 1.
Case I (when β <∞): This case is a bit strange since the constraint of AP(p) ≤ 1 is not tight
for p > β. Intuitively, one can slightly increase the distribution for p > β so that the constraint
of AP(p) ≤ 1 is still satisfied while the objective function is strictly increased. This seems always
possible. The only reason that we cannot do this is due to the hidden constraint that the distribu-
tions are regular. This motivates the following notion of critical instance in Definition 2. The first
condition for criticality means, for each i ∈ [n] with Fi(β) < 1, that revenue-quantile curve ri(q) is
a line segment18 on q ∈ [0, 1 − Fi(β)] (this range refers to all values p ∈ [β,∞]).
Definition 2. A critical instance {Fi}ni=0 is feasible, has well-defined and finite β, and satisfies:
1. ∀(i ∈ [n]: Fi(β) < 1), ∃ai > 1, ∃bi ≥ 0: Fi(p) = 1− bip−ai for all p ∈ (β,∞);
2. ∂+AP
(
β
)
= 0.
Case I.1 (when {Fi}ni=0 is non-critical): Given that β ∈ (1,∞), indeed we can transform any
a non-critical instance into another critical instance, or an instance with β = ∞, while preserve
the property from Lemma 6.
17Each regular distribution Fi has at most one probability-mass (which must be support-supremum ui if exists).
Therefore, function AP(p) is continuous when p is sufficiently large. We define β
def
= ∞ when lim
p→∞
AP(p) = 1.
18In terms of notations in Definition 2, we have ri(q) = ai · q + bi for all q ∈ [0, 1− Fi(β)].
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• Suppose the first condition for criticality fails: There exists k ∈ [n] with qβ def= 1−Fk(β) > 0,
so that revenue-quantile curve rk(q) is not a line segment (yet still concave) on q ∈ [0, qβ ].
Given ∆r > 0, as Figure 6(a) demonstrates, there is a unique line segment rk(q) such that
(1) rk(0) = rk(0) + ∆r; and (2) rk(q) is tangent to rk(q) at
(
qβ, rk(qβ)
)
, for some qβ > 0. In
the range of q ∈ (qβ, 1], we further define rk(q) def= rk(q). Interpreted as a revenue-quantile
curve, rk(q) corresponds to some distribution F k.
We shall find the maximum ∆r > 0 such that AP
(
p, {F0} ∪ {F k} ∪ {Fi}i∈[n]\{k}
) ≤ 1 for all
p ∈ (1,∞]. Such ∆r and rk(q) always exist, which can be inferred from the following facts19.
(a): rk(q) is not a line segment (yet still concave) on q ∈ [0, qβ ].
(b): Given p ∈ (β,∞], AP(p, {Fi}ni=0) is strictly smaller than 1, due to the definition of β.
(c): AP
(
β, {Fi}ni=0
)
= 1.
Since rk(q) ≥ rk(q) for all q ∈ [0, 1], distribution F k stochastically dominates distribution Fk.
Hence, after replacing Fk by F k, we know (1) the revenue from OPT can never decrease; and
(2)
n∑
i=0
ri(0) strictly increases by ∆r > 0.
• Otherwise, the second condition for criticality fails, yet the first holds: ∂+AP
(
β
) 6= 0, and for
all i ∈ [n] with Fk(β) < 1, revenue-quantile curve rk(q) is a line segment on q ∈ [0, 1−Fk(β)].
Once again, we can find a distribution F k such that, after replacing Fk by F k, (1) the revenue
from OPT can never decrease; and (2)
n∑
i=0
ri(0) strictly increases by ∆r > 0.
To see so, we shall notice that20 ∂+AP(β) < 0 and ∂+AP(β) ≥ 0. In other words, there exists
k ∈ [n] such that qβ def= 1− Fk(β) > 0 and ∂+Fk(β) > ∂−Fk(β).
In terms of revenue-quantile curve, we have ∂+rk(qβ) < ∂−rk(qβ), as Figure 6(b) suggests.
As per this, the existence of desired distribution F k comes from same arguments as before.
rk(q)
q
0 1
rk(q)
qk
rk(qβ) = rk(qβ)
qβ
rk(0)
rk(qβ) = rk(qβ)
qβ
rk(0) = rk(0) + ∆r
(a) When the first condition for criticality fails
rk(q)
q
0 1
rk(q)
qk
rk(0)
rk(qβ) = rk(qβ)
qβ
rk(0) = rk(0) + ∆r
(b) When the first condition for criticality holds
Figure 6: Demonstration for the reduction from a non-critical instance to a critical instance
19Combining facts (a,b) together implies the existence of candidates ∆r > 0. Also, combine facts (a,c) together,
the maximum ∆r = rk(0) − rk(0) is no more than rk(qβ) − ∂+rk(qβ) · qβ − rk(0). Note that line segment rk(q) is
tangent to rk(q) at
(
qβ , rk(qβ)
)
, when rk(0) = rk(qβ)− ∂+rk(qβ) · qβ .
20As mentioned before, ∂+AP(β) ≤ 0 and ∂+AP(β) ≥ 0, based on the feasibility to constraint (C0). Moreover,
since the second condition for criticality fails, we have ∂+AP(β) 6= 0.
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After replacing Fk by the above F k, possible ∂+rk(0) ≤ 1 + r0(0), which violates the property
from Lemma 6. In this case, we further apply the reduction involved in Lemma 6 (to the k-th
distribution). Afterwards, as mentioned before,
n∑
i=0
ri(0) remains same, yet r0(0) increases strictly.
To sum up, each of the above reductions brings greater
n∑
i=0
ri(0) and greater r0(0), where one
quantity increases strictly. On the other hand,
n∑
i=0
ri(0) = AP
(∞, {Fi}ni=0) ≤ 1 and r0(0) ≤ 1√321.
Thus, the procedure (invoking the above reductions) will converge, and bring either (1) a critical
instance {Fi}ni=0 (see Case I.2); or (2) an instance {Fi}ni=0 with β =∞ (see Case II).
Case I.2 (when {Fi}ni=0 is critical): Given that β ∈ (1,∞), we are left to investigate all
critical instances. When a critical instance {Fi}ni=0 satisfies the property from Lemma 6, the fol-
lowing lemma (whose proof is deferred to Appendix C.4) implies that r0(0) >
1√
3
in the worst case.
Lemma 11. Given a critical instance {Fi}ni=0 of Program (P0) that satisfies the property from
Lemma 6 (i.e., ∂+ri(0) > 1 + r0(0) for all i ∈ [n] with ri(0) > 0), then r0(0) > 1√3 .
Case II (when β =∞): In this case, as mentioned before, constraint (C0) is tight when p goes
to infinity:
n∑
i=0
ri(0) = AP(∞) = AP(β) = 1. Given this, we testify Lemma 12 in Appendix C.5,
and thus narrow down the feasible space of Program (P0). Apparently, respect the property from
Lemma 6, an instance {Fi}ni=0 with r0(0) ≤ 1√3 and
n∑
i=0
ri(0) = 1 can never be feasible.
Lemma 12. Given a feasible instance {Fi}ni=0 of Program (P0) that
n∑
i=0
ri(0) = 1 and satisfies the
property from Lemma 6 (i.e., ∂+ri(0) > 1 + r0(0) for all i ∈ [n] with ri(0) > 0), then r0(0) > 1√3 .
To sum up, putting the above Case I and Case II (Lemma 11 and Lemma 12 essentially)
together completes the proof of Lemma 7.
5 Main Proof: Optimization Part
In the optimization part of the main proof, we are provided with Program (P1), which is rewritten
as fellow. For convenience, constraint (C2) is reformulated in terms of potential functions. Recall
that Ψ
(
p, {Fi}
)
= ln
(
1 + p · 1−Fi(p)
Fi(p)
)
and R(p) = p ln
(
p2
p2−1
)
, for all p ∈ (0,∞).
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n∑
i=0
ri(0) = AP
(
∞, {Fi}
n
i=0
)
≤ 1 is due to Lemma 10 and feasibility to constraint (C0). r0(0) ≤
1√
3
respects the
statement of Lemma 7.
18
max
{Fi}ni=1∈Regn
OPT = 2 +
∫ ∞
1
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx (P1)
subject to: vi > 1 and Φi(v
+
i ) ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ [n] (C1)
Ψ
(
p, {Fi}ni=1
)
=
n∑
i=1
Ψ
(
p, {Fi}
) ≤ R(p) ∀p ∈ (1,∞) (C2)
As mentioned in Section 3.3, we adopt the most natural proof plan for solving Program (P1):
construct a list (finite sequence) of instances, where the head is the given feasible instance {Fi}ni=1,
and the tail is a continuous instance Cont(γ̂). This proof plan will be implemented as MAIN
(namely Algorithm 1) in Section 5.1. To convey basic ideas, we would outline the main steps before
introducing MAIN: with given precision ǫ ∈ (0, 1),
(a): For the head instance {Fi}ni=1, we would capture its next instance Cont(γ∗)∪ {F ∗i }ni=1 (see
line (2) to line (5) of MAIN). While being feasible to Program (P1) (see Section 5.2), the
next instance Cont(γ∗) ∪ {F ∗i }ni=1 further possesses three properties:
1. Hybridization: Different from the (discrete instance) head {Fi}ni=1, the next is a mix of
continuous-component Cont(γ∗) and discrete-component {F ∗i }ni=1, and thus is “closer”
to the (continuous instance) tail Cont(γ̂). Notably, γ∗ ≤ 33
ǫ2
is finite (see Lemma 13);
2. Constraint-slack (see inequality (1) in Section 5.2): For discrete-component {F ∗i }ni=1 of
the next instance, let u∗ denote its support-supremum. W.r.t. the next instance, there
is a fixed parameter δ∗ ≥ 132ǫ2 (see Lemma 13) such that, for all p ∈ (1, u∗],
LHS of constraint (C2) ≤ RHS of constraint (C2)− δ∗;
3. Near-optimality (see Section 5.2): OPT
(
next
) ≥ OPT(head)− 5ǫ.
(b): We acquire the remaining list iteratively, by invoking SUBROUTINE (namely Algorithm 2 in
Section 5.3) in line (7) of MAIN. Each remaining instance current is constructed from its
previous instance in a tailor-made way (again, see Section 5.3). Here, we shall stress that a
specific current is feasible to Program (P1), and preserves analogous properties:
1. Hybridization (see Section 5.3): The current is constructed from its previous through
“augmenting” the continuous-component, and “diminishing” the discrete-component.
As a consequence, the current is “closer” to the (continuous instance) tail Cont(γ̂),
compared with its previous;
2. Constraint-slack (see Section 5.4.2): For discrete-component of the current, denote by
u its support-supremum. Our tailor-made construction (see Section 5.3) automatically
respects this property: given the current, in the range of p ∈ (1, u], we have
LHS of constraint (C2) ≤ RHS of constraint (C2)− δ∗;
3. Optimality (see Section 5.5): OPT
(
current
) ≥ OPT(previous).
Suppose that the list of instances is indeed finite (to be affirmed soon after), then SUBROUTINE
returns a (continuous instance) tail Cont(γ̂). Accordingly, applying proof plan (b.3) inductively
gives OPT
(
tail
) ≥ OPT(next) (a.3)≥ OPT(head)− 5ǫ. In other words,
OPT
(
Cont(γ̂)
) ≥ OPT({Fi}ni=1)− 5ǫ.
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(c): Now, we would briefly explain why the list is finite, and defer more details to Section 5.3.
• In each iteration of SUBROUTINE, how we construct a current instance (from its pre-
vious instance) is potential-based (recall Section 3.2 for more details);
• As input of SUBROUTINE, the next instance Cont(γ∗)∪{F ∗i }ni=1 has a finite potential.
On the other hand, the tail instance (if attainable) is of 0-potential. To see the list is
a finite sequence of instances, it suffices to find a suitable and fixed22 step-size ∆∗ > 0,
which prescribes the potential-decrease23 per iteration;
• A workable step-size ∆∗ > 0 is defined in line (6) of MAIN. Such ∆∗ is carefully chosen,
to enable our proof plan (b.3) that OPT
(
current
) ≥ OPT(previous).
• Notably, such ∆∗ is proportional to δ∗, and is inversely proportional to γ∗2. Hence, proof
plan (a.1) and (a.2) are both necessary: to make ∆∗ bounded away from 0+, introduce
continuous-component Cont(γ∗), where γ∗ ≤ 33
ǫ2
, and constraint-slack δ∗ ≥ 132ǫ2.
To sum up, the desired list is finite, ending up with the (continuous instance) tail Cont(γ̂).
The above ideas will be implemented as algorithmMAIN (namely Algorithm 1). Basically, algorithm
MAIN consists of two parts: PREPROCESSING and SUBROUTINE.
• Input : MAIN takes a feasible instance {Fi}ni=1 of Program (P1) and a fixed ǫ > 0 as input;
• Output : MAIN outputs a continuous instance Cont(γ̂) that is provably better than the input
instance {Fi}ni=1 (in terms of the objective value, within 5ǫ-loss);
• PREPROCESSING: with precision ǫ > 0 and input instance {Fi}ni=1, we construct a “hybrid”
instance Cont(γ∗) ∪ {F ∗i }ni=1;
• SUBROUTINE: we construct a finite sequence of instances, and therefore gradually transform
Cont(γ∗)∪{F ∗i }ni=1 into Cont(γ̂). SUBROUTINE is an iterative algorithm: in each iteration,
by invoking algorithm DIMINISH (see Section 5.3), we get a new regular instance that is
feasible to Program (P1), and generates a greater objective value than previous instances;
In Section 5.2, we will prove that Cont(γ∗) ∪ {F ∗i }ni=1 is regular, feasible to Program (P1), and
gives an objective value at least OPT
({Fi}ni=1) − 5ǫ. Further, all proofs about SUBROUTINE are
given in Section 5.3, Section 5.4 and Section 5.5. Particularly, we will show that SUBROUTINE
terminates after finite iterations, and then outputs our final continuous instance Cont(γ̂).
5.1 PREPROCESSING
We first present algorithm MAIN, which invokes algorithm SUBROUTINE at the end. Noticeably,
benefits from the PREPROCESSING part (namely line (1) to line (6) in the below) are threefold:
(1) it introduces a continuous instance Cont(γ∗), incurring only a small loss of objective value;
(2) it gives a uniform upper bound u∗ (depending on ǫ) for supports of all distributions F ∗i ’s; and
(3) it specifies a fixed step-size ∆∗ for algorithm SUBROUTINE, which is helpful in proving that
algorithm SUBROUTINE (and thus algorithm MAIN) terminates in finite time.
22Here, “fixed” means the step-size ∆∗ > 0 only depends on the head instance {Fi}ni=1 and precision ǫ > 0.
23That is, how “closer” (to the tail instance) a current instance is, compared with its previous instance.
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Algorithmus 1 MAIN(ǫ, {Fi}ni=1)
Input: fixed-precision ǫ ∈ (0, 1); feasible instance {Fi}ni=1.
Output: continuous instance Cont(γ̂).
1: Let u∗ def= R−1(ǫ). ⊲ Support-supremum of {F ∗i }ni=1.
2: Define D∗i (p)
def
=

Di
(
1 + ǫ
) ∀p ∈ (0, 1]
Di
(
(1 + ǫ) · p) ∀p ∈ (1, u∗]
1 ∀p ∈ (u∗,∞)
for all i ∈ [n]. ⊲ Discrete-component {F ∗i }ni=1.
3: Let v∗ def= min
{
v∗i : i ∈ [n]
}
and κ∗ def=
n∏
i=1
(1− q∗i ). ⊲ Fixed parameters.
4: Let δ∗ def= 12 ·min
{R(p)−Ψ(p, {F ∗i }ni=1) : p ∈ (1, u∗]}. ⊲ Constraint-slack parameter (fixed).
5: Define γ∗ def= R−1(δ∗). ⊲ Continuous-component Cont(γ∗).
6: Let ∆∗ def= v
∗−1
3γ∗2 · κ∗ · δ∗. ⊲ Step-size parameter (fixed).
7: return Cont(γ̂)
def
= SUBROUTINE
(
∆∗, u∗,Cont(γ∗) ∪ {F ∗i }ni=1
)
.
From Lemma 17 in Section 5.3, we know γ̂ ∈ (1,∞) is well-defined. Here is our overall method:
OPT
({Fi}ni=1)− 5ǫ ≤OPT(Cont(γ∗) ∪ {F ∗i }ni=1) (See Lemma 14 and 15 in Section 5.2)
≤OPT(Cont(γ̂)) (See Lemma 20 in Section 5.5)
≤OPT(Cont(1)). (By Lemma 4, and since γ̂ ∈ (1,∞))
Since ǫ ∈ (0, 1) is fixed before launching algorithmMAIN, we can choose an arbitrary small ǫ ∈ (0, 1),
hence the upper-bound part of Theorem 1: for all feasible instance {Fi}ni=1 of Program (P1),
OPT
({Fi}ni=1) ≤ OPT(Cont(1)) = 2 + ∫ ∞
1
(
1− e−Q(x)
)
dx.
Prior to characterizing the near-optimal hybrid instance Cont(γ∗) ∪ {F ∗i }ni=1, we introduce the
following lemma (whose proof is deferred to Appendix E.1) to measure the quantities defined in
algorithm MAIN, which turns out to be crucial for proving the near-optimality.
Lemma 13. 132ǫ
2 ≤ δ∗ ≤ 12ǫ, and 1 < v∗ ≤ u∗ ≤ γ∗ ≤ 33ǫ2 , and κ∗ ∈ (0, 1], and ∆∗ ∈ (0, δ∗).
5.2 Regularity, Feasibility and Near-Optimality of Cont(γ∗) ∪ {F ∗i }ni=1
We turn to investigate the regularity, feasibility and ǫ-optimality of instance Cont(γ∗) ∪ {F ∗i }ni=1.
Regularity. Recall Definition 1, continuous instance Cont(γ∗) consists of infinite “small” trian-
gular distributions, hence the regularity of Cont(γ∗). We also have {F ∗i }ni=1 ∈ Regn, in that each
D∗i is well-defined on p ∈ (0,∞) (see the equivalent conditions for regularity in Section 2.2).
Feasibility. The feasibility to constraint (C1) is trivial. For continuous instance Cont(γ∗), by
definition it satisfies constraint (C1). For each i ∈ [n], D∗i (p) remains Di(1 + ǫ) when p ∈ (0, 1].
This indicates that Φi(v
+
i ) ≥ 1 and vi > 1, due to the definition of virtual value.
The feasibility to constraint (C2) is given by R(max{p, γ∗}) + Ψ(p, {F ∗i }ni=1) ≤ R(p), for all
p ∈ (1,∞). We would handle this in the following two cases:
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Case I (when u∗ < p <∞): In this case, D∗i (p) = F ∗i (p) = 1 for each i ∈ [n], due to line (2) of
algorithm MAIN. Thus, the feasibility of Cont(γ∗)∪ {F ∗i }ni=1 comes from that of Cont(γ∗);
Case II (when 1 < p ≤ u∗): In this case, R(max{p, γ∗}) = R(γ∗) = δ∗, due to Lemma 13 that
γ∗ ≥ u∗. Besides, note that δ∗ = 12 ·min
{R(p)−Ψ(p, {F ∗i }ni=1) : p ∈ (1, u∗]} ≥ 132ǫ2 > 0,
R(max{p, γ∗}) +Ψ(p, {F ∗i }ni=1) = δ∗ +Ψ(p, {F ∗i }ni=1) ≤ R(p)− δ∗ ≤ R(p). (1)
Near-optimality. We have OPT
(
Cont(γ∗) ∪ {F ∗i }ni=1
) ≥ OPT({F ∗i }ni=1). To measure the loss
of objective value, it suffices to verify that OPT
({F ∗i }ni=1) ≥ OPT({Fi}ni=1)− 5ǫ, that is,
2 +
∫ u∗
1
(
1−
n∏
i=1
D∗i (x)
)
dx ≥ 2 +
∫ ∞
1
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx− 5ǫ.
Under the definition of D∗i ’s in line (2) of algorithm MAIN, this inequality comes from combining
Lemma 14 and Lemma 15 (whose proofs are deferred to Appendix E.2) in the below.
Lemma 14.
∫ ∞
1
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx−
∫ ∞
1
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di
(
(1 + ǫ) · x)) dx ≤ 3ǫ.
Lemma 15.
∫ ∞
u∗
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di
(
(1 + ǫ) · x)) dx ≤ ∫ ∞
u∗
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx ≤ 2ǫ.
5.3 SUBROUTINE and Running Time
As mentioned before, algorithm SUBROUTINE iteratively calls algorithm DIMINISH to construct
new instances that are regular, feasible to Program (P1), and generate greater objective values
(compared with previous instances). In each iteration, for brevity we respectively re-denote by
Cont(γ) ∪ {Fi}ni=1 and Cont(γ) ∪ {F i}ni=1 the current and new instances.
When potential Ψ
({Fi}ni=1) decreases to 0, algorithm SUBROUTINE terminates, and outputs a
continuous instance Cont(γ̂). We present the algorithms as follows.
Algorithmus 2 SUBROUTINE(∆∗, u∗,Cont(γ∗) ∪ {F ∗i }ni=1)
Input: step-size ∆∗; support-supremum u∗; feasible instance Cont(γ∗) ∪ {F ∗i }ni=1.
Output: desired continuous instance Cont(γ̂).
1: Let u
def
= u∗ and Cont(γ) ∪ {Fi}ni=1 def= Cont(γ∗) ∪ {F ∗i }ni=1. ⊲ Initialization.
2: while Ψ
({Fi}ni=1) > 0 do
3: Let v
def
= max
{
vi :
(
i ∈ [n])∧ (Ψ({Fi}) > 0)}. ⊲ Referred to the next Fi to “vanish”.
4: Let ∆
def
= min
{
∆∗,Ψ
(
v, {Fi}ni=1
)}
. ⊲ Potential-decrease in this iteration.
5: Let u
def
= argmax
{
p ∈ [v, u] : Ψ(p, {Fi}ni=1) ≥ ∆}. ⊲ Support-supremum of {F i}ni=1.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
6: Define {F i}ni=1 def= DIMINISH(∆, u, {Fi}ni=1).
7: Define Cont(γ) by letting R(γ) = R(γ) + ∆.
8: Update: u← u and Cont(γ) ∪ {Fi}ni=1 ← Cont(γ) ∪ {F i}ni=1.
9: end while
10: return Cont(γ).
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Algorithmus 3 DIMINISH(∆, u, {Fi}ni=1)
Input: potential-decrease ∆; next support-supremum u; current instance {Fi}ni=1.
Output: next instance {F i}ni=1.
1: Let ∆#
def
= ∆ and W
def
= {i ∈ [n] : Fi has probability-mass at u}. ⊲ Initialization.
2: for all i ∈ [n] \W do
3: Let ∆i
def
= Ψ
(
u, {Fi}
)
. Update: ∆# ← (∆# −∆i).
4: Define F i as Ψ
(
p, {F i}
) ≡ Ψ(p, {Fi})−∆i, for all p ∈ (0, u].
5: end for ⊲ ∆# ≥ 0, by definition of u.
6: for all i ∈W do ⊲ Orders of i’s do not matter.
7: Let ∆i
def
= min
{
∆#,Ψ
(
u, {Fi}
)}
. Update: ∆# ← (∆# −∆i).
8: Define F i as Ψ
(
p, {F i}
) ≡ Ψ(p, {Fi})−∆i, for all p ∈ (0, u].
9: end for ⊲ ∆# = 0, by definition of u.
10: return {F i}ni=1.
For algorithm SUBROUTINE, we first list several useful facts (namely Lemma 16, whose proofs
are deferred to Appendix F), and then measure its running time in Lemma 17. Recall Lemma 13
for fixed-parameter v∗ = min
{
v∗i : i ∈ [n]
}
> 1.
Lemma 16. In each iteration of SUBROUTINE, (omit line (8) which is for updating parameters),
1. γ∗ ≥ γ ≥ γ ≥ u ≥ u, and ui = u for each i ∈ [n] that ∆i > 0;
2. qi ≤ qi and ui ≥ vi = vi = v∗i ≥ v∗ > 1, for each i ∈ [n];
3. Ψ
(
p, {F i}ni=1
)
= Ψ
(
p, {Fi}ni=1
)−∆ for all p ∈ (0, u].
Lemma 17. SUBROUTINE terminates in at most
⌈
1
∆∗ ·Ψ
({F ∗i }ni=1)+ n⌉ iterations, and then out-
put a continuous instance Cont(γ̂) that R(γ̂) = R(γ∗) + Ψ({F ∗i }ni=1), where γ̂ ∈ (1,∞) is well-
defined.
Proof. Emphasize again, when algorithm SUBROUTINE terminates, potential Ψ({Fi}ni=1) = 0.
Each iteration falls into either of the following two cases:
Case I (when ∆ = ∆∗): In this case, we know from Lemma 16.3, after the update in line (8) of
algorithm SUBROUTINE, that potential Ψ
({Fi}ni=1) decreases by ∆ = ∆∗.
With fixed step-size ∆∗ > 0 and input instance Cont(γ∗) ∪ {F ∗i }ni=1, this case happens for
at most
⌈
1
∆∗ ·Ψ
({F ∗i }ni=1)⌉ times;
Case II (when ∆ < ∆∗): In this case, due to line (4) and line (5) of algorithm SUBROUTINE,
u = v and ∆ = Ψ
(
v, {Fi}ni=1
)
= Ψ
(
u, {Fi}ni=1
)
. Hence, there exists k ∈ [n] such that
• Since u = v, it follows from line (3) of algorithm SUBROUTINE that
u = v = vk
Lemma 16.2
========== vk Ψ
({Fk}) > 0;
• Since ∆ = Ψ
(
u, {Fi}ni=1
)
, we know from Lemma 16.3 that Ψ
(
u, {F i}ni=1
)
= 0 and thus,
Ψ
({F k}) = Ψ(vk, {F k}) vk=u===== Ψ(u, {F k}) ≤ Ψ(u, {F i}ni=1) = 0.
23
Thus, the k-th distribution “vanishes” in this iteration, in that Ψ
({Fk}) > 0 and Ψ(F k) = 0.
Clearly, with input instance Cont(γ∗) ∪ {F ∗i }ni=1, this case happens for at most n times.
In total, Case I and Case II can happen for at most
⌈
1
∆∗ ·Ψ
({F ∗i }ni=1)+ n⌉ times. Afterwards,
potential Ψ
({Fi}ni=1) decreases to 0, and algorithm SUBROUTINE terminates.
In each iteration of algorithm SUBROUTINE (omit the update in line (8)), combining Lemma 16.3
and line (7) together implies that R(γ) + Ψ(p, {Fi}ni=1) = R(γ) + Ψ(p, {F i}ni=1), for all p ∈ (0, u].
Particularly, we must have
R(γ) + Ψ({Fi}ni=1) = R(γ) + Ψ({F i}ni=1).
By induction, output instance Cont(γ̂) satisfies that R(γ̂) = R(γ∗) + Ψ({F ∗i }ni=1). Furthermore,
parameter γ̂ must be well-defined in interval (1,∞), due to Lemma 3 that R(p) is decreasing on
p ∈ (1,∞), lim
p→∞R(p) = 0 and limp→1+R(p) =∞.
5.4 Proof Plan about SUBROUTINE
The rest proofs about algorithm SUBROUTINE (refer to the regularity, feasibility and optimality of
involved instances) all relies on induction. Recall Section 5.2 and inequality (1) for the base-case,
• Cont(γ∗) ∪ {F ∗i }ni=1 is regular, and feasible to Program (P1);
• R(γ∗) + Ψ(p, {F ∗i }ni=1) ≤ R(p)− δ∗ for all p ∈ (1, u∗].
From now on, we would focus on a specific iteration of algorithm SUBROUTINE, safely omitting
the update in line (8). After verifying Main Lemma 2, by induction output instance Cont(γ̂) of
algorithm SUBROUTINE satisfies all properties as desired.
Main Lemma 2. In each iteration of SUBROUTINE, suppose that Cont(γ) ∪ {Fi}ni=1 is regular,
and feasible to Program (P1), and that R(γ) + Ψ(p, {Fi}ni=1) ≤ R(p)− δ∗ for all p ∈ (1, u], then
1. Cont(γ) ∪ {F i}ni=1 is regular, and feasible to Program (P1). See Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2;
2. R(γ) + Ψ(p, {F i}ni=1) ≤ R(p)− δ∗ for all p ∈ (1, u]. See Case II in Section 5.4.2;
3. OPT
(
Cont(γ) ∪ {F i}ni=1
) ≥ OPT(Cont(γ) ∪ {Fi}ni=1). See Section 5.5.
5.4.1 Regularity of {F i}ni=1
For each k ∈ [n], the regularity premise of Main Lemma 2 indicates that rk(q) is continuous and
concave on [0, 1] (see Section 2.2). Under our potential-based construction of F k,
• rk(q) is a left-differentiable and right-differentiable function on [0, 1];
• Ψ
(
p, {F k}
)
remains ln
(
1 + vkqk1−qk
)
= ln
(
1 + vkqk1−qk
)
− ∆k when p ∈ (0, vk] = (0, vk], due to
Lemma 5. In terms of revenue-quantile curve, we know rk(q) =
vkqk
1−qk · (1− q) when q ∈ [qk, 1].
Clearly, rk(q) is concave on q ∈ [qk, 1].
It remains to prove that rk(q) is concave on [0, qk]. For our potential-based construction, we obtain
the following structural lemma in Appendix G.2.
Lemma 18. rk(q) ≤ ∂+rk(x) · (q − x) + rk(x) for all x ∈ (0, qk) and q ∈ [x, qk).
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Equipped with Lemma 18, the concavity of rk(q) (and thus the regularity of F k) immediately
follows from the equivalent condition for concave functions.
Fact 3 (Equivalent Condition for Concavity). Suppose r(q) is a left- and right-differentiable func-
tion on [a, b], then r(q) is concave on [a, b] iff
r(q) ≤ ∂+r(x) · (q − x) + r(x) ∀x ∈ (a, b), q ∈ [x, b).
5.4.2 Feasibility of Cont(γ) ∪ {F i}ni=1
We turn to check the feasibility to constraint (C1). For each k ∈ [n], the feasibility premise of Main
Lemma 2 ensures that vk > 1 and Φk(v
+
k ) ≥ 1. It follows from Lemma 16.2 that vk = vk > 1. For
virtual value functions, we further acquire Lemma 19 in Appendix G.3, which implies that
Φk(v
+
k ) ≥ Φk(v+k )
vk=vk====== Φk(v
+
k ) ≥ 1 ∀k ∈ [n].
Later, Lemma 19 also serves as a cornerstone of our optimality-analyses (specifically, the proof of
Lemma 21) in Section 5.5.
Lemma 19. Φk(p) ≥ Φk(p) for all p ∈ (vk,∞) = (vk,∞) and k ∈ [n].
As for the feasibility to constraint (C2), for all p ∈ (1,∞), we shall check that
R(max{p, γ})+Ψ(p, {F i}ni=1) ≤ R(p). (2)
Case I (when u < p <∞): In this case, F i(p) = 1 for each i ∈ [n]. Recall Lemma 3 that R(p) is
decreasing on p ∈ (1,∞), clearly LHS of (2) = R(max{p, γ}) ≤ R(p).
Case II (when 1 < p ≤ u): In this case, we know R(max{p, γ}) = R(γ), by Lemma 16.1 that
γ ≥ u ≥ u ≥ p. Under premise in Main Lemma 2 that R(γ) + Ψ(p, {Fi}ni=1) ≤ R(p)− δ∗,
LHS of (2) =R(γ) + Ψ(p, {F i}ni=1) (∗)= R(γ) + Ψ(p, {Fi}ni=1)−∆
(⋄)
=R(γ∗) + Ψ(p, {F ∗i }ni=1) ≤ R(p)− δ∗,
where (∗) comes from Lemma 16.3, and (⋄) comes from line (7) of algorithm SUBROUTINE.
5.5 Optimality: Monotonicity of Objective Value
Each iteration of algorithm SUBROUTINE can be divided into n processes. In the k-th process,
assume24 w.l.o.g. ∆k > 0, then Lemma 16.1 ensures that uk = u. The following box reviews the
changes during the k-th process:
24Otherwise, i.e., when ∆k = 0, we know γk = γk and F k ≡ Fk, and therefore the optimality trivially holds.
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• {F i}k−1i=1 ∪ {Fi}ni=k becomes {F i}ki=1 ∪ {Fi}ni=k+1, where F k is defined as
Ψ
(
p, {F k}
) ≡ Ψ(p, {Fk}) −∆k ∀p ∈ (0, u] = (0, uk]; (3)
• Cont(γk) becomes Cont(γk), where γk and γk satisfies R(γk) = R(γ) +
k−1∑
i=1
∆i and
R(γk) = R(γk) + ∆k; (4)
• Clearly, ∆k > 0 means Ψ
({Fk}) > 0 and γk > γk (see Lemma 3.1). Based on Lemma 16, and
since vk ≤ uk ≤ uk ≤ u = max
{
ui :
(
i ∈ [n])∧ (Ψ({Fi}) > 0)}, we can conclude that
γ∗ ≥ γk > γk ≥ uk ≥ uk ≥ vk = vk ≥ v∗ > 1. (5)
The objective value can never decrease after the above process, which is formulated as Lemma 20
in the below. Clearly, applying Lemma 20 over all k ∈ [n] indicates Main Lemma 2.3.
Lemma 20. OPT
(
Cont(γk) ∪ {F i}ki=1 ∪ {Fi}ni=k+1
) ≥ OPT(Cont(γk) ∪ {F i}k−1i=1 ∪ {Fi}ni=k).
Proof. Let dk(p)
def
=
k−1∏
i=1
Di(p) ·
n∏
i=k+1
Di(p) for notational convenience. Recall Lemma 4 and the
objective of Program (P1), the statement of the lemma is given by
2+
∫ ∞
1
(
1− dk(x) ·Dk(x) · e−Q
(
max{x,γk}
))
dx ≥ 2+
∫ ∞
1
(
1− dk(x) ·Dk(x) · e−Q
(
max{x,γk}
))
dx.
Recall Lemma 16.1 that γ ≥ γ ≥ u = max{ui : Ψ({Fi}) > 0} ≥ u = max{ui : Ψ({F i}) > 0}.
Certainly, Dk(p) = Dk(p) = dk(p) = 1 for all p ∈ (γ,∞). As per this, after rearranging the above
inequality, we are left to justify that∫ γk
1
dk(x) ·
(
Dk(x) · e−Q(γk) −Dk(x) · e−Q(γk)
)
dx ≥
∫ γk
γk
(
e−Q(x) − e−Q(γk)
)
dx. (E1)
In spirit, the following observations are crucial for testifying inequality (E1). Independent of any-
thing else, suppose that step-size ∆k is a first-order infinitesimal. Since then,
•
(
Dk(p)−Dk(p)
)
is a positive first-order infinitesimal, for all p ∈ (1,∞);
•
(
γk − γk
)
and
(
e−Q(γk) − e−Q(γk)) is positive first-order infinitesimals;
• The LHS of inequality (E1) is a first-order infinitesimal: the interval of integration, [1, γk], is
of constant length; the involved integrand is (pointwisely) of first-order infinitesimal;
• The RHS of inequality (E1) is a positive second-order infinitesimal: the interval of integration,
[γk, γk], has a length of first-order infinitesimal;
(
e−Q(p) − e−Q(γk)) is a first-order infinitesi-
mal, for all p ∈ [γk, γk].
Conceivably, a first-order infinitesimal (namely the LHS) should be no less than a second-order
infinitesimal (namely the RHS). However, because of the following two issues, converting the above
intuition into the ultimate proof is far from obvious.
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• Whether the LHS of inequality (E1) is positive is quite non-trivial: in fact, we can construct
a sophisticated example such that, on interval p ∈ [1, γk], the values of the involved integrand
(of the LHS) change signs.
The main tool for overcoming this issue is Abel’s inequality. Showing that Abel’s inequality is
applicable requires enormous calculations. Nevertheless, the subsequent benefits are twofold:
(see Analysis I) we do catch a new definite integration, which always takes a positive value,
to bound the LHS of inequality (E1) from below; (see Analysis II) the involved integrand
is greatly simplified, and thus the new definite integration admits an explicit formula.
• Whether the chosen step-size ∆k is small enough to guarantee inequality (E1)?
We shall rewrite/relax both hand side of inequality (E1) to be formulas containing ∆k, and
measure the resulting coefficients (of ∆k and ∆
2
k). For the RHS, this task is relatively easy.
To treat the LHS in a similar manner, the following two observations are crucial.
1. Recall step (5) of MAIN that ∆∗ = v
∗−1
3γ∗2 · κ∗ · δ∗. Adopting the idea from Section 5.4.2,
we can show a slack of constraint (C2): for all p ∈ (1, u],
Ψ
(
Cont(γk)∪ {F i}ki=1 ∪ {Fi}ni=k+1
)
= Ψ
(
Cont(γk) ∪ {F i}k−1i=1 ∪ {Fi}ni=k
) ≤ R(p)− δ∗.
In fact, this constraint-slack will reward us with a lower bound (containing ∆∗) of the
LHS of inequality (E1).
2. Hitherto, it suffices to show that the relax LHS (i.e., a formula of order ∆∗ ≥ ∆ =
n∑
i=1
∆i ≥ ∆k) is no less than the relaxed RHS (i.e., a formula of order ∆2k): this task is
relatively easy. Notably, the value ∆∗ = v
∗−1
3γ∗2 · κ∗ · δ∗ is carefully chosen, to make it fit
in the coefficients on both hand sides of the relaxed inequality (E1).
We will elaborate on the above ideas in Analysis III.
In the rest part of Section 5.5, we will implement the above proof plan.
Fact 4 (Abel’s Inequality). Suppose (1) λ(x) is a non-negative and increasing function on [a, b];
and (2) µ(x) is an integrable function such that
∫ b
y
µ(x)dx ≥ 0 for all y ∈ [a, b], then
∫ b
a
λ(x) · µ(x)dx ≥ λ(a+) ·
∫ b
a
µ(x)dx.
Analysis I: Exploiting Abel’s Inequality. To see Fact 4 can be applied to the LHS of inequal-
ity (E1), we shall check the two involved conditions. Specifically,
1. dk(p) =
k−1∏
i=1
Di(p) ·
n∏
i=k+1
Di(p) is a non-negative and increasing function on p ∈ (0,∞);
2.
∫ γk
p
(
Dk(x) · e−Q(γk) −Dk(x) · e−Q(γk)
)
dx ≥ 0 for all p ∈ [1, γk] .
The correctness of the first condition is trivial. The second condition is more technical. Based on
Lemma 19, Lemma 22 (to appear soon after, whose proof is deferred to Appendix H) and extra
mathematical facts, we further confirm Lemma 21 in Appendix I. Hence, the second condition for
applying Fact 4 (to the LHS of inequality (E1)) is also guaranteed.
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Lemma 21.
∫ γk
p
Dk(x) · e−Q(γk)dx ≥
∫ γk
p
Dk(x) · e−Q(γk)dx for all p ∈ [1, γk].
To generate useful bound for the LHS of inequality (E1), we need to measure dk(1
+). For each
i ∈ [n], we have shown in Section 5.4.2 that Φi(v+i ) ≥ Φi(v+i ) ≥ 1, which means
Di(p) = Di(1
+) = 1− qi Di(p) = Di(1+) = 1− qi ∀p ∈ (0, 1]. (6)
Recall Lemma 13 for fixed-parameter κ∗ =
n∏
i=1
(1− q∗i ) ∈ (0, 1].
dk(1
+)
(6)
=
k−1∏
i=1
(1− qi) ·
n∏
i=k+1
(1− qi) (⋄)=
∏
i∈[n]\{k}
(1− q∗i ) ≥ κ∗, (7)
where in (⋄) we apply Lemma 16.2 inductively. Combine Fact 4 and inequality (7) together,
LHS of (E1) ≥ κ∗ ·
∫ γk
1
(
Dk(x) · e−Q(γk) −Dk(x) · e−Q(γk)
)
dx.
Analysis II: Getting Explicit Formulas. The relaxed formula mentioned above (for the LHS
of inequality (E1)) admits an explicit formula. Recall that Dk(p) = 1 for all p ∈ (γ,∞).∫ γk
1
Dk(x)dx =γk − 1 +
∫ 1
0
(
1−Dk(x)
)
dx−
∫ ∞
0
(
1−Dk(x)
)
dx
(6)
= γk − 1 + qk −
∫ ∞
0
(
1−Dk(x)
)
dx
(⋄)
=γk − 1 + qk − vkqk,
where (⋄) comes from Main Lemma 1.2 (that rk(0) = 0) and Main Lemma 4 (see Appendix A).
Similarly,
∫ γk
1
Dk(x)dx = γk − 1 + qk − vkqk Lemma 16.2========== γk − 1 + qk − vkqk. To sum up,
LHS of (E1) ≥ κ∗ ·
[
(γk − 1− vkqk + qk) · e−Q(γk) − (γk − 1− vkqk + qk) · e−Q(γk)
]
Moreover, we can relax the RHS of inequality (E1) as follows:
RHS of (E1) =
∫ γk
γk
(
e−Q(x) − e−Q(γk)
)
dx ≤ (γk − γk) ·
(
e−Q(γk) − e−Q(γk)
)
,
which follows from Lemma 3.1 that Q(p) is decreasing on p ∈ (1,∞). Adopt both tricks, and then
rearrange the intermediate inequality. Afterwards, we are left to prove the following.
γk − (1− qk + vkqk)− (vk − 1) · qk − qk
eQ(γk)−Q(γk) − 1 ≥
1
κ∗
· (γk − γk). (E2)
Analysis III: Exploiting Auxiliary Lemmas. To conquer inequality (E2), we shall introduce
the following technical lemma (whose proof is deferred to Appendix H).
Lemma 22. For all p ∈ [vk, uk] ⊂ [vk, uk],
γk −
[
Fk(p) + p ·
(
1− Fk(p)
)]− (p− 1) · F k(p)− Fk(p)
eQ(γk)−Q(γk) − 1 ≥
1
κ∗
· γ∗2 ·∆∗. (8)
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We continue to relax both hand sides of inequality (E2). Assigning p← vk in Lemma 22 gives
LHS of (E2) = LHS of (8) ≥ 1
κ∗
· γ∗2 ·∆∗.
Moreover, recall Lemma 3.1 that R(p) is a decreasing and convex function on p ∈ (1,∞),
RHS of (E2) ≤ 1
κ∗
· R(γk)−R(γk)∣∣R′(γk)∣∣ (4)= 1κ∗ · ∆k∣∣R′(γk)∣∣ (⋆)≤ 1κ∗ · γ2k ·∆k,
where in (⋆) we apply Lemma 3.3 that
∣∣R′(p)∣∣ ≥ 1
p2
for all p ∈ (1,∞). Gather everything together,
it remains to show that
1
κ∗
· γ∗2 ·∆∗ ≥ 1
κ∗
· γ2k ·∆k.
This follows as γ∗ ≥ γk and ∆∗ ≥ ∆ ≥ ∆k, according to inequality (5) and line (4) of algorithm
SUBROUTINE, respectively. This completes the proof of Lemma 20.
6 Bayesian Multi-Dimensional Unit-Demand Mechanism Design
In this section, we move to the multi-dimensional unit-demand environment (with a single buyer),
aiming to certify Theorem 2.
[Theorem 2]. To sell heterogeneous items to a unit-demand buyer with independent regular dis-
tributions for different items, the supremum of the ratio of optimal item pricing to uniform pricing
equals to C∗ ≈ 2.6202.
Intuitively, the upper-bound part comes from combining Theorem 1 and previous results (i.e.,
the copying technique developed in [16, 17, 18]). As for the lower-bound part, it turns out that
applying a natural extension of Example 1 (i.e., the lower-bound instance for Theorem 1) would
work. We will settle everything in the rest of this section.
6.1 Recap of Multi-Dimensional Unit-Demand Setting
The problem of selling heterogeneous items among unit-demand buyers, is termed the Bayesian
multi-dimensional unit-demand mechanism design (BMUMD) problem [17, 33, 18]. In the restricted
setting with a single buyer, basic concepts for the problem are given as follows. We re-denote by
n ∈ N+ the number of items, and re-denote by {Fi}ni=1 the buyer’s value distributions for the items.
BMUMD problem. In the single-buyer setting, Chawla et al. [18] proved that any a mechanism
(possibly randomized) can be mapped to a lottery-pricing mechanism. We denote a lottery ℓ =(
pℓ, xℓ1, x
ℓ
2, · · · , xℓn
)
by (n+1) elements: the embedded price pℓ ∈ R+; and each i-th item’s allocation
probability xℓi . With values (w1, w2, · · · , wn) drawn from distributions {Fi}ni=1, the buyer will gain
utility ul
def
=
n∑
i=1
wi · xℓi − pℓ after accepting this lottery. W.l.o.g. we have
n∑
i=1
xℓi ≤ 1, since the buyer
is unit-demand.
A lottery-pricing mechanism involves an assemblage of lotteries L = {ℓ0, ℓ1, ℓ2, · · · }, where the
special lottery ℓ0 = {0}n+1 respects the buyer’s rationality. Facing lottery set L, the buyer will take
a utility-optimal lottery ℓ∗ ∈ argmax {ul : ℓ ∈ L} (possibly the special lottery l0, which results in
ul0 = 0). For brevity, denote by BMUMD
({Fi}ni=1) the optimal lottery-pricing and revenue.
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Restricted to deterministic mechanisms, the BMUMD problem is also known as the Bayesian
unit-demand item-pricing (BUPP) problem in [16, 11, 18, 19]. In an item pricing scheme: the seller
posts prices (p1, p2, · · · , pn) ∈ Rn+ for the items; with values (w1, w2, · · · , wn), the buyer selects a
utility-optimal item i∗ ∈ argmax {wi− pi : i ∈ [n]} (or nothing when wi∗ < pi∗). Again, we abuse
notation BUPP
({Fi}ni=1) to denote the optimal item pricing and revenue.
A uniform-pricing (UP) mechanism [11, 26] is a restricted item pricing, where p1 = p2 = · · · =
pn = p. For a specific price p ∈ R+, let UP
(
p, {Fi}ni=1
)
be the revenue from such uniform-pricing.
Since then, UP
({Fi}ni=1) def= max{UP(p, {Fi}ni=1) : p ∈ R+} presents the optimum.
Copying Technique. Chawla et al. [16, 18] developed the so-called copying technique. Derived
from an original instance {Fi}ni=1 for the single-buyer BMUMD problem, consider a new scenario:
the seller aims to sell a single item among n buyers; for the item, each i-th buyer’s value follows
distribution Fi. Chawla et al. named this instance the copied instance. For brevity, we use {Fi}ni=1
to denote both instances. Which scenario we refer to will be clear from the context.
For the involved two instances, Chawla et al. [16, 18] acquired the following two lemmas, hence
a connection to Myerson Auction (OPT) in the single-dimensional setting.
Lemma 23 ([16]). BUPP
({Fi}ni=1) ≤ OPT({Fi}ni=1).
Lemma 24 ([18]). BMUMD
({Fi}ni=1) ≤ 2OPT({Fi}ni=1).
6.2 Upper-Bound Analysis of Theorem 2
As Lemma 25 suggests, in terms of revenue, the multi-dimensional uniform-pricing (UP) and the
single-dimensional anonymous pricing (AP) are equivalent.
Lemma 25. UP
(
p, {Fi}ni=1
)
= AP
(
p, {Fi}ni=1
)
for all p ∈ (0,∞). Thus, UP({Fi}ni=1) = AP({Fi}ni=1).
Proof. Given p ∈ (0,∞), in both of the original and copied instances, the seller allocates an/the
item with probability 1−
n∏
i=1
Fi(p). Clearly, this fact indicates the lemma.
Recall Theorem 1 that C∗ · AP({Fi}ni=1) ≥ OPT({Fi}ni=1) for all {Fi}ni=1 ∈ Regn. Combining
this with Lemma 23 and Lemma 25, we settle the upper-bound part of Theorem 2 as follows:
C∗ · UP({Fi}ni=1) = C∗ · AP({Fi}ni=1) ≥ OPT({Fi}ni=1) ≥ BUPP({Fi}ni=1).
Similarly, gathering Theorem 1, Lemma 24 and Lemma 25 together results in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. To sell heterogeneous items, to a unit-demand buyer with regular distributions, the
ratio of BMUMD to UP is upper-bounded by 2C∗ ≈ 5.2404.
Note that the ratio involved in Corollary 1 is lower-bound by C∗ ≈ 2.6202 (see Section 6.3). As
stressed by Alaei et al. [4], closing this gap remains an important open problem, either by proving
improved upper bound, or constructing sharper examples.
6.3 Lower-Bound Analysis of Theorem 2
We are left with the lower-bound part of Theorem 2, which comes from gathering Main Lemma 3
(in the below) with Theorem 3 and Lemma 25: viewed as a single-buyer multi-item instance25,
Example 1 turns out to be the desired lower-bound instance for Theorem 2.
25In terms of notations defined in Example 1, the seller brings (n+ 2) heterogeneous items, for which the buyer’s
values are drawn from distributions {Tri(∞)} ∪ {Tri(vi, qi)}
n+1
i=1 .
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[Example 1 ([32])]. Given ǫ ∈ (0, 1), let a def= Q−1 (ln 8
ǫ
)
> 1, b
def
= 8
ǫ
and δ
def
= b−a
n
. Define
triangular instance {Tri(∞)} ∪ {Tri(vi, qi)}n+1i=1 as, for each i ∈ [n+ 1],
vi = b− (i− 1) · δ qi = R(vi)−R(vi−1)
vi +R(vi)−R(vi−1) .
[Theorem 3 ([32])]. Consider the triangular instance in Example 1. When n ∈ N+ is sufficiently
large, AP
({Tri(∞)} ∪ {Tri(vi, qi)}n+1i=1 ) ≤ 1 and further,
C∗ ≥ OPT({Tri(∞)} ∪ {Tri(vi, qi)}n+1i=1 ) = 1 + n+1∑
i=1
viqi ·
i−1∏
j=1
(1− qi) ≥ C∗ − ǫ.
Main Lemma 3. Consider the triangular instance in Example 1. For any fixed ǫ′ ∈ (0, 1),
BUPP
({Tri(∞)} ∪ {Tri(vi, qi)}n+1i=1 ) ≥ −ǫ′ +OPT({Tri(∞)} ∪ {Tri(vi, qi)}n+1i=1 ).
Proof. Recall Lemma 25, the revenue from the multi-dimensional BUPP is no more than the revenue
from the single-dimensional OPT: in the former case, the unit-demand buyer would choose an item
in favor of himself (rather than in favor of the seller). However, with a triangular instance like
Example 1, the seller can manipulate the items’ prices, so as to incentive the buyer to choose
higher-price items, while keeping revenue-loss small enough (compared with OPT).
Emphasizing again, here we regard Example 1 as a single-buyer multi-item instance. In partic-
ular, with parameters h ∈ (0, 1) and H > v1 = b, take the item pricing (H, p1, p2, · · · , pn+1) below
into account:
• Post price H for item Tri(∞);
• Post price pi
def
= (1 − h) · vi for the i-th item Tri(vi, qi), for each i ∈ [n + 1]. Since then, by
choosing the i-th item, the buyer’s utility is at most vi − pi = h · vi.
Under such item pricing, consider the following (n + 2) disjoint events: (A∞) that the buyer gets
item Tri(∞); and (Ai for each i ∈ [n+ 1]) that the buyer gets the i-th item Tri(vi, qi).
Recall Example 1 that b = v1 > v2 > · · · > vn+1 = a, event {A∞} happens when the buyer
values item Tri(∞) at w∞ > H+h ·b, with utility exceeding h ·b (thus exceeding h ·vi, the greatest
possible utility from the i-th item, for each i ∈ [n + 1]). Besides, event {A∞} happens only if the
buyer values item Tri(∞) at w∞ ≥ H. Formally,
Pr
{
w∞ > H + h · b
} ≤ Pr{A∞} ≤ Pr{w∞ ≥ H}.
Independent of anything else, we can impel H to approach to infinity. Afterwards, the buyer gets
item Tri(∞) with negligible probability and expected payment of 1, in that
lim
H→∞
Pr
{
A∞
} ≤ lim
H→∞
Pr
{
w∞ ≥ H
}
= lim
H→∞
1
H + 1
= 0
lim
H→∞
H · Pr{A∞} ≤ lim
H→∞
H · Pr{w∞ ≥ H} = lim
H→∞
H
H + 1
= 1,
lim
H→∞
H · Pr{A∞} ≥ lim
H→∞
H · Pr{w∞ > H + h · b} = lim
H→∞
H
H + h · b+ 1 = 1.
For each i ∈ [n+ 1], even {Ai} happens when the following two conditions hold:
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• The buyer values the j-th item at wj < pj = (1 − h) · vj , for each j ∈ [i− 1]. Respecting his
own rationality, the buyer will discard all these items;
• The buyer values the i-th item at wi = vi, gaining utility wi− pi = h · vi. This utility exceeds
h · vk (namely the greatest possible utility from the k-th item), for each k ∈ [n+ 1] \ [i].
Conditioned on that event {Ai} happens, we can bound the expected revenue from below:
pi · Pr{Ai} ≥(1− h) · vi · Pr
{
wi = vi
} · i−1∏
j=1
Pr
{
wj < (1− h) · vj
}
=(1− h)i · viqi ·
i−1∏
j=1
[
1− qj
1− h · (1− qj)
]
≥[1− (n + 1) · h] · viqi · i−1∏
j=1
(1− qj),
for each i ∈ [n+ 1]. To sum up, the revenue from such item pricing (H, p1, p2, · · · , pn+1) is
1 +
n+1∑
i=1
pi · Pr{Ai} ≥1 +
[
1− (n+ 1) · h] · n+1∑
i=1
viqi ·
i−1∏
j=1
(1− qj)
≥[1− (n + 1) · h] · OPT({Tri(∞)} ∪ {Tri(vi, qi)}n+1i=1 ). (By Fact 2)
Recall Theorem 3 that OPT
({Tri(∞)} ∪ {Tri(vi, qi)}n+1i=1 ) ≤ C∗ < 3. After assigning h← ǫ′3·(n+1) ,
where ǫ′ > 0 is given in the lemma, we conclude that
1 +
n+1∑
i=1
pi · Pr{Ai} ≥ −ǫ′ +OPT
({Tri(∞)} ∪ {Tri(vi, qi)}n+1i=1 )
In terms of revenue, optimal deterministic mechanism BUPP
({Tri(∞)} ∪ {Tri(vi, qi)}n+1i=1 ) must
surpass the above item pricing (H, p1, p2, · · · , pn+1). This completes the proof of Main lemma 3.
References
[1] Melika Abolhassani, Soheil Ehsani, Hossein Esfandiari, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi,
Robert D. Kleinberg, and Brendan Lucier. Beating 1-1/e for ordered prophets. In Proceed-
ings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2017,
Montreal, QC, Canada, June 19-23, 2017, pages 61–71, 2017.
[2] Saeed Alaei. Bayesian combinatorial auctions: Expanding single buyer mechanisms to many
buyers. SIAM J. Comput., 43(2):930–972, 2014.
[3] Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, and Jason D. Hartline. The simple economics of ap-
proximately optimal auctions. In 54th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science, FOCS 2013, 26-29 October, 2013, Berkeley, CA, USA, pages 628–637, 2013.
[4] Saeed Alaei, Jason D. Hartline, Rad Niazadeh, Emmanouil Pountourakis, and Yang Yuan.
Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing. In IEEE 56th Annual Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science, FOCS 2015, Berkeley, CA, USA, 17-20 October, 2015, pages 1446–1463,
2015.
32
[5] Yossi Azar, Ashish Chiplunkar, and Haim Kaplan. Prophet secretary: Surpassing the 1-1/e
barrier. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Ithaca,
NY, USA, June 18-22, 2018, pages 303–318, 2018.
[6] Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, and Noam Nisan. The menu-size complexity of
revenue approximation. In Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on
Theory of Computing, STOC 2017, Montreal, QC, Canada, June 19-23, 2017, pages 869–877,
2017.
[7] Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, and S. Matthew Weinberg. A simple and
approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer. In 55th IEEE Annual Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2014, Philadelphia, PA, USA, October 18-21, 2014,
pages 21–30, 2014.
[8] Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Negin Golrezaei, Renato Paes Leme, Martin Pal, and Balasubramanian
Sivan. Improved approximations for free-order prophets and second-price auctions. CoRR,
abs/1807.03435, 2018.
[9] Liad Blumrosen and Thomas Holenstein. Posted prices vs. negotiations: an asymptotic anal-
ysis. In Proceedings 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2008), Chicago, IL,
USA, June 8-12, 2008, page 49, 2008.
[10] Patrick Briest. Uniform budgets and the envy-free pricing problem. In Automata, Languages
and Programming, 35th International Colloquium, ICALP 2008, Reykjavik, Iceland, July 7-
11, 2008, Proceedings, Part I: Tack A: Algorithms, Automata, Complexity, and Games, pages
808–819, 2008.
[11] Yang Cai and Constantinos Daskalakis. Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional
pricing. Games and Economic Behavior, 92:266–305, 2015.
[12] Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, and S. Matthew Weinberg. A duality based unified approach to
bayesian mechanism design. In Proceedings of the 48th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on
Theory of Computing, STOC 2016, Cambridge, MA, USA, June 18-21, 2016, pages 926–939,
2016.
[13] Yang Cai and Mingfei Zhao. Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality. In Pro-
ceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2017,
Montreal, QC, Canada, June 19-23, 2017, pages 170–183, 2017.
[14] Nicolo` Cesa-Bianchi, Claudio Gentile, and Yishay Mansour. Regret minimization for reserve
prices in second-price auctions. IEEE Trans. Information Theory, 61(1):549–564, 2015.
[15] Tanmoy Chakraborty, Eyal Even-Dar, Sudipto Guha, Yishay Mansour, and S. Muthukrishnan.
Approximation schemes for sequential posted pricing in multi-unit auctions. In Internet and
Network Economics - 6th International Workshop, WINE 2010, Stanford, CA, USA, December
13-17, 2010. Proceedings, pages 158–169, 2010.
[16] Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, and Robert D. Kleinberg. Algorithmic pricing via virtual
valuations. In Proceedings 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2007), San
Diego, California, USA, June 11-15, 2007, pages 243–251, 2007.
33
[17] Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, David L. Malec, and Balasubramanian Sivan. Multi-
parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing. In Proceedings of the 42nd ACM
Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2010, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 5-8 June
2010, pages 311–320, 2010.
[18] Shuchi Chawla, David L. Malec, and Balasubramanian Sivan. The power of randomness in
bayesian optimal mechanism design. Games and Economic Behavior, 91:297–317, 2015.
[19] Xi Chen, Ilias Diakonikolas, Anthi Orfanou, Dimitris Paparas, Xiaorui Sun, and Mihalis Yan-
nakakis. On the complexity of optimal lottery pricing and randomized mechanisms. In IEEE
56th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2015, Berkeley, CA,
USA, 17-20 October, 2015, pages 1464–1479, 2015.
[20] Xi Chen, Ilias Diakonikolas, Dimitris Paparas, Xiaorui Sun, and Mihalis Yannakakis. The
complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing for a unit-demand buyer. Games and Economic
Behavior, 110:139–164, 2018.
[21] Xi Chen, George Matikas, Dimitris Paparas, and Mihalis Yannakakis. On the complexity
of simple and optimal deterministic mechanisms for an additive buyer. In Proceedings of
the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2018, New
Orleans, LA, USA, January 7-10, 2018, pages 2036–2049, 2018.
[22] Jose´ R. Correa, Patricio Foncea, Ruben Hoeksma, Tim Oosterwijk, and Tjark Vredeveld.
Posted price mechanisms for a random stream of customers. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM
Conference on Economics and Computation, EC ’17, Cambridge, MA, USA, June 26-30, 2017,
pages 169–186, 2017.
[23] Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, and Christos Tzamos. The complexity of optimal
mechanism design. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on
Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2014, Portland, Oregon, USA, January 5-7, 2014, pages 1302–
1318, 2014.
[24] Paul Du¨tting, Felix A. Fischer, and Max Klimm. Revenue gaps for discriminatory and anony-
mous sequential posted pricing. CoRR, abs/1607.07105, 2016.
[25] Venkatesan Guruswami, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin, David Kempe, Claire Kenyon,
and Frank McSherry. On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth
Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2005, Vancouver, British
Columbia, Canada, January 23-25, 2005, pages 1164–1173, 2005.
[26] Nima Haghpanah and Jason D. Hartline. Reverse mechanism design. In Proceedings of the
Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC ’15, Portland, OR, USA,
June 15-19, 2015, pages 757–758, 2015.
[27] Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, and Tuomas Sandholm. Automated
online mechanism design and prophet inequalities. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Second AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, July 22-26, 2007, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada,
pages 58–65, 2007.
[28] Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan. Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items. In
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC ’12, Valencia, Spain, June 4-8, 2012, page
656, 2012.
34
[29] Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan. The menu-size complexity of auctions. In ACM Conference
on Electronic Commerce, EC ’13, Philadelphia, PA, USA, June 16-20, 2013, pages 565–566,
2013.
[30] Jason D Hartline. Mechanism design and approximation. Book draft. October, 122, 2013.
[31] Jason D. Hartline and Tim Roughgarden. Simple versus optimal mechanisms. In Proceedings
10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2009), Stanford, California, USA, July
6–10, 2009, pages 225–234, 2009.
[32] Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu, Zhihao Gavin Tang, and Tao Xiao. Tight revenue gaps among simple
mechanisms. SODA 2019, arXiv:1804.00480.
[33] Robert Kleinberg and S. Matthew Weinberg. Matroid prophet inequalities. In Proceedings of
the 44th Symposium on Theory of Computing Conference, STOC 2012, New York, NY, USA,
May 19 - 22, 2012, pages 123–136, 2012.
[34] Brendan Lucier. An economic view of prophet inequalities. SIGecom Exchanges, 16(1):24–47,
2017.
[35] Roger B. Myerson. Optimal auction design. Math. Oper. Res., 6(1):58–73, 1981.
[36] Aviad Rubinstein. On the computational complexity of optimal simple mechanisms. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, Cam-
bridge, MA, USA, January 14-16, 2016, pages 21–28, 2016.
[37] Qiqi Yan. Mechanism design via correlation gap. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual
ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2011, San Francisco, California, USA,
January 23-25, 2011, pages 710–719, 2011.
[38] Andrew Chi-Chih Yao. An n-to-1 bidder reduction for multi-item auctions and its applications.
In Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms,
SODA 2015, San Diego, CA, USA, January 4-6, 2015, pages 92–109, 2015.
35
A Extended Preliminaries
In this appendix, we formally prove a few facts relating revenue-quantile curve and virtual value
CDF, which will be useful in our proof. Fact 5 captures reductions from revenue-quantile curve
ri(q), and Fact 6 formalizes reductions from virtual value CDF Di. Notably, inverse function D
−1
i
(respect virtual value CDF) is defined as follows: for all x ∈ [1− qi, 1],
D−1i (x)
def
= argmax
{
p ∈ (0,∞] : Di(p) ≤ x
}
.
Fact 5. Given a continuous and concave revenue-quantile curve ri(q) on q ∈ [0, 1],
1. Value CDF Fi is given by Fi(p)
def
= 0 for all p ∈ (0, ri(1)] and
Fi(p)
def
= 1−max{q ∈ [0, 1] : ri(q)/q ≤ p} ∀p ∈ (ri(1),∞];
2. Virtual Value CDF Di is given by Di(p)
def
= 1− qi for all q ∈
(
0,Φi(v
+
i )
]
and
Di(p)
def
= 1−max {q ∈ [0, 1] : ∂+ri(q) ≤ p} ∀p ∈ (Φi(v+i ),∞];
Fact 6. Given a well-defined virtual value CDF Di and ri(0) = lim
p→∞ p ·
(
1− Fi(p)
)
,
1. In the range of q ∈ [0, qi], revenue-quantile curve ri(q) is given by
ri(q)
def
= ri(0) +
∫ q
0
D−1i (1− x) · dx;
2. In the range of p ∈ [vi,∞], parameterized by t ∈ [0, qi], value CDF Fi is given by{
Fi = 1− t
p = ri(t)
/
t
.
As a corollary of Fact 5 and Fact 6, we can prove the following structural lemma.
Main Lemma 4 (Virtual Value). Given a regular distribution Fi ∈ Reg,
ri(0) +
∫ ∞
p
(
1−Di(x)
)
dx =
(
Φ−1i (p
+)− p) · (1−Di(p+)),
for all p ∈ [0,∞). Particularly, ri(0) +
∫ ∞
0
(
1−Di(x)
)
dx = ri(qi) = viqi.
Proof. Due to integration by substitution,
p · (1−Di(p+))+ ∫ ∞
p
(
1−Di(x)
)
dx =
∫ 1−Di(p+)
0
D−1i (1− y)dy (Let y = 1−Di(x))
=ri
(
1−Di(p+)
)− ri(0) (By Fact 6.1)
=
(
1−Di(p+)
) · F−1i (Di(p+)) − ri(0) (By Fact 5.1)
=Φ−1i (p
+) · (1−Di(p+))− ri(0).
36
After being rearranged, this equation is exactly the formula in the lemma. Moreover, for the special
case that p = 0, we shall notice Di(0
+) = 1 − qi and Φ−1i (0+) = vi (see our definition of inverse
function Φ−1i in Section 2.2). This completes the proof of the lemma.
A.1 Proof of Fact 1
[Fact 1 (Characterization)]. Given a regular instance {Fi}ni=1 ∈ Regn,
OPT
({Fi}ni=1) = n∑
i=1
ri(0) +
∫ ∞
0
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx.
Proof. In Myerson Auction, the item is always allocated to the buyer with highest virtual value
(required to be no less than 0). Let x(·) be the corresponding (monotone) allocation rule. Clearly,
the k-th buyer always wins, when his bid goes to ∞, while other buyers’ bids are finite:
lim
bk→∞
xk(bk, b−k) = 1 ∀k ∈ [n], ∀b−k ∈ Rn−1+ . (9)
Given b ∈ Rn+, Lemma 1 (Myerson Lemma) explicitly formulates the payment of the k-th buyer:
πk(b) =
∫ bk
0
z · dxk(z, b−k). (10)
Hence, with fixed b−k ∈ Rn−1+ and bk drawn from Fk,
E bk|b−k
[
πk(b)
]
=
∫ ∞
0
πk(bk, b−k) · dFk(bk) (10)=
∫ ∞
0
∫ bk
0
z · dxk(z, b−k) · dFk(bk)
(By interchange of the order of integration)
=
∫ ∞
0
(∫ ∞
z
dFk(bk)
)
· z · dxk(z, b−k) =
∫ ∞
0
(
1− Fk(z)
) · z · dxk(z, b−k)
(By integration by parts)
=
[(
1− Fk(z)
) · z · xk(z, b−k)]∣∣∣∞
0
−
∫ ∞
0
(
1− Fk(z)− z · dFk(z)
dz
)
· xk(z, b−k) · dz
= lim
z→∞
[(
1− Fk(z)
) · z · xk(z, b−k)]+ ∫ ∞
0
Φk(z) · xk(z, b−k) · dFk(z)
(9)
= rk(0) + E bk|b−k
[
Φk(bk) · xk(bk, b−k)
]
.
As per this, with b drawn from {Fi}ni=1, the expected payment of the k-th buyer equals to
Eb
[
πk(b)
]
= rk(0) + Eb
[
Φk(bk) · xk(bk, b−k)
] ∀k ∈ [n].
Sum this equation over all k ∈ [n], the expected revenue from Myerson Auction equals to
Eb
[
n∑
i=1
πi(b)
]
=
n∑
i=1
ri(0) + Eb
[
n∑
i=1
Φi(bi) · xi(bi, b−i)
]
.
Again, the buyer with highest virtual value (required to be no less than 0) always wins, the above
formula can be rewritten as
Eb
[
n∑
i=1
πi(b)
]
=
n∑
i=1
ri(0) +Eb
[(
max
{
Φi(bi) : i ∈ [n]
})
+
]
(∗)
=
n∑
i=1
ri(0) +
∫ ∞
0
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx,
where {Di}ni=1 denotes the virtual value CDF’s, and (∗) follows from order statistics. This completes
the proof of the lemma.
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B Mathematical Facts
In this appendix, we verify a few mathematical facts (mainly inequalities) which are omitted in the
main text.
B.1 Missing Proof of Lemma 26
Lemma 26. H(s, p) < 0 for all s ∈
[
0, 1√
3
]
and p ∈ (1,∞), where
H(s, p)
def
= ln
(
1− 1
p
)
+ ln
(
1 +
s
p
)
+
[
p− (1 + s)] ·( 1
p− 1 +
1
p+ s
− 2
p
)
.
Proof. To conquer the inequality in the lemma, we first investigate the monotonicity of H(s, p),
and thus acquire Lemma 27 (whose proof is deferred to the following).
Lemma 27. Let Mp
def
= 56 +
1
3
√
3
+
√(
5
6 +
1
3
√
3
)2
+ 2
3
√
3
≈ 2.2246,
1. Given p ∈ (1,Mp], ∂H∂s ≤ 0 for all s ∈
[
0, 1√
3
]
;
2. Given p ∈ (Mp,∞), there exists a unique Ms ∈
(
0, 1√
3
)
such that ∂H
∂s
≤ 0 for all s ∈ [0,Ms],
and ∂H
∂s
> 0 for all s ∈
(
Ms,
1√
3
]
.
Lemma 27 implies, to settle Lemma 26 (no matter whether p > Mp or not), that it suffices to show
H1(p)
def
= H(0, p) < 0 H2(p)
def
= H
(
1√
3
, p
)
< 0,
for all p ∈ (1,∞). We would justify these two inequalities as follows.
Firstly, H1(p) = ln
(
1− 1
p
)
+ 1
p
(⋄)
= −
∞∑
k=2
1
k
· 1
pk
< 0 for all p ∈ (1,∞), where (⋄) follows from
Taylor series. As for H2(p) = ln
(
1− 1
p
)
+ ln
(
1 + 1√
3p
)
+
[
p−
(
1 + 1√
3
)]
·
(
1
p−1 +
√
3√
3p+1
− 2
p
)
, it
can be checked that H ′2(p) = h2(p) · p−2 · (p− 1)−2 ·
(
p+ 1√
3
)−2
, where
h2(p)
def
=
(
2 +
14
3
√
3
)
· p2 −
(
2
3
+
8
3
√
3
)
· p−
(
2
3
+
2
3
√
3
)
.
As a convex quadratic function, h2(p) > 0 for all p ∈ (1,∞), since (1) h2(1) = 23 + 43√3 > 0; and
(2) h2(p) has axis of symmetry
1
2 ·
(
2
3 +
8
3
√
3
)/(
2 + 14
3
√
3
)
= 19−5
√
3
44 ≈ 0.2350 < 1. Thus, H2(p) is
strictly increasing on (1,∞). Noting that lim
p→∞H2(p) = 0, we complete the proof of the lemma.
[Lemma 27]. Let Mp
def
= 56 +
1
3
√
3
+
√(
5
6 +
1
3
√
3
)2
+ 2
3
√
3
≈ 2.2246,
1. Given p ∈ (1,Mp], ∂H∂s ≤ 0 for all s ∈
[
0, 1√
3
]
;
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2. Given p ∈ (Mp,∞), there exists a unique Ms ∈
(
0, 1√
3
)
such that ∂H
∂s
≤ 0 for all s ∈ [0,Ms],
and ∂H
∂s
> 0 for all s ∈
(
Ms,
1√
3
]
.
Proof. Given p ∈ (1,∞), it can be checked that ∂H
∂s
= h(s,p)
p·(p−1)·(p+s)2 , where
h(s, p)
def
= (p − 2) · s2 + (3p2 − 5p) · s− p.
We would explore the real roots of this function as follows.
Case I (when p = 2): In this case, h(s, 2) = 2s− 2 < 0 for all s ∈
(
0, 1√
3
)
;
Otherwise, given p ∈ (1, 2) ∪ (2,∞), h(s, p) is a quadratic function of s, with axis of symmetry
ρh(p)
def
= − 3p
2 − 5p
2 · (p − 2) = −
3
2
· (p − 2)− 1
p− 2 −
7
2
.
Clearly, h(s, p) has real roots in the range of s ∈
(
0, 1√
3
)
only if
∆h(p)
def
= (3p2 − 5p)2 + 4 · (p− 2) · p = p · (p− 1) ·
(
p− 7−
√
17
6
)
·
(
p− 7 +
√
17
6
)
≥ 0.
Since 7−
√
17
6 ≈ 0.4795 < 1 < 7+
√
17
6 ≈ 1.8539, we safely assume p ∈
[
7+
√
17
6 , 2
)
∪ (2,∞) henceforth.
Case II (when 7+
√
17
6 ≤ p < 2): In this case, h(s, p) is a concave function of s, with axis of sym-
metry ρh(p)
(†)
≥ ρh
(
7+
√
17
6
)
= 3+
√
17
2 ≈ 3.5616 > 1√3 ≈ 0.5774, where (†) follows as ρh(p) is
increasing on p ∈
(
2−
√
2
3 , 2
)
, and 2−
√
2
3 ≈ 1.1835 < 7+
√
17
6 ≈ 1.8539;
Case III (when 2 < p <∞): In this case, h(s, p) is a convex function of s, with axis of symmetry
ρh(p) = −32 · (p − 2)− 1p−2 − 72 < −72 < 0;
To sum up, given p ∈
[
7+
√
17
6 , 2
)
∪ (2,∞), we know h(s, p) is strictly increasing on s ∈
(
0, 1√
3
)
.
Together with the fact h(0, p) = −p < 0, such monotonicity implies that h(s, p) has (a unique) real
root in the range of s ∈
(
0, 1√
3
)
, iff h
(
1√
3
, p
)
=
√
3p2 −
(
2
3 +
5√
3
)
· p− 23 > 0, that is, iff
p > Mp =
5
6
+
1
3
√
3
+
√(
5
6
+
1
3
√
3
)2
+
2
3
√
3
≈ 2.2246.
Gathering everything together, we can summarize that
• Given p ∈ (1,Mp], h(s, p) ≤ 0 for all s ∈
[
0, 1√
3
]
, in that h(0, p) = −p < 0 and h(s, p) has no
roots in the interior of this interval;
• Given p ∈ (Mp,∞), h(s, p) is strictly increasing when s ∈
(
0, 1√
3
)
, and has a unique root,
namely Ms, in this range.
Since then, Lemma 27 follows from above immediately.
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B.2 Missing Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 were first obtained in [32]. For the sake of completeness, here we offer
a proof of the whole lemma.
[Lemma 3 ([32])]. For R(p) = p ln
(
p2
p2−1
)
and Q(p) = ln
(
p2
p2−1
)
− 12Li2
(
1
p2
)
,
1. R′(p) = p · Q′(p), R′(p) < Q′(p) < 0 and R′′(p) > 0, for all p ∈ (1,∞);
2. R(∞) = Q(∞) = 0 and R(1+) = Q(1+) =∞;
3. 1
p
≤ R(p) ≤ 1
p−1 and
1
p2
≤ |R′(p)| ≤ 1
p2−p , for all p ∈ (1,∞).
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Given p ∈ (1,∞), since ln(1 + x) ≤ x for all x ≥ 0, we have
R′(p) = − 2
p2 − 1 + ln
(
1 +
1
p2 − 1
)
(∗)
≤ − 1
p2 − 1 < 0, (11)
Besides, Q′(p) = − 2
p(p2−1) +
∞∑
k=1
1
k
· 1
p2k+1
= − 2
p(p2−1) − 1p · ln
(
1− 1
p2
)
(11)
= R
′(p)
p
, for all p ∈ (1,∞).
Combining the above two facts together directly implies R′(p) < Q′(p) < 0 for all p ∈ (1,∞).
Finally, observing that R′′(p) (11)= 2(p2+1)
p(p2−1)2 > 0, we complete the proof of Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. For the first limit, since ln(1 + x) ≤ x for all x ≥ 0,
0 ≤ R(∞) = lim
p→∞ p ln
(
1 +
1
p2 − 1
)
≤ lim
p→∞
p
p2 − 1 = 0,
0 ≤ Q(∞) = lim
p→∞
∫ ∞
p
(−R′(x)
x
)
dx ≤ lim
p→∞
∫ ∞
p
(−R′(x)) dx = lim
p→∞R(p) = 0.
For the second limit,
R(1+) ≥ ln
(
lim
p→1+
p2
p2 − 1
)
= ln(∞) =∞,
Q(1+) = lim
p→1+
∫ ∞
p
−R′(x)
x
dx ≥ lim
p→1+
∫ 2
p
−R′(x)
2
dx = lim
p→1+
R(p)−R(2)
2
=∞.
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.2.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Since ln(1− x) ≤ −x for all x ∈ [0, 1),
R(p) = −p ln
(
1− 1
p2
)
≥ p · 1
p2
=
1
p
∀p ∈ (1,∞).
Since ln(1 + x) ≤ x for all x ≥ 0,
R(p) = p ln
(
1 +
1
p2 − 1
)
≤ p
p2 − 1 ≤
p+ 1
p2 − 1 =
1
p− 1 ∀p ∈ (1,∞).
Furthermore, |R′(p)|
(11)
≥ 1
p2−1 >
1
p2
and
∣∣R′(p)∣∣ (11)= 2
p2 − 1 + ln
(
1− 1
p2
)
(⋆)
≤ 2
p2 − 1 −
1
p2
=
1
p2 − p −
1
p3 + p2
<
1
p2 − p,
where (⋆) follows as ln(1− x) ≤ −x for all x ∈ [0, 1). This completes the proof of Lemma 3.3.
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B.3 Useful Inequalities for Lemma 22 and Lemma 21
Lemma 28. For all y ≥ x > 1,
1. 1− e−
(
R(x)−R(y)
)
≤
(
1− x
y
)
· x+eR(x)−R(y)−1
(x−1)2 ;
2. 1
y
·
[
1− e−
(
R(x)−R(y)
)]
≤ 1− e−
(
Q(x)−Q(y)
)
≤ 1
x
·
[
1− e−
(
R(x)−R(y)
)]
;
3. e
R(x)−R(y)
x+eR(x)−R(y)−1 ≥ 1y ;
4. 1− 1
y
≥ (x− 1) · eR(x)−R(y)
x+eR(x)−R(y)−1 .
Proof of Lemma 28.1. Since R(x) ≥ R(y) when y ≥ x > 1 (see Lemma 3.1), and 1 − e−z ≤ z for
all z ≥ 0, we can relax the left hand side (of the inequality in the lemma) as follows:
1− e−
(
R(x)−R(y)
)
≤ R(x)−R(y).
Furthermore, the right hand side (of the inequality in the lemma) can be relaxed as follows:(
1− x
y
)
· x+ e
R(x)−R(y) − 1
(x− 1)2 ≥
(
1− x
y
)
· x
(x− 1)2 .
As per these, we only need to show G1(x, y) ≤ 0 when y ≥ x > 1, where
G1(x, y)
def
= R(x)−R(y)−
(
1− x
y
)
· x
(x− 1)2 .
For this, we shall notice ∂G1
∂y
= −R′(y)− 1
y2
· (1− 1
x
)−2 ≤ g1(y), where
g1(y)
def
= −R′(y)− 1
y2
·
(
1− 1
y
)−2
=
2
y2 − 1 − ln
(
y2
y2 − 1
)
− 1
(y − 1)2 . (12)
Since g1(∞) = 0 and g′1(y) = 6y
2+2
y·(y−1)·(y2−1)2 ≥ 0, when y ≥ x > 1, we surely have
∂G1
∂y
≤ g1(y) ≤ 0. (13)
Together with the fact G1(x, y) = 0 when y = x > 1, we complete the proof of Lemma 28.1.
Proof of Lemma 28.2. Define G2(x, y)
def
= 1
y
·
[
1− e−
(
R(x)−R(y)
)]
−1+e−
(
Q(x)−Q(y)
)
. Noticing that
G2(x, y) = 0 when y = x > 1, we safely turn to certify
∂G2
∂x
=− 1
y
· e−
(
R(x)−R(y)
)
· (−R′(x)) + e−(Q(x)−Q(y)) · (−Q′(x))
=
(−R′(x)) · e−R(x)+Q(y) · (1
x
· eR(x)−Q(x) − 1
y
· eR(y)−Q(y)
)
≥ 0, (Since Q′(x) = 1
x
· R′(x))
for all y ≥ x > 1. Due to Lemma 3.1 that R′(x) ≤ 0, we only need to check g2(x) ≥ g2(y), where
g2(x)
def
= R(x)−Q(x)− lnx. This follows from the monotonicity of g2:
g′1(x) = −(x− 1) ·
(−Q′(x)) − 1
x
≤ −1
x
≤ 0 ∀x ∈ (1,∞).
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We continue to attest the second inequality in Lemma 28.2, that is,
G3(x, y)
def
=
1
x
·
[
1− e−
(
R(x)−R(y)
)]
− 1 + e−
(
Q(x)−Q(y)
)
≥ 0,
for all y ≥ x > 1. Since G3(x, y) = 0 when y = x > 1, we only need to verify
∂G3
∂y
=
1
x
· e−(R(x)−R(y)) · (−R′(y)) − e−(Q(x)−Q(y)) · (−Q′(y))
=
1
x
· (−Q′(y)) · e−R(x)+Q(y) · (y · eR(y)−Q(y) − x · eR(x)−Q(x)) ≥ 0. (Since R′(y) = y · Q′(y))
Since Q′(y) ≤ 0 for all y > 1 (see Lemma 3.1), it remains to reveal g3(y) ≥ g3(x) for all y ≥ x > 1,
where g3(x)
def
= lnx+R(x)−Q(x). The monotonicity of g3(x) is proved as follows:
g′3(x)
(11)
=
1
x
+
(
1− 1
x
)
·
[
− 2
x2 − 1 + ln
(
x2
x2 − 1
)]
≥ 1
x
−
(
1− 1
x
)
· 2
x2 − 1 =
x− 1
x(x+ 1)
≥ 0.
This completes the proof of the Lemma 28.2.
Proof of Lemma 28.3. After being rearranged, the inequality in Lemma 28.3 becomes
eR(x)−R(y) ≥ x− 1
y − 1 .
Since y ≥ x > 1, the lemma directly follows from Lemma 3.1 as eR(x)−R(y) ≥ 1 ≥ x−1
y−1 .
Proof of Lemma 28.4. Since 0 ≤ R(x) ≤ 1
x−1 (see Lemma 3.3), and 1 − e−z ≤ z for all z ≥ 0, we
know 1− e−R(x) ≤ 1
x−1 for all x ∈ (1,∞). After being rearranged, this inequality becomes
1 ≥ (x− 1) · e
R(x)
x+ eR(x) − 1
(‡)
≥ (x− 1) · e
R(x)−R(y)
x+ eR(x)−R(y) − 1 ,
for all y ≥ x > 1, where (‡) follows as g4(z) def= zx+z−1 is increasing on z ∈ (0,∞). As per these, we
can safely rearrange the inequality in Lemma 28.4 as follows:
y − 1 ≥ 1
1− (x− 1) · eR(x)−R(y)
x+eR(x)−R(y)−1
− 1 = (x− 1) · e
R(x)−R(y)
x+ eR(x)−R(y) − 1− (x− 1) · eR(x)−R(y) ,
Further rearranging results in G4(x, y)
def
=
(
1
x−1 − 1y−1
)
−(1− e−(R(x)−R(y))) ≥ 0, for all y ≥ x > 1.
This inequality can be confirmed by observing that G4(x, y) = 0 when y = x > 1, and that
∂G4
∂y
=
1
(y − 1)2 + e
−
(
R(x)−R(y)
)
· R′(y)
(‡)
≥ 1
(y − 1)2 +R
′(y)
(12)
= −g1(y)
(13)
≥ 0,
where (‡) follows as R′(p) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ (1,∞). This completes the proof of Lemma 28.4.
C Missing Proofs in Section 4
C.1 Proof of Lemma 6
In a worst-case instance {Fi}ni=0, w.l.o.g.
• With some pre-fixed r0(0) ≥ 0, r0(q) = r0(0) · (1− q) for all q ∈ [0, 1];
• For each i ∈ [n], qi > 0, ∂+ri(q) > 1 for all q ∈ [0, qi), vi = ri(qi)qi > 1.
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[Lemma 6]. There exists a worst-case instance {Fi}ni=0 of Program (P0), such that for all i ∈ [n]
with ri(0) > 0,
∂+ri(0) > 1 + r0(0).
Proof. Assume to the contrary: There exists k ∈ [n] such that rk(0) > 0 and ∂+rk(0) ≤ 1 + r0(0).
In terms of revenue-quantile curve, let us replace F0 by F 0 (resp. replace Fk by F k).
• Define r0(q)
def
=
(
r0(0) + rk(0)
) · (1− q) for all q ∈ [0, 1];
• Define qk
def
= qk and rk(q)
def
=
{
rk(q)− rk(0) ∀q ∈ [0, qk]
rk(qk)−rk(0)
1−qk · (1− q) ∀q ∈ (qk, 1]
.
We have shown in Section 4.3 that OPT
({F 0}⋃{F k}⋃{Fi}i∈[n]\{k}) = OPT({Fi}ni=0). In the rest
proof, we focus on the feasibility of instance {F 0}
⋃{F k}⋃{Fi}i∈[n]\{k}.
Feasibility Analysis. Under our construction of F k, its feasibility to constraint (C1) trivially
follows from Lemma 2.1: Since ∂+rk(q) = ∂+rk(q) > 1 for all q ∈ [0, qk) = [0, qk),
vk =
vk(qk)
qk
> 1 Φk(v
+
k ) = lim
q→q−
k
∂+rk(q) = lim
q→q−
k
∂+rk(q) = Φk(v
+
k ) ≥ 1.
It remains to preserve constraint (C0) that AP
(
p, {F 0}
⋃{F k}⋃{Fi}i∈[n]\{k}) ≤ AP(p, {Fi}ni=0), or
equivalently,
F 0(p) · F k(p) ≥ F0(p) · Fk(p),
for all p ∈ (1,∞). Depending on whether p > vk def= rk(qk)−rk(0)qk or not, our claim is clarified in the
following two cases. Noticeably, premise ∂+rk(0) ≤ 1 + r0(0) is only used in Case II.
rk(q)
q0
rk(qk)
rk(0)
y
rk(y)
L(q)
1
r(q) = p · q
(a) Original rk(q)
rk(q)
qrk(0) = 0
rk(qk)
y
rk(y)
1
r(q) = p · q
(b) rk(q) after reduction
Figure 7: Demonstrations for the reduction in Lemma 6
Case I (when vk < p <∞). In this case, there exists some y ∈ [0, qk) = [0, qk) such that
p · y = rk(y) = rk(y)− rk(0), (14)
which is shown in Figure 7(b). In Figure 7(a), line segment L(q) has endpoints (y, rk(y)) and (1, 0).
Clearly, L(q) def= rk(y)1−y · (1− q) for all q ∈ [y, 1], corresponding to CDF
FL(p′)
def
=
(1− y) · p′
(1− y) · p′ + rk(y) ∀p
′ ∈
[
0,
rk(y)
y
]
.
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We know26 p ∈
[
0, rk(y)
y
]
and rk(q) ≥ L(q) for all q ∈ [y, 1], since rk(q) is concave on [y, 1] ⊂ [0, 1].
As a consequence, Fk(p
′) ≤ FL(p′) for all p′ ∈
[
0, rk(y)
y
]
, and specifically,
Fk(p) ≤ FL(p) = (1− y) · p
(1− y) · p+ rk(y) . (15)
Since F 0(p) =
p
p+r0(0)
= p
p+r0(0)+rk(0)
, F k(p) = 1− y and F0(p) = pp+r0(0) , our claim follows as(
F 0(p) · F k(p)
)−1
=
(
1 +
r0(0) + rk(0)
p
)
· 1
1− y
≤
(
1 +
r0(0)
p
)
·
(
1 +
rk(0)
p
)
· 1
1− y
(14)
=
(
1 +
r0(0)
p
)
·
(
1 +
rk(y)
1− y ·
1
p
)
(15)
≤ (F0(p) · Fk(p))−1.
Case II (when 1 < p ≤ vk). In this case, observe that p ≤ vk = rk(qk)−rk(0)qk ≤ vk =
rk(qk)
qk
<∞,
all involved CDF’s admit explicit formulas:
F 0(p) =
p
p+ r0(0)
F k(p) =
p
p+ rk(qk)1−qk
F0(p) =
p
p+ r0(0)
Fk(p) =
p
p+ rk(qk)1−qk
. (16)
Due to premise ∂+rk(0) ≤ 1 + r0(0), and since rk(q) is concave,
rk(qk)− rk(0)
qk
≤ ∂+rk(0) ≤ 1 + r0(0). (17)
Recall that r0(0) = r0(0) + rk(0), rk(qk) = rk(qk)− rk(0) and qk = qk. Put everything together,(
F 0(p) · F k(p)
)−1 − (F0(p) · Fk(p))−1
(16)
=
(
1 +
r0(0) + rk(0)
p
)
·
(
1 +
rk(qk)− rk(0)
1− qk ·
1
p
)
−
(
1 +
r0(0)
p
)
·
(
1 +
rk(qk)
1− qk ·
1
p
)
=−
(
p+
r0(0)
qk
− rk(qk)− rk(0)
qk
)
· rk(0)
1− qk ·
qk
p2
(17)
≤ −
(
p+
r0(0)
qk
− 1− r0(0)
)
· rk(0)
1− qk ·
qk
p2
≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows as p > 1 and qk ≤ 1. This completes the proof of the lemma.
C.2 Proofs of Lemma 9 and Lemma 10
In a worst-case instance {Fi}ni=0, w.l.o.g.
• With some pre-fixed r0(0) ≥ 0, r0(q) = r0(0) · (1− q) for all q ∈ [0, 1];
• For each i ∈ [n], qi > 0, ∂+ri(q) > 1 for all q ∈ [0, qi), vi = ri(qi)qi > 1.
26Particularly, when y = 0, premise rk(0) > 0 imposes
rk(y)
y
=∞, and thus p ≤ rk(y)
y
still holds.
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[Lemma 9]. AP
(
p, {Fi}ni=0
)
is increasing, when 1 < p < min
{
vi : i ∈ [n]
}
.
Proof. When 1 < p < min
{
vi : i ∈ [n]
}
, AP
(
p, {Fi}ni=0
)
= p·
{
1−
n∏
i=0
[
(1−qi)·p
(1−qi)·p+ri(qi)
]}
. Therefore,
in this range, we can settle the lemma by observing that
AP
′(p, {Fi}ni=0) =1− n∏
i=0
[
(1− qi) · p
(1− qi) · p+ ri(qi)
]
·
[
1 +
n∑
i=0
ri(qi)
(1− qi) · p+ ri(qi)
]
≥1−
n∏
i=0
[
(1− qi) · p
(1− qi) · p+ ri(qi)
]
·
[
1 +
n∑
i=0
ri(qi)
(1− qi) · p
]
(⊎)
≥ 1−
n∏
i=0
[
(1− qi) · p
(1− qi) · p+ ri(qi)
]
·
n∏
i=0
[
1 +
ri(qi)
(1− qi) · p
]
= 0,
where (⊎) follows as 1 +
n∑
i=0
zi ≤
n∏
i=0
(1 + zi) when zi ≥ 0 for each i ∈ {0}
⋃
[n].
[Lemma 10]. AP
(∞, {Fi}ni=0) = n∑
i=0
ri(0).
Proof. Recall Section 2.2, distribution Fi is regular iff its revenue-quantile curve ri(q) is continuous
and concave on q ∈ [0, 1]. Such continuity and concavity promise that lim
q→0+
ri(q) = r0(0) ∈ [0,∞).
Recall the definition of revenue-quantile curve in Section 2.3, for each i ∈ {0} ∪ [n],
lim
p→∞ p ·
(
1− Fi(p)
)
= lim
p→∞ ri
(
1− Fi(p)
)
= lim
q→0+
ri(q) = ri(0),
which means Fi(p) = 1− ri(0)p + o
(
1
p
)
for sufficiently large p. Therefore, with pre-fixed n ∈ N and
sufficiently large p, we must have
AP
(
p, {Fi}ni=0
)
= p ·
[
1−
n∏
i=0
(
1− ri(0)
p
+ o
(
1
p
))]
=
n∑
i=0
ri(0) + o
(
1
p
)
.
Letting p approach to ∞, we complete the proof of the lemma.
C.3 Proof of Lemma 8
In a worst-case instance {Fi}ni=0, w.l.o.g.
• With some pre-fixed r0(0) ≥ 0, r0(q) = r0(0) · (1− q) for all q ∈ [0, 1];
• For each i ∈ [n], qi > 0, ∂+ri(q) > 1 for all q ∈ [0, qi), vi = ri(qi)qi > 1.
[Lemma 8]. Given a feasible instance {Fi}ni=0 of Program (P0) that r0(0) ≥ 12 , there exists
another feasible instance {F i}ni=0 such that OPT
({F i}ni=0) ≥ OPT({Fi}ni=0), and
r0(q) = 1− q ∀q ∈ [0, 1] ri(0) = 0 ∀i ∈ [n].
Proof. Given a feasible instance {Fi}ni=0 that r0(0) ≥ 12 , a desired instance {F i}ni=0 is constructed
in Algorithm 4. Notably, premise r0(0) ≥ 12 is only used in Case II.1 of Analysis III.
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Analysis I: Reduction. It was explicitly shown in [4] that
n∑
i=0
ri(qi) ≥ OPT
({Fi}ni=0). Assuming
w.l.o.g. OPT
({Fi}ni=0) > 1, we have r0(0) + n∑
i=1
ri(qi) > 1. Due to premise vi > 1 for each i ∈ [n],
definitely min{vi : i ∈ [n]} > 1. Since then,
• ExAnte(p)
def
= r0(0) +
∑
i∈[n]:vi≥p
ri(qi) +
∑
i∈[n]:vi<p
ri
(
1− Fi(p)
)
is decreasing on (0,∞);
• ExAnte
(
min{vi : i ∈ [n]}
)
= r0(0) +
n∑
i=1
ri(qi) > 1, ;
• ExAnte(∞) =
n∑
i=0
ri(0)
(∗)
= AP
(∞, {Fi}ni=0) ≤ 1, where (∗) follows from Lemma 10.
• ExAnte(p) has at most n points of discontinuity: For each i ∈ [n], Fi has at most one point
of discontinuity (which must be ui if exists, see Section 2.2).
As per these, we know (1) parameter θ
def
= max
{
p ∈ (1,∞] : ExAnte(p) ≥ 1} is well-defined; and
(2) let S
def
= {i ∈ [n] : Fi has probability-mass at θ}, then
ExAnte(θ)−
∑
i∈S:vi≥θ
ri(qi)−
∑
i∈S:vi<θ
ri
(
1− Fi(θ)
) ≤ 1. (18)
Afterwards, we would (1) determine parameter zi ∈ [0, qi] for each i ∈ [n]; then (2) construct a
desired instance {F i}ni=0 in term of revenue-quantile curves (in a fashion suggested by Figure 8).
ri(q)
q0
r(q) = θ · q
qi
ri(qi)
zi
ri(zi)
ri(0)
1
(a) Original ri(q)
ri(q)
q0
qi
r(qi)
1
(b) ri(q) after reduction
Figure 8: Demonstration for Algorithm 4, where qi = qi − zi and r(qi) = ri(qi)− ri(zi).
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Algorithmus 4 (Reduction for Lemma 8)
Input: parameter θ, indices S, feasible instance {ri}ni=0 that r0(0) ≥ 12 and
n∑
i=0
ri(qi) > 1.
Output: parameters {zi}ni=1, desired instance {ri}ni=0, then {F i}ni=0 follows.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
1: Let ∆#
def
= 1− r0(0). ⊲ Firstly, compute parameters {zi}ni=0.
2: for all i ∈ [n] \ S do
3: if vi ≥ θ then Define zi def= qi.
4: else Define zi
def
=
(
1− Fi(θ)
) ≤ qi.
5: Update: ∆# ←
(
∆# − ri(zi)
)
6: end for ⊲ ∆# ≥ 0 at the end of this loop, by inequality (18).
7: for all i ∈ S do ⊲ Different orders of i’s in S do not matter.
8: Define zi
def
= min
{
1− Fi(θ), ∆#θ
}
≤ qi. ⊲ Such Fi has probability-mass at ui = θ.
9: Update: ∆# ←
(
∆# − ri(zi)
)
.
10: end for ⊲ ∆# = 0 at the end of this loop, since ExAnte(θ) ≥ 1.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
11: Define r0(q)
def
= 1− q for all q ∈ [0, 1]. ⊲ Secondly, construct desired {ri}ni=0.
12: for all i ∈ [n] do
13: Define qi
def
= (qi − zi) ∈ [0, qi] and ri(q) def=
{
ri(q + zi)− ri(zi) ∀q ∈ [0, qi]
ri(qi)−ri(zi)
1−qi · (1− q) ∀q ∈ (qi, 1]
.
14: end for
15: return {zi}ni=1 and {ri}ni=0.
Analysis II: Optimality. The facts below are central to justifying the optimality of {F i}ni=0.
Here, the concavity of ri(q) ensures ∂+ri(q) ≥ ∂+ri(q + zi) = ∂+ri(q) for all q ∈ (0, qi). Since
then, fact (c) follows directly from Fact 5.2 (namely how to convert a revenue-quantile curve to
the corresponding virtual value CDF).
(a): r0(0) +
n∑
i=1
ri(zi) = r0(0) = 1. This follows from definitions of θ and zi’s;
(b): ri(0) = 0 and ri(qi) = ri(qi)− ri(zi) for all i ∈ [n], due to line (13) of Algorithm 4;
(c): 1 ≥ Di(p) ≥ Di(p) for all p ∈ (0,∞) and i ∈ [n].
After our reduction, the objective value of Program (P0) can never decrease: OPT
({F i}ni=0) =
2+
∫ ∞
1
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx ≥ 1+
n∑
i=0
ri(0)+
∫ ∞
1
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx = OPT
({Fi}ni=0). After being
rearranged, this inequality is equivalent to
1−
n∑
i=0
ri(0) ≥
∫ ∞
1
(
n∏
i=1
Di(x)−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx
=
n∑
k=1
∫ ∞
1
k−1∏
i=1
Di(x) ·
n∏
i=k+1
Di(x) ·
(
Dk(x)−Dk(x)
)
dx.
(19)
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Based on the above facts, we can certify inequality (19) as follows:
RHS of (19)
(c)
≤
n∑
k=1
∫ ∞
1
(
Dk(x)−Dk(x)
)
dx
(c)
≤
n∑
k=1
∫ ∞
0
(
Dk(x)−Dk(x)
)
dx
=
n∑
k=1
∫ ∞
0
(
1−Dk(x)
)
dx−
n∑
k=1
∫ ∞
0
(
1−Dk(x)
)
dx
=
n∑
k=1
(
rk(qk)− rk(0)
) − n∑
k=1
(
rk(qk)− rk(0)
)
(By Main Lemma 4)
(b)
=
n∑
k=1
(
rk(zk)− rk(0)
) (a)
= 1−
n∑
k=0
rk(0) = LHS of (19).
Analysis III: Feasibility. For output {F i}ni=0 of Algorithm 4, the feasibility to constraint (C1)
trivially follows from Lemma 2.1: For each i ∈ [n], under premise ∂+ri(q) > 1 for all q ∈ [0, qi), it
follows from line (13) that ∂+ri(q) = ∂+ri(q + zi) > 1 for all q ∈ [0, qi) = [0, qi − zi). Clearly27,
vi =
ri(qi)
qi
> 1 Φi(v
+
i ) = lim
q→q−i
∂+ri(q) ≥ 1.
On the other hand, the feasibility to constraint (C0) is specified in the following two cases. For
this, the facts mentioned in Analysis II are also useful.
Case I (when p > θ): In this case, for each i ∈ [n], it is easy to see F i(p) = 1. Consequently,
AP
(
p, {F i}ni=0
)
= AP
(
p, {F 0}
)
= p ·
(
1− p
p+1
)
= p
p+1 ≤ 1.
Case II (when 1 < p ≤ θ): In this case, for each j ∈ {0}⋃[n], let sj def= r0(0) + j∑
i=1
ri(zi) for
notational simplicity. For all j ∈ [n], we claim
p
p+ sj
·
j∏
i=1
F i(p) ·
n∏
i=j+1
Fi(p) ≥ p
p+ sj−1
·
j−1∏
i=1
F i(p) ·
n∏
i=j
Fi(p) ∀p ∈ (1, θ]. (20)
If so, since s0 = r0(0) and sn = r0(0) +
n∑
i=1
ri(zi)
(a)
= 1 = r0(0), this chain of inequalities implies
n∏
i=0
F i(p)
sn=r0(0)
=======
p
p+ sn
·
n∏
i=1
F i(p)
(20)
≥ p
p+ s0
·
n∏
i=1
Fi(p)
s0=r0(0)
=======
n∏
i=0
Fi(p) ∀p ∈ (1, θ],
which guarantees AP
(
p, {F i}ni=0
) ≤ AP(p, {Fi}ni=0) ≤ 1 for all p ∈ (1, θ].
Given k ∈ [n], under induction hypothesis that inequality (20) holds for all j ∈ [k− 1], we shall
attest that so it is when j = k. Rearrange inequality (20), it suffices to show(
1 +
sk−1 + rk(zk)
p
)
· (F k(p))−1 ≤ (1 + sk−1
p
)
· (Fk(p))−1 ∀p ∈ (1, θ]. (21)
For each i ∈ [n], let vi def= ri(qi)qi > 1. Define U
def
=
{
i ∈ [n] : (vi ≤ θ)
∧
(vi ≥ p)
}
. Depending on
whether k ∈ U or not, we would deal with inequality (21) in different manners.
27Particularly, F i “vanishes” when qi = 0, i.e., when zi = qi. If so, vi ≡ Φi(v
+
i ) can be set as any finite value.
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Case II.1 (when 1 < p ≤ θ and k ∈ U): In this case, since rk(q) is concave on [0, 1] and k ∈ U ,
vk =
rk(qk)
qk
≥ rk(qk)− rk(zk)
qk − zk
(⊎)
= vk ≥ p,
where (⊎) follows from line (13) of Algorithm 4. Clearly, F k(p) and Fk(p) admit explicit formulas:
F k(p) =
(1− qk) · p
(1− qk) · p+ rk(qk)
Fk(p) =
(1− qk) · p
(1− qk) · p+ rk(qk) . (22)
Since then, we can check inequality (21) as follows:
LHS of (21)− RHS of (21)
(22)
=
(
1 +
sk−1 + rk(zk)
p
)
·
(
1 +
rk(qk)
1− qk
· 1
p
)
−
(
1 +
sk−1
p
)
·
(
1 +
rk(qk)
1− qk ·
1
p
)
(By line (13) of Algorithm 4, rk(qk) = rk(qk)− rk(zk) and qk = qk − zk ≤ qk)
≤
(
1 +
sk−1 + rk(zk)
p
)
·
(
1 +
rk(qk)− rk(zk)
1− qk ·
1
p
)
−
(
1 +
sk−1
p
)
·
(
1 +
rk(qk)
1− qk ·
1
p
)
=−
(
p− rk(qk)− sk−1
qk
+
rk(zk)
qk
)
· qk
1− qk ·
rk(zk)
p2
(⋄)
≤ −
(
p− 1 + rk(zk)
qk
)
· qk
1− qk ·
rk(zk)
p2
≤ 0, (As p > 1)
where in (⋄) we apply Lemma 29 (whose premise vk ≤ θ follows as k ∈ U).
Lemma 29. Suppose vk ≤ θ, then rk(qk)−sk−1qk = vk −
sk−1
qk
≤ 1.
Proof of Lemma 29. Recall premise r0(0) ≥ 12 in Lemma 8, and facts mentioned in Analysis II,
1
2 ≤ r0(0) = s0 ≤ · · · ≤ sk−1 ≤ · · · ≤ sn = r0(0) +
n∑
i=1
ri(zi)
(a)
= 1, which means
0 ≤ 1− sk−1
sk−1
≤ 1. (23)
Given p ∈ (1, θ], under induction hypothesis that inequality (20) holds for all j ∈ [k − 1], certainly
p
p+sk−1
·Fk−1(p) ≥ pp+sk−1 ·
k−1∏
i=1
F i(p) ·
n∏
i=k
Fi(p)
(20)
≥ p
p+r0(0)
·
n∏
i=1
Fi(p)
s0=r0(0)
=======
n∏
i=0
Fi(p). As per this,
and under our premise that {Fi}ni=0 is feasible to constraint (C0), definitely
p ·
(
1− p
p+ sk−1
· Fk−1(p)
)
≤ AP(p, {Fi}ni=0) ≤ 1,
for all p ∈ (1, θ]. Under premise θ ≥ vk > 1, assigning p← vk gives vk ·
[
1− vk
vk+sk−1
· (1− qk)
]
≤ 1,
or equivalently,
qk ≤ 1− sk−1
vk
+
sk−1
v2k
. (24)
Accordingly, vk − sk−1qk
(24)
≤ vk − v2k
/(
1−sk−1
sk−1
· vk + 1
) (23)
≤ vk − v
2
k
vk+1
= vk
vk+1
≤ 1. This completes
the proof of Lemma 29.
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Case II.2 (when 1 < p ≤ θ and k ∈ [n]\U): Due to line (13) of Algorithm 4, and as Figure 9(b)
shows, there exists y ∈ [0, qk) = [0, qk − zk) such that
p · y = rk(y) = rk(y + zk)− rk(zk). (25)
No matter whether y = 0 or not, we always have p ∈
[
0, rk(y+zk)
y+zk
]
:
• Suppose y = 0, then p ≤ θ
(∨)
≤ rk(zk)
zk
= rk(y+zk)
y+zk
, where (∨) follows from the definition of zk;
• Otherwise, p
(25)
= rk(y+zk)−rk(zk)
y+zk−zk ≤
rk(y+zk)
y+zk
, where the inequality follows as rk(q) is concave.
rk(q)
q0
y + zk
rk(y + zk)
L(q)
1
r(q) = p · q
(a) Original rk(q)
rk(q)
qrk(0) = 0
rk(qk)
y
rk(y)
1
r(q) = p · q
(b) rk(q) after reduction
Figure 9: Demonstrations for the reduction in Algorithm 4
In Figure 9(a), line segment L(q) has endpoints (y + zk, rk(y + zk)) and (1, 0). Transparently,
L(q) def= rk(y+zk)1−y−zk · (1− q) for all q ∈ [y + zk, 1], which corresponds to CDF
FL(p′)
def
=
(1− y − zk) · p′
(1− y − zk) · p′ + rk(y + zk) ∀p
′ ∈
[
0,
rk(y + zk)
y + zk
]
.
Since rk(q) is concave on [y+ zk, 1] ⊂ [0, 1], we know rk(q) ≥ L(q) for all q ∈ [y+ zk, 1] and further,
Fk(p
′) ≤ FL(p′) for all p′ ∈
[
0, rk(y+zk)
y+zk
]
. Specifically, recall that p ∈
[
0, rk(y+zk)
y+zk
]
,
Fk(p) ≤ FL(p) = (1− y − zk) · p
(1− y − zk) · p+ rk(y + zk) ≤
(1− y) · p
(1− y) · p+ rk(y + zk) . (26)
Together with the fact F k(p) = 1− y, we settle inequality (21) as follows:
LHS of (21) =
(
1 +
sk−1 + rk(zk)
p
)
· 1
1− y ≤
(
1 +
sk−1
p
)
·
(
1 +
rk(zk)
p
)
· 1
1− y
(25)
=
(
1 +
sk−1
p
)
·
(
1 +
rk(y + zk)
1− y ·
1
p
)
(26)
≤ RHS of (21).
To sum up, by induction inequality (21) holds for each j ∈ [n]. As mentioned before, this indicates
AP
(
p, {F i}ni=0
) ≤ AP(p, {Fi}ni=0) ≤ 1 for all p ∈ (1, θ].
Henceforth, we settle the optimality and feasibility of {F i}ni=0, hence Lemma 8.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 11
The following mathematical fact is got in Appendix B.1, and is central to the proof of Lemma 11.
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[Lemma 26]. H(s, p) < 0 for all s ∈
[
0, 1√
3
]
and p ∈ (1,∞), where
H(s, p)
def
= ln
(
1− 1
p
)
+ ln
(
1 +
s
p
)
+
[
p− (1 + s)] · ( 1
p− 1 +
1
p+ s
− 2
p
)
.
Recall the definition of critical instance:
[Definition 2]. A critical instance {Fi}ni=0 is feasible, has well-defined and finite β, and satisfies:
1. ∀(i ∈ [n]: Fi(β) < 1), ∃ai > 1, ∃bi ≥ 0: Fi(p) = 1− bip−ai for all p ∈ (β,∞);
2. ∂+AP
(
β
)
= 0.
[Lemma 11]. Given a critical instance {Fi}ni=0 of Program (P0) that satisfies the property from
Lemma 6 (i.e., ∂+ri(0) > 1 + r0(0) for all i ∈ [n] with ri(0) > 0), then r0(0) > 1√3 .
Proof. We would settle Lemma 11 in two steps, both of which are based on proof by contradiction.
Analysis I. We first claim there exists at least one k ∈ [n] such that rk(0) > 0.
When {Fi}ni=0 satisfies all premises, clearly28 Γ def=
{
i ∈ [n] : Fi(β) < 1
} 6= ∅. By the first
condition for criticality, for each i ∈ Γ, there exists ai > 1 and bi ≥ 0 such that Fi(p) = 1 − bip−ai
for all p ∈ (β,∞). Indeed, Γ0 def=
{
i ∈ Γ : bi = 0
}
= ∅. For this, we shall observe that
(a): Fi(β
+) = Fi(β) < 1 for each i ∈ (Γ \Γ0). Clearly, such distribution Fi has support-supremum
ui =∞ (in that ri(0) = bi > 0), and thus must be continuous at β < ui =∞ (see Section 2.2);
(b): Fi(β
+) = 1 yet Fi(β) < 1, for each i ∈ Γ0.
Assume to the contrary Γ0 6= ∅, then it follows from above that
AP
(
β+, {Fi}ni=0
)
=AP
(
β+, {F0}
⋃
{Fi}i∈Γ
) (b)
= AP
(
β+, {F0}
⋃
{Fi}i∈Γ\Γ0
)
(a)
=AP
(
β, {F0}
⋃
{Fi}i∈Γ\Γ0
) (b)
< AP
(
β+, {F0}
⋃
{Fi}i∈Γ
)
= AP
(
β, {Fi}ni=0
)
,
which violates to premise ∂+AP
(
β, {Fi}ni=0
)
= 0. Hitherto, we know (Γ \ Γ0) = Γ 6= ∅. To sum up,
for each i ∈ Γ 6= ∅, there exists ai > 1 and bi > 0 such that
• Fi(p) = 1− bip−ai for all p ∈ (β,∞), and Fi(β+) = Fi(β) < 1;
• fi(p) = F
′
i (p) =
bi
(p−ai)2 > 0 when p ∈ (β,∞);
• ri(q) = ai · q + bi when q ∈
[
0, 1 − Fi(β)
]
, due to the reduction of revenue-quantile curve in
Section 2.3.
Now, we achieve our claim by observing ri(0) = bi > 0 and ∂+ri(0) = ai > 1, for each i ∈ Γ 6= ∅.
28If Γ = ∅, we obtain a contradiction 1 = AP
(
β, {Fi}
n
i=0
)
= AP
(
β, {F0}
)
= β ·
(
1− β
β+r0(0)
)
≤ r0(0) ≤
1√
3
.
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Analysis II. To see the lemma, assume to the contrary that r0(0) ≤ 1√3 . Based on the conclusions
of Analysis I,
p− 1− Fi(p)
fi(p)
= ai > 1 + r0(0),
for all p ∈ (β,∞) and i ∈ Γ 6= ∅. Particularly, when p goes to β+, rearranging this inequality gives[
β − (1 + r0(0))] · fi(β+) ≥ 1− Fi(β+) = 1− Fi(β), (27)
for each i ∈ Γ 6= ∅. Recall premise that β = max{p ∈ (1,∞] : AP(p, {Fi}ni=0) = 1} is well-defined
and finite, and the second condition for criticality that ∂+AP
(
β, {Fi}ni=0
)
= 0. We have
(c): ln
(
1− 1
β
)
+ln
(
1 + r0(0)
β
)
=
∑
i∈Γ
lnFi(β). This follows from rearranging 1 = AP
(
β, {Fi}ni=0
)
=
AP
(
β, {F0}
⋃{Fi}i∈Γ) = β · (1− ββ+r0(0) · ∏
i∈Γ
Fi(β)
)
;
(d): 1
β−1 +
1
β+r0(0)
− 2
β
=
∑
i∈Γ
fi(β
+)
Fi(β)
. This follows from taking right-derivatives on both hand sides
of the equation in (c), under premise ∂+AP
(
β, {F0}
⋃{Fi}i∈Γ) = ∂+AP(β, {Fi}ni=0) = 0.
Gathering everything together results in
ln
(
1− 1
β
)
+ ln
(
1 +
r0(0)
β
)
(c)
= −
∑
i∈Γ
ln
(
1 +
1− Fi(β)
Fi(β)
)
(⋆)
≥ −
∑
i∈Γ
1− Fi(β)
Fi(β)
(27)
≥ −
[
β − (1 + r0(0))] ·∑
i∈Γ
fi(β
+)
Fi(β)
(d)
= −
[
β − (1 + r0(0))] · ( 1
β − 1 +
1
β + r0(0)
− 2
β
)
,
where (⋆) follows as x ≥ ln(1 + x) for all x ≥ 0.
In terms of H(s, p) defined in Lemma 26, rearranging this inequality gives H
(
r0(0), β
) ≥ 0.
Under premises 1 < β <∞ and 0 ≤ r0(0) ≤ 1√3 , this contradicts Lemma 26 that H(s, p) < 0 for all
s ∈
[
0, 1√
3
]
and p ∈ (1,∞). Refuting our previous assumption, we settle the proof of Lemma 11.
C.5 Proof of Lemma 12
In a worst-case instance {Fi}ni=0, w.l.o.g.
• With some pre-fixed r0(0) ≥ 0, r0(q) = r0(0) · (1− q) for all q ∈ [0, 1];
• For each i ∈ [n], qi > 0, ∂+ri(q) > 1 for all q ∈ [0, qi), vi = ri(qi)qi > 1.
[Lemma 12]. Given a feasible instance {Fi}ni=0 of Program (P0) that
n∑
i=0
ri(0) = 1 and satisfies
the property from Lemma 6 (i.e., ∂+ri(0) > 1+r0(0) for all i ∈ [n] with ri(0) > 0), then r0(0) > 1√3 .
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Proof. For ease of notation, let S
def
=
{
i ∈ [n] : ri(0) > 0
} ⊂ [n]. Assuming to the contrary that
r0(0) ≤ 1√3 , we claim that AP
(
p, {Fi}ni=0
)
> 1 when p is sufficiently large. This would violate the
feasibility to constraint (C0).
ri(q)
q0
ri(qi)
qi > 0
ri(0) > 0
ci
ri(ci)
1
r(q) = ai · q + ri(0)
Figure 10: Demonstrations for Lemma 12
For each i ∈ S, given ai ∈
(
1 + r0(0), ∂+ri(0)
)
, let ci > 0 be that ri(ci) = aici + ri(0) (which
refers to Figure 10 in the above). Recall that qi > 0 for each i ∈ S. As Figure 10 suggests, for each
i ∈ S, we shall notice that
• The concavity of ri(q) indicates that ri(q) ≥ ai · q + ri(0) when q ∈ [0, ci];
• Fi(p) ≥ 1− ri(0)p−ai for all p ∈
(
ri(ci)
ci
,∞
)
, due to Fact 5 (i.e., the reduction from ri(q) to Fi).
Define θ
def
= max
{
ri(ci)
ci
: i ∈ S
}
. For all p ∈ [θ,∞], we know from the above that
p ·
[
1− p
p+ r0(0)
·
∏
i∈S
(
1− ri(0)
p− ai
)]
≤ AP(p, {F0}⋃{Fi}i∈S) ≤ AP(p, {Fi}ni=0).
To obtain the desired contradiction, it suffices to prove that p ·
[
1− p
p+r0(0)
· ∏
i∈S
(
1− ri(0)
p−ai
)]
> 1,
when p is sufficiently large. Let t
def
= 1
p
∈ [0, θ−1] for notational brevity. After rearranging, we turn
to show that GAP(t) > 0 when t > 0 is sufficiently small, where
GAP(t)
def
= ln(1− t) + ln (1 + r0(0) · t)+∑
i∈S
ln(1− ai · t)−
∑
i∈S
ln
[
1− (ai + ri(0)) · t] .
Equipped with the new notations, we shall observe GAP(0) = 0 and further,
• First Derivative: G′
AP
(t) = − 11−t+ r0(0)1+r0(0)·t−
∑
i∈S
ai
1−ai·t+
∑
i∈S
ai+ri(0)
1−
(
ai+ri(0)
)
·t
. In that
n∑
i=0
ri(0) = 1,
we must have G′
AP
(0) = −1 + r0(0) +
∑
i∈S
ri(0) = −1 +
n∑
i=0
ri(0) = 0;
• Second Derivative: G′′
AP
(t) = − 1
(1−t)2 −
r20(0)(
1+r0(0)·t
)2 −∑
i∈S
a2i
(1−ai·t)2 +
∑
i∈S
(
ai+ri(0)
)2
[
1−
(
ai+ri(0)
)
·t
]2 . Hence,
G′′AP(0) =− 1− r20(0)−
∑
i∈S
a2i +
∑
i∈S
(
ai + ri(0)
)2
> −1− r20(0) + 2 ·
∑
i∈S
ai · ri(0)
>− 1− r20(0) + 2 ·
∑
i∈S
(
1 + r0(0)
) · ri(0) = −1− r20(0) + 2 · (1− r20(0)) ≥ 0,
53
where the last inequality follows from our assumption that r0(0) ≤ 1√3 .
Combining everything together, we conclude that GAP(t) > 0 when t > 0 is sufficiently small, which
contradicts the feasibility to constraint (C0). This completes the proof of the lemma.
D Proof of Lemma 4
[Definition 1]. Given γ ∈ [1,∞) and n ∈ N+, triangular instance {Tri(vi, qi)}n2i=1 satisfies that
• vi = γ + n− i−1n , for all i ∈ [n2]. For notational simplicity, let v0
def
= ∞;
•
i∑
j=1
ln
(
1 + viqi1−qi
)
= R(vi), that is, qi = e
R(vi)−R(vi−1)−1
vi+e
R(vi)−R(vi−1)−1 , for all i ∈ [n
2].
When n approaches to infinity, {Tri(vi, qi)}n2i=1 converges to Cont(γ).
[Lemma 4]. OPT
(
Cont(γ)
)
= 2+
∫ ∞
1
(
1− e−Q
(
max{x,γ}
))
dx is decreasing for all γ ∈ [1,∞).
y
p
1
0−1 1 2 3 4 5γ
y = e−Q(p)
e−Q(γ)
Figure 11: Demonstration for y = e−Q(p), where OPT
(
Cont(γ)
)
equals to the area of shadow
Proof. Figure 11 is offered to make things mimic, from which the monotonicity of OPT
(
Cont(γ)
)
follows immediately. Given γ ∈ [1,∞) and n ∈ N+ in Definition 1, we would use a formula obtained
in [32] (see Lemma 1 therein) to rewrite the objective value of Program (P1):
OPT
(
{Tri(vi, qi)}n2i=1
)
= 2 +
∫ ∞
1
1− ∏
i∈[n2]:vi>x
(1− qi)
 dx. (28)
When n approaches to infinity, combining Definition 1 and Lemma 3 gives
lim
n→∞
∏
i∈[n2]:vi>p
(1− qi) = lim
n→∞
∏
i∈[n2]:vi>p
(
1 +
eR(vi)−R(vi−1) − 1
vi
)−1
= lim
n→∞
∏
i∈[n2]:vi>p
(
1 +
R(vi)−R(vi−1)
vi
)−1
= lim
n→∞
∏
i∈[n2]:vi>p
[
1 +
|R′(vi)|
vi
· (vi−1 − vi)
]−1
=exp
− lim
n→∞
∑
i∈[n2]:vi>p
|R′(vi)|
vi
· (vi−1 − vi)
 = exp(− ∫ ∞
p
|R′(x)|
x
dx
)
= e−Q(p),
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for all p ∈ (γ,∞). Similarly, we also have lim
n→∞
∏
i∈[n2]:vi>p
(1−qi) = e−Q(γ), for all p ∈ (1, γ]. Applying
these to Eq (28) completes the proof of the lemma.
E Missing Proofs in Section 5.1 and Section 5.2
E.1 Proof of Lemma 13
[Lemma 13]. 132ǫ
2 ≤ δ∗ ≤ 12ǫ, and 1 < v∗ ≤ u∗ ≤ γ∗ ≤ 33ǫ2 , and κ∗ ∈ (0, 1], and ∆∗ ∈ (0, δ∗).
Proof. Given ǫ ∈ (0, 1), for u∗ = R−1(ǫ), it follows from Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.3 that
1
ǫ
=
1
R(u∗) ≤ u
∗ ≤ 1R(u∗) + 1 ≤
2
ǫ
, (29)
∣∣R′((1 + ǫ) · u∗)∣∣ ≥ ∣∣R′(2u∗)∣∣ ≥ 1
4u∗2
(29)
≥ 1
16
ǫ2. (30)
For each i ∈ [n], clearly Di
(
(1 + ǫ) · p) ≤ D∗i (p) when p ∈ (0,∞), due to the definition of {D∗i }ni=1
in line (2) of Algorithm 1. By Fact 6.2, we also have Fi
(
(1+ ǫ) ·p) ≤ F ∗i (p) when p ∈ (0,∞). Thus,
Ψ
(
p, {F ∗i }ni=1
) ≤ Ψ((1 + ǫ) · p, {Fi}ni=1) (⋄)≤ R((1 + ǫ) · p), (31)
where (⋄) follows as {Fi}ni=1 is feasible to constraint (C2). As a consequence,
δ∗ =
1
2
·min
{
R(p)−Ψ(p, {F ∗i }ni=1) : p ∈ (1, u∗]}
(31)
≥ 1
2
·min
{
R(p)−R((1 + ǫ) · p) : p ∈ (1, u∗]}
=
1
2
·
(
R(u∗)−R((1 + ǫ) · u∗)) (By Lemma 3.1, R′(p) ≤ R′((1 + ǫ) · p))
≥1
2
· ∣∣R′((1 + ǫ) · u∗)∣∣ · ǫ · u∗ (29,30)≥ 1
32
ǫ2. (Since R(p) is convex and decreasing)
The monotonicity of R(p) also implies δ∗ ≤ 12 ·min
{R(p) : p ∈ (1, u∗]} = 12 · R(u∗) = 12ǫ.
As for the second claim, it is easy to see u∗ ≥ v∗ > 1. Moreover, noticing that R(p) is strictly
decreasing on p ∈ (1,∞), and R(p) ≤ 1
p−1 , we can infer
33
ǫ2
≥ 1 + 32
ǫ2
≥ γ∗ ≥ u∗ by observing
1
γ∗ − 1 ≥ R(γ
∗) = δ∗ ≥ 1
32
ǫ2 R(γ∗) = δ∗ ≤ 1
2
ǫ < ǫ = R(u∗).
Besides, 1 ≥
n∏
i=1
(1− q∗i ) = κ∗ ≥ e−R(v
∗) > 0, in that
R(v∗) ≥R((1 + ǫ) · v∗) (31)≥ Ψ(v∗, {F ∗i }ni=1) (Since R(p) is decreasing)
=
n∑
i=1
ln
(
1 +
v∗i q
∗
i
1− q∗i
)
≥
n∑
i=1
ln
(
1 +
q∗i
1− q∗i
)
= − lnκ∗. (Since v∗i ≥ v∗ > 1 for all i ∈ [n])
Eventually, 0 < ∆∗ = v
∗−1
3γ∗2 · κ∗ · δ∗ < δ∗, in that γ∗ ≥ v∗ > 1 and κ ∈ (0, 1]. This completes the
proof of the lemma.
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E.2 Proofs of Lemma 14 and Lemma 15
[Lemma 14].
∫ ∞
1
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx−
∫ ∞
1
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di
(
(1 + ǫ) · x)) dx ≤ 3ǫ.
Proof. By line (2) of Algorithm 1, Di(p) ≤ Di
(
(1 + ǫ) · p) for all p ∈ (0,∞) and i ∈ [n]. Hence,
LHS ≤
(∫ 1
0
+
∫ ∞
1
)(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx−
(∫ 1
0
+
∫ ∞
1
)(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di
(
(1 + ǫ) · x)) dx
(∗)
=
(
1− 1
1 + ǫ
)
·
∫ ∞
0
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx ≤ ǫ ·OPT({Fi}ni=1),
where (∗) follows from integration by substitution. Alaei et al. [4] proved OPT({Fi}ni=1) ≤ e ≤ 3.
Applying this to the above inequality completes the proof of the lemma.
[Lemma 15].
∫ ∞
u∗
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di
(
(1 + ǫ) · x)) dx ≤ ∫ ∞
u∗
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx ≤ 2ǫ.
Proof. The first inequality follows from the monotonicity of Di’s. As for the second one, note that
1−
n∏
i=1
zi ≤
n∑
i=1
(1− zi) for all (z1, z2, · · · , zn) ∈ [0, 1]n (which can be easily attested by induction),
∫ ∞
u∗
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Di(x)
)
dx ≤
∫ ∞
u∗
n∑
i=1
(
1−Di(x)
)
dx
(⋆)
≤
n∑
i=1
u∗ · 1− Fi(u
∗)
Fi(u∗)
(32)
where in (⋆) we apply Lemma 30 in the below. For each i ∈ [n], we have
ln
(
1 + u∗ · 1− Fi(u
∗)
Fi(u∗)
)
= Ψ
(
u∗, {F ∗i }
) ≤ Ψ(u∗, {F ∗i }ni=1) (∨)≤ R(u∗) = ǫ ≤ 1.
where (∨) follows as {F ∗i }ni=1 is feasible to constraint (C2). Accordingly, u∗ · 1−Fi(u
∗)
Fi(u∗)
≤ e− 1 ≤ 2
for each i ∈ [n]. Note that z ≤ 2 ln(1 + z) for all z ∈ [0, 2],
LHS of (32) ≤ 2 ·
n∑
i=1
ln
(
1 + u∗ · 1− Fi(u
∗)
Fi(u∗)
)
= 2Ψ
(
u∗, {F ∗i }ni=1
) (◦)≤ 2R(u∗) = 2ǫ,
where (◦) also follows from the feasibility of {F ∗i }ni=1. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 30.
∫ ∞
p
(
1−Di(x)
)
dx ≤ p · 1− Fi(p)
Fi(p)
for all p ∈ (0,∞) and i ∈ [n].
Proof. Given p ∈ (0,∞), since Di(p+) = Fi(Φ−1i (p+)), we settle the lemma by observing∫ ∞
p
(
1−Di(x)
)
dx =
[
(x− p) · (1− Fi(x))]∣∣∣
x=Φ−1i (p
+)
(By Main Lemma 4)
≤
(
x · 1− Fi(x)
Fi(x)
)∣∣∣∣
x=Φ−1i (p
+)
(∧)
≤ p · 1− Fi(p)
Fi(p)
,
where (∧) follows as Φ−1i (p) ≥ p, and y = x · 1−Fi(x)Fi(x) is decreasing on (0,∞) (see Lemma 5).
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F Proof of Lemma 16
[Lemma 16]. In a non-terminal iteration of Algorithm 2, omit the update in line (8),
1. γ∗ ≥ γ ≥ γ ≥ u ≥ u, and ui = u for each i ∈ [n] that ∆i > 0;
2. qi ≤ qi and ui ≥ vi = vi = v∗i ≥ v∗ > 1, for each i ∈ [n];
3. Ψ
(
p, {F i}ni=1
)
= Ψ
(
p, {Fi}ni=1
)−∆ for all p ∈ (0, u].
Proof. By line (7) of Algorithm 2, R(γ) = R(γ) + ∆ ≥ R(γ). As per this, we can infer γ ≤ γ
from Lemma 3.1. By induction, we also have γ ≤ γ∗. Essentially, u (resp. u) is the maximum
support-supremum, among all non-vanishing Fi’s (resp. F i’s). Since then, we know
• u ≤ u (even though some Fi’s vanishes in the current iteration), since ui ≤ ui for all i ∈ [n];
• ui = u for each i ∈ [n] that ∆i > 0. Assuming to the contrary that ui 6= u, we would see a
contradiction that ∆i > 0, in both of the following two cases:
1. When ui < u, this distribution’s aggregated potential-decrease is still 0, since u has never
met this distribution’s support, in the current and all previous iterations;
2. Otherwise, i.e., when ui > u, this distribution’s potential already decreases to 0, in some
previous iteration, which can be inferred from line (5) of Algorithm 2.
It remains to expose γ ≥ u. For convenience, we would justify this after confirming the rest claims.
For the second claim, it is easy to see qi ≥ qi and ui ≥ vi, for each i ∈ [n]. By Lemma 13 that
v∗ = min
{
v∗j : j ∈ [n]
}
> 1, clearly v∗i ≥ v∗ > 1 for each i ∈ [n]. Besides, (1) when ∆i = 0, we
surely have F i ≡ Fi and thus, vi = vi; otherwise, i.e. (2) when ∆i > 0, it follows from Lemma 5
and line (4)/line (8) of Algorithm 3 that
• Ψ
(
p, {F i}
)
is strictly decreasing on p ∈ [vi, u] = [vi, ui] ⊂ [vi, ui], which means that vi ≤ vi;
• Ψ
(
p, {F i}
)
remains ln
(
1 + viqi1−qi
)
−∆i on p ∈ (0, vi], which means vi ≥ vi.
Therefore, vi = vi always holds, whether ∆i = 0 or not. By induction, vi = vi = v
∗
i for all i ∈ [n].
Furthermore, the third claim can be easily inferred from line (4)/line (8) of Algorithm 3. For
this, we shall emphasize again that ui = u, for all i ∈ [n] that ∆i > 0.
Eventually, to see γ ≥ u, we shall recall inequality (1) that R(γ∗) +Ψ(p, {F ∗i }ni=1) ≤ R(p)− δ∗
for all p ∈ (1, u∗]. In the current iteration, assume w.l.o.g.
R(γ) + Ψ(p, {Fi}ni=1) ≤ R(p)− δ∗ ∀p ∈ (1, u]. (33)
Particularly, assigning p← u in inequality (33) results in
R(u)
(33)
≥ R(γ) + Ψ(u, {Fi}ni=1)+ δ∗ ≥ R(γ) + δ∗ (∨)≥ R(γ) + ∆ (∧)= R(γ),
where (∨) follows as δ∗ ≥ ∆∗ ≥ ∆ (see Lemma 13 and line (4) of Algorithm 2), and (∧) follows
from line (7) of Algorithm 2. As per this, we can infer γ ≥ u from Lemma 3.1. Additionally,
R(γ) + Ψ(p, {F i}ni=1) =R(γ) + Ψ(p, {Fi}ni=1)−∆ (By the third claim)
=R(γ) + Ψ(p, {Fi}ni=1) (33)≤ R(p)− δ∗, (By line (7) of Algorithm 2)
for all p ∈ (1, u] ⊂ (1, u]. This means inequality (33) holds in the next iteration, which completes
the proof of the lemma.
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G Missing Proofs in Section 5.4
G.1 Auxiliary Lemma 31
Lemma 31. Given a ≥ 1, b ≥ 0 and Ftan(p) =
{
1− b
p−a p ∈ (a+ b,∞)
0 p ∈ (0, a+ b] . For all θ ∈ (a + b,∞)
and ∆k ∈
(
0,Ψ
(
θ, {Ftan}
)]
, the F tan defined below is regular in the range of p ∈ (0, θ]:
Ψ
(
p, {F tan}
) ≡ Ψ(p, {Ftan}) −∆k ∀p ∈ (a+ b, θ].
r(q)
q
0 1x
rtan(x) = θ · x
x
rtan(x) = θ · x
a+ b
rtan(q) = a · q + b
rtan(q)
(a) rtan(q) and rtan(q)
F (p)
p
0 θa+ b
1
1− x
Ftan(q) = 1−
b
p−a
1− x
rtan(q)
(b) Ftan and F tan
Figure 12: Demonstrations for rtan(q), rtan(q), Ftan and F tan.
Proof. To make things mimic, we provide Figure 12 to exhibit involved revenue-quantile curves and
CDF’s. When p ∈ (0, a + b], clearly Ψ(p, {F tan}) = Ψ(p, {Ftan}) = ∞ and F tan(p) = Ftan(p) = 0,
which indicates the regularity in this range. It remains to deal with the case when p ∈ (a + b, θ].
Recall Section 2.2 for the definition of regularity, the following two claims are equivalent:
• F tan is regular, in the range of p ∈ (a+ b, θ];
• Φtan(p)
def
= p− 1−F tan(p)
ftan(p)
is increasing when p ∈ (a+ b, θ], where f tan(p) def= F ′tan(p).
To settle the lemma, we would verify the second claim instead.
Given p ∈ (a+ b, θ], let y def=
(
1− a+b
p
)
∈ (0, 1− a+b
θ
) ⊂ (0, 1) for notational simplicity. Clearly,
y can be viewed as an increasing function of p. Under the construction in the lemma,
F tan(p) = F tan
(
a+ b
1− y
)
=
(a+ b) · y
ay + b− (1− e−∆k) · (1− y) · (b+ y)
f tan(p) = f tan
(
a+ b
1− y
)
=
[
b− (1− e−∆k) · (b+ y2)] · (1− y)2
[ay + b− (1− e−∆k) · (1− y) · (b+ y)]2 . (34)
As a consequence, Φtan(p) = p− 1−F tan(p)f tan(p) = a+Υ(y) ·
(
1− e−∆k), where
Υ(y)
def
=
(a− 1) · y2 + e−∆k · (b+ y)2
b− (1− e−∆k) · (b+ y2) .
To see the lemma, it suffices to show Υ(y) is increasing on y ∈ (0, 1). Since a ≥ 1 and b ≥ 0,
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• Υ1(y)
def
= (a− 1) · y2 + e−∆k · (b+ y)2 is a positive and increasing function on y ∈ (0, 1);
• Υ2(y)
def
= b− (1− e−∆k) · (b+ y2) is a decreasing function on y ∈ (0, 1);
• Υ2(y)
(34)
=
[
ay+b
1−y −
(
1− e−∆k) · (b+ y)]2 · f tan ( a+b1−y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ (0, 1).
Putting these together indicates the monotonicity of Υ(y), and thus settles the lemma.
G.2 Proof of Lemma 18
[Lemma 18]. rk(q) ≤ ∂+rk(x) · (q − x) + rk(x) for all x ∈ (0, qk) and q ∈ [x, qk).
Proof. W.l.o.g., we would assume ∆k > 0, and thus u = uk (by Lemma 16.1). To make things
mimic, all involved revenue-quantile curves are shown in Figure 13. Recall Fact 5, these revenue-
quantile curves can be converted into the corresponding CDF’s, and vice versa. Under our induction
hypothesis that Fk is regular, rk(q) is continuous and concave on q ∈ [0, 1] (see Section 2.2).
r(q)
q
0 1xx
θ · x
θ · x
rk(q)
rk(q)
(a) rk(q) and rk(q)
rtan(q)
r(q)
q
0 1x
θ · x rk(q)
(b) rk(q) and rtan(q)
r(q)
q
0 1xx
θ · x
θ · x
rtan(q)
rk(q)
(c) rtan(q) and rtan(q)
r(q)
q
0 1x
θ · x
rk(q)
rk(q)
(d) rk(q) and rtan(q)
Figure 13: Demonstrations for rk(q), rk(q), rtan(q) and rtan(q).
As mentioned before, rk(0) = 0. Since rk(q) is continuous and concave, and as Figure 13(a)
suggests, y = rk(x)1−x is continuous and strictly increasing on x ∈ [0, qk]. As per these, given ∆k ∈(
0, ln
(
1 + vkqk1−qk
)]
, there exists a unique x∗ ∈ (0, qk] such that
ln
(
1 +
rk(x
∗)
1− x∗
)
= ∆k
rk(x
∗)
x∗
= uk
Lemma 16.1
========== u.
(a): Given x ∈ (x∗, qk), let θ def= rk(x)x ∈ [vk, uk] ⊂ [vk, uk], a
def
= ∂+rk(x) and b
def
= rk(x)−∂+rk(x) ·x
for notational brevity. Consider the tangent to rk(q) at
(
x, rk(x)
)
, that is,
rtan(q)
def
= a · q + b ∀q ∈ [x, 1].
Clearly, rtan(q) corresponds to CDF Ftan(p)
def
=
{
1− b
p−a ∀p ∈ (a+ b, θ]
0 ∀p ∈ (0, a+ b] . As Figure 13(b)
illustrates, the concavity of rk(q) and tangency imply that
(1): rk(q) ≤ rtan(q) for all q ∈ [x, 1], and thus Fk(p) ≥ Ftan(p) for all p ∈ (0, θ];
(2): rk(x) = rtan(x) and ∂+rk(x) = ∂+rtan(x). Thus, Fk(θ) = Ftan(θ) and fk(θ) = ftan(θ);
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(3): a = ∂+rk(x) = Φk(θ) ≥ Φk(v+k ) ≥ 1 and b ≥ 0, where the two inequalities respectively
follows from our induction hypotheses that Fk is regular (that is, Ψk(p) is increasing
when p ≥ vk = vk), and that Fk satisfies constraint (C1).
(b): Parameter x can be determined by θ and x as ln
(
1 + θ·x1−x
)
= ln
(
1 + θ·x1−x
)
−∆k ≥ 0.
(1): As Figure 13(a) suggests, x ranges from 0 to qk, when x increases from x
∗ to qk.
We further define rtan(q) from rtan(q) and ∆k: In terms of CDF’s,
Ψ
(
p, {F tan}
) ≡ Ψ(p, {Ftan}) −∆k ∀p ∈ (0, θ].
In the range of p ∈ (0, θ] ⊂ (0, uk] = (0, u], recall line (4)/line (8) of Algorithm 3,
Ψ
(
p, {F k}
) ≡ Ψ(p, {Fk}) −∆k.
Respectively, F k and F tan are constructed from Fk and Ftan in same fashions. It follows from
fact (a.1) that Ψ
(
p, {Fk}
) ≤ Ψ(p, {F k}) for all p ∈ (0, θ], which means
Ψ
(
p, {F k}
)
= Ψ
(
p, {Fk}
) −∆k ≤ Ψ(p, {Ftan})−∆k = Ψ(p, {F tan}),
for all p ∈ (0, θ]. In other words,
(2): F k(p) ≥ F tan(p) for all p ∈ (0, θ]. Hence, rk(q) ≤ rtan(q) for all q ∈ [x, 1].
Similarly, as Figure 13(c) suggests, we can also infer from fact (a.2) that
(3): F k(θ) = F tan(θ) and fk(θ) = f tan(θ), which means that rk(x) = rtan(x) and ∂+rk(x) =
∂+rtan(x).
(c): F tan turns out to be regular on p ∈ (0, θ], which is formalized as Lemma 31 in the below (for
this, fact (a.3) ensures the lemma is applicable). That is, rtan(q) is concave on q ∈ [x, 1]. By
equivalent condition for concave functions (see Fact 3),
(1): rtan(q) ≤ ∂+rtan(x) · (q − x) + rtan(x) for all q ∈ [x, 1].
To sum up, and as Figure 13(d) conveys,
rk(q)
(b.2)
≤ rtan(q)
(c.1)
≤ ∂+rtan(x) · (q − x) + rtan(x) (b.3)= ∂+rk(x) · (q − x) + rk(x),
for all q ∈ [x, 1]. Combining this with fact (b.1), we complete the proof of the lemma.
G.3 Proof of Lemma 19
[Lemma 19]. Φk(p) ≥ Φk(p) for all p ∈ (vk,∞) = (vk,∞) and k ∈ [n].
Proof. First of all, when p ∈ (uk,∞), the lemma certainly holds in that Φk(p) = p ≥ Φk(p). In the
range of p ∈ (vk, uk], under our construction in line (4)/line (8) of Algorithm 3,
F k(p) =
Fk(p)
1− (1− e−∆k) ·
[
1−
(
1− 1
p
)
· Fk(p)
] ,
fk(p)
def
= F
′
k(p) =
fk(p)−
(
1− e−∆k) · (fk(p) + Fk(p)2p2 ){
1− (1− e−∆k) ·
[
1−
(
1− 1
p
)
· Fk(p)
]}2 .
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Φk(p) ≥ Φk(p) is equivalent to p− 1−F k(p)fk(p) ≥ p−
1−Fk(p)
fk(p)
. To reveal this, we first plug the above two
formulas into the left hand side of this inequality, and then rearrange the intermediate inequality.
Afterwards, it remains to deal with fk(p) ≥ 1−Fk(p)
p−1+e−∆k ·
(
1+p· 1−Fk(p)
Fk(p)
)2 , or equivalently,
Φk(p) = p− 1− Fk(p)
fk(p)
≥ 1− e−∆k ·
(
1 + p · 1− Fk(p)
Fk(p)
)2
. (35)
Recall our induction hypotheses, Fk is regular (which indicates the monotonicity of Φk(p)), and
satisfies constraint (C1). As per these, inequality (35) surely holds in that
LHS of (35) ≥ Φk(v+k ) ≥ 1 ≥ RHS of (35),
for all p ∈ (vk, uk] ⊂ (vk, uk]. This completes the proof of the lemma.
H Proof of Lemma 22
Assume w.l.o.g. ∆k > 0, then Lemma 16.1 ensures uk = u: While {F i}k−1i=1 ∪ {Fi}ni=k+1 remains,
• Fk becomes F k, where F k is defined as Ψ
(
p, {F k}
) ≡ Ψ(p, {Fk})−∆k for all p ∈ (0, uk];
• Cont(γk) becomes Cont(γk), where γk is defined by letting R(γk) = R(γk) + ∆k;
• γ∗ ≥ γk > γk ≥ uk ≥ uk ≥ vk = vk ≥ v∗ > 1.
H.1 Auxiliary Lemma 32
Lemma 32. Given p ∈ [vk, uk],
(p− 1) · F k(p)− Fk(p)
eQ(γk)−Q(γk) − 1 ≤ 2γ
∗2 ·∆∗ + γk ·
[
Fk(p) + p ·
(
1− Fk(p)
)] · (1− 1
p
)
· Fk(p).
Proof. Under premise γk ≤ γk, clearly Q(γk) ≥ Q(γk). Since ex − 1 ≥ x for all x ≥ 0,
eQ(γk)−Q(γk) − 1 ≥ Q(γk)−Q(γk) Lemma 3.1=========
∫ γk
γk
|R′(x)|
x
dx ≥
∫ γk
γk
|R′(x)|
γk
dx
(4)
=
∆k
γk
.
Together with Lemma 33 in the below, we can infer from above
(p− 1) · F k(p)− Fk(p)
eQ(γk)−Q(γk) − 1 ≤ 2(p − 1) · γk ·∆k + γk ·
[
Fk(p) + p ·
(
1− Fk(p)
)] ·(1− 1
p
)
· Fk(p).
Due to Algorithm 3 and line (4) of Algorithm 2, we know ∆k ≤
n∑
i=1
∆i = ∆ ≤ ∆∗. Under premise
γ∗ ≥ γk ≥ uk ≥ p ≥ vk > 1, we settle the lemma by observing 2(p− 1) · γk ·∆k ≤ 2γ∗2 ·∆∗.
Lemma 33. Given p ∈ [vk, uk], F k(p)− Fk(p) ≤ 2∆2k +
[
Fk(p) + p ·
(
1− Fk(p)
)] · ∆k
p
· Fk(p).
Proof. Let t
def
=
[
Fk(p) + p ·
(
1− Fk(p)
)] · 1
p
for notational simplicity. We shall prove
F k(p)− Fk(p) ≤ 2∆2k + t ·∆k · Fk(p), (36)
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for all p ∈ [vk, uk]. Recall Ψ
(
p, {Fk}
)
= ln
(
1 + p · 1−Fk(p)
Fk(p)
)
, rearranging Eq. (3) results in
F k(p)
(3)
=
Fk(p)
1− t · (1− e−∆k)
(†)
≤ Fk(p)
1− t ·∆k ,
where (†) follows as 0 ≤ t ·∆k ≤ 12 < 1 (see Lemma 34), and 1− e−x ≤ x for all x ≥ 0. Since then,
LHS of (36) ≤ t ·∆k
1− t ·∆k · Fk(p)
(‡)
≤ (2t2 ·∆2k + t ·∆k) · Fk(p) (⋆)≤ RHS of (36),
where (‡) follows as x1−x ≤ 2x2 + x for all x ∈
[
0, 12
]
, and (⋆) follows as Fk(p) ≤ 1 and t ≤ 1 (see
Lemma 34). This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 34. 0 ≤ ∆k ≤ 12 , and 0 ≤
[
Fk(p) + p ·
(
1− Fk(p)
)] · 1
p
≤ 1 for all p ∈ [vk, uk].
Proof. For the first claim, recall line (4) of Algorithm 2, Algorithm 3 and Lemma 13,
0 ≤ ∆k ≤
n∑
i=1
∆i = ∆ ≤ ∆∗ ≤ δ∗ ≤ 1
2
ǫ ≤ 1
2
.
Furthermore, under premise p ≥ vk > 1 (see inequality (5)), the second claim follows as
0 ≤
[
Fk(p) + p ·
(
1− Fk(p)
)] · 1
p
= 1−
(
1− 1
p
)
· Fk(p) ≤ 1.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
H.2 Auxiliary Lemma 35
The following mathematical fact is obtained in Appendix B.3.
[Lemma 28.1]. For all y ≥ x > 1,
1. 1− e−
(
R(x)−R(y)
)
≤
(
1− x
y
)
· x+eR(x)−R(y)−1(x−1)2 .
Lemma 35. Given p ∈ [vk, uk], define p̂ by letting R(p̂) = R(p)−Ψ
(
p, {Fk}
)
, then
1
p̂
≤ 1
Fk(p) + p · (1− Fk(p)) −
(
1− 1
p
)
· Fk(p).
Proof. SinceR(p)−R(p̂) = Ψ(p, {Fk}) = ln(1 + p · 1−Fk(p)Fk(p) ), we surely have Fk(p) = pp+eR(p)−R(p̂)−1 .
Plug this into the inequality in the lemma, it remains to show
1
p̂
≤ p+ e
R(p)−R(p̂) − 1
p
· 1
eR(p)−R(p̂)
− p− 1
p+ eR(p)−R(p̂) − 1 .
After rearranging, we are left with
1− e−
(
R(p)−R(p̂)
)
≤
(
1− p
p̂
)
· p+ e
R(p)−R(p̂) − 1
(p − 1)2 .
Clearly, R(p̂) ≤ R(p) means p̂ ≥ p ≥ vk > 1. Since then, the above inequality can be inferred from
Lemma 28.1. This completes the proof of the lemma.
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H.3 Auxiliary Lemma 36
Lemma 36. Given p ∈ [vk, uk], define p̂ by letting R(p̂) = R(p)−Ψ
(
p, {Fk}
)
, then
γk − p̂ ≥ 1|R′(p̂)| · δ
∗ ≥ (p̂2 − p̂) · δ∗.
Proof. The second inequality follows from Lemma 3.3 that |R′(p̂)| ≤ (p̂2 − p̂). As for the first one,
recall the definition of γk that R(γk) = R(γ) +
k−1∑
i=1
∆i. In the range of p ∈ [vk, uk] ⊂ (1, u] ⊂ (1, u],
R(γk)−R(p̂) =R(γ) +
k−1∑
i=1
∆i −R(p) + Ψ
(
p, {Fk}
)
≤R(γ) +
k−1∑
i=1
∆i −R(p) +
k−1∑
i=1
Ψ
(
p, {F i}
)
+
n∑
i=k
Ψ
(
p, {Fi}
)
(∗)
=R(γ)−R(p) +
n∑
i=1
Ψ
(
p, {Fi}
)
= R(γ)−R(p) + Ψ(p, {Fi}ni=1) (⋄)≤ −δ∗,
where (∗) follows from line (4)/line (8) of Algorithm 3, and (⋄) follows from induction hypothesis
R(γ) + Ψ(p, {Fi}ni=1) ≤ R(p) − δ∗ for all p ∈ (1, u]. Noting that R(p) is decreasing and convex
on p ∈ (1,∞) (see Lemma 3.1), we can infer from above γk − p̂ ≥ 1|R′(p̂)| · δ∗, hence settling the
lemma.
H.4 Proof of Lemma 22
[Lemma 22]. For all p ∈ [vk, uk] ⊂ [vk, uk],
γk −
[
Fk(p) + p ·
(
1− Fk(p)
)]− (p− 1) · F k(p)− Fk(p)
eQ(γk)−Q(γk) − 1 ≥
1
κ∗
· γ∗2 ·∆∗. (8)
Proof. The proof of Lemma 22 consists of the following three parts.
Part I. Based on definitions of F k and γk, we obtain Lemma 32 in Appendix H.1, which indicates
• LHS of (8) ≥− 2γ∗2 ·∆∗ + γk ·
[
Fk(p) + p ·
(
1− Fk(p)
)]
·
[
− 1
γk
+
1
Fk(p) + p ·
(
1− Fk(p)
) − (1− 1
p
)
· Fk(p)
]
;
[Lemma 32]. Given p ∈ [vk, uk],
(p− 1) · F k(p)− Fk(p)
eQ(γk)−Q(γk) − 1 ≤ 2γ
∗2 ·∆∗ + γk ·
[
Fk(p) + p ·
(
1− Fk(p)
)] ·(1− 1
p
)
· Fk(p).
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Part II. Define p̂ by letting R(p̂) = R(p)−Ψ(p, {Fk}). In Lemma 35 (justified in Appendix H.2),
we get a measurement of p̂. Applying the lemma to the conclusion of Part I, we know
• LHS of (8) ≥− 2γ∗2 ·∆∗ + γk ·
[
Fk(p) + p ·
(
1− Fk(p)
)] · (1
p̂
− 1
γk
)
(∗)
≥ − 2γ∗2 ·∆∗ + γk ·
(
1
p̂
− 1
γk
)
= −2γ∗2 ·∆∗ + 1
p̂
· (γk − p̂) ;
where (∗) follows as p̂ ≤ γk (see Lemma 36) and Fk(p)+p·
(
1−Fk(p)
)
= 1+(p−1)·(1−Fk(p)) ≥ 1.
[Lemma 35]. Given p ∈ [vk, uk], define p̂ by letting R(p̂) = R(p)−Ψ
(
p, {Fk}
)
, then
1
p̂
≤ 1
Fk(p) + p ·
(
1− Fk(p)
) − (1− 1
p
)
· Fk(p).
Part III. We know p̂ ≥ p, in that R(p̂) = R(p) − Ψ(p, {Fk}) ≤ R(p). Under premise p ≥ vk ≥
v∗ > 1, clearly p̂ ≥ v∗ > 1. Since then, and recall line (6) of Algorithm 1 that ∆∗ = v∗−1
3γ∗2 · κ∗ · δ∗,
δ∗ =
3
κ∗
· γ
∗2 ·∆∗
v∗ − 1 ≥
3
κ∗
· γ
∗2 ·∆∗
p̂− 1 (37)
Applying Lemma 36 (to be acquired in Appendix H.3) to the conclusion of Part II results in
• LHS of (8) ≥− 2γ∗2 ·∆∗ + (p̂− 1) · δ∗
(37)
≥
(
3
κ∗
− 2
)
· γ∗2 ·∆∗ ≥ RHS of (8). (By Lemma 13 that κ∗ ∈ (0, 1])
[Lemma 36]. Given p ∈ [vk, uk], define p̂ by letting R(p̂) = R(p)−Ψ
(
p, {Fk}
)
, then
γk − p̂ ≥ 1|R′(p̂)| · δ
∗ ≥ (p̂2 − p̂) · δ∗.
This completes the proof of Lemma 22.
I Proof of Lemma 21
Assume w.l.o.g. ∆k > 0, then Lemma 16.1 ensures uk = u: While {F i}k−1i=1 ∪ {Fi}ni=k+1 remains,
• Fk becomes F k, where F k is defined as Ψ
(
p, {F k}
) ≡ Ψ(p, {Fk})−∆k for all p ∈ (0, uk];
• Cont(γk) becomes Cont(γk), where γk is defined by letting R(γk) = R(γk) + ∆k;
• γ∗ ≥ γk > γk ≥ uk ≥ uk ≥ vk = vk ≥ v∗ > 1;
Analysis 0: Auxiliary Facts. The following mathematical facts are certified in Appendix B.3.
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[Lemma 28.2,3,4]. For all y ≥ x > 1,
2. 1− e−
(
R(x)−R(y)
)
≤
(
1− x
y
)
· x+eR(x)−R(y)−1(x−1)2 ;
3. e
R(x)−R(y)
x+eR(x)−R(y)−1 ≥ 1y ;
4. 1− 1
y
≥ (x− 1) · eR(x)−R(y)
x+eR(x)−R(y)−1 .
To justify Lemma 21, the following facts are also required:
(a): γk ≥ Φk(u+k ) ≥ 1. This is confirmed as follows:
• We know Φk(u
+
k ) ≤ uk ≤ γk, according to the definition of Φk;
• Φk(u
+
k ) ≥ Φk(v+k ) = Φk(v+k ) ≥ 1, which follows from induction hypotheses that Fk is
regular (that is, Φk is increasing when p ≥ vk = vk), and that Φk(v+k ) ≥ 1;
(b): Fk(u
+
k ) ≥ ukuk+eR(γk)−R(γk)−1 . This can be inferred from Lemma 37 in the below;
(c): F k(p) ≥ eQ(γk)−Q(γk) · Fk(p) for all p ∈ [vk, uk]. This will be attested soon in Lemma 38.
Lemma 37. Suppose ∆k > 0, then ln
(
1 + uk · 1−Fk(u
+
k
)
Fk(u
+
k
)
)
= Ψ
(
u+k , {Fk}
) ≤ ∆k = R(γk)−R(γk).
Proof. For notational convenience, we would reuse W = {i ∈ [n] : Fi has probability-mass at u}
defined in Algorithm 3. By Lemma 16.1, ∆k > 0 means uk = u. Suppose k ∈ W , under induction
hypothesis that Fk is regular, uk = u is Fk’s support-supremum (see Section 2.2). Hence,
Fk(u
+
k ) = 1 Ψ
(
u+k , {Fk}
)
= 0 ≤ ∆k.
Otherwise, i.e., when k ∈ [n] \W , it follows from line (3) of Algorithm 3 that
Ψ
(
u+k , {Fk}
) uk=u===== Ψ(u+, {Fk}) continuity======== Ψ(u, {Fk}) line (3)====== ∆k.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 38. F k(p) ≥ eQ(γk)−Q(γk) · Fk(p) for all p ∈ [vk, uk].
Proof. Given p ∈ [vk, uk], under our construction that Ψ
(
p, {F k}
)
= Ψ
(
p, {Fk}
)−∆k,
F k(p)
(3)
=
{
1− (1− e−∆k) · [1− (1− 1
p
)
· Fk(p)
]}−1
· Fk(p)
≥
[
1− (1− e−∆k) · 1
p
]−1
· Fk(p) (Since Fk(p) ≤ 1 and p ≥ vk > 1)
≥
[
1− (1− e−∆k) · 1
γk
]−1
· Fk(p). (Since p ≤ uk ≤ γk)
To settle the lemma, we shall prove
[
1− (1− e−∆k) · 1
γk
]−1 ≥ eQ(γk)−Q(γk), or equivalently,
1− e−
(
Q(γk)−Q(γk)
)
≤ 1
γk
· (1− e−∆k) (4)= 1
γk
·
[
1− e−
(
R(γk)−R(γk)
)]
,
which follows from Lemma 28.2 immediately. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Depending on whether p ≥ Φk(u+k ) or not, we would handle Lemma 21 in different manners.
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Analysis I: When p ∈ [Φk(u+k ), γk]. In this case, Lemma 21 is established on fact (a), fact (b),
Main Lemma 4 and the above mathematical facts.
[Lemma 21.1].
∫ γk
p
Dk(x) · e−Q(γk)dx ≥
∫ γk
p
Dk(x) · e−Q(γk)dx for all p ∈
[
Φk(u
+
k ), γk
]
.
Proof. Since Dk(p) ≤ 1 for all p ∈ (0,∞), it suffices to show
∫ γk
p
Dk(x)·e−Q(γk)dx ≥
∫ γk
p
e−Q(γk)dx,
or equivalently, ∫ γk
p
[
Dk(x)− e−
(
Q(γk)−Q(γk)
)]
dx ≥ 0.
Note that Dk(p) is increasing on p ∈ (0,∞), the left hand side of this inequality can be viewed as
a concave function of p. Thus, we only need to deal with the case that p = Φk(u
+
k ), in which the
above inequality is equivalent to
∫ γk
Φk(u
+
k
)
[
1− e−
(
Q(γk)−Q(γk)
)]
≥
∫ γk
Φk(u
+
k
)
(
1−Dk(x)
)
dx. For this,
• The left hand side surely equals to
(
γk − Φk(u+k )
) · [1− e−(Q(γk)−Q(γk))];
• The right hand side equals to
∫ ∞
Φk(u
+
k
)
(
1−Dk(x)
)
dx, since Dk(p) = 1 when p > γk ≥ uk.
Further applying Main Lemma 4 to the right hand side, we are left with(
γk −Φk(u+k )
) · [1− e−(Q(γk)−Q(γk))] ≥ (uk − Φk(u+k )) · (1− Fk(u+k )). (38)
We continue to relax both hand sides of inequality (38). Firstly, due to Lemma 28.2,
LHS of (38) ≥ (γk − Φk(u+k )) · 1γk ·
[
1− e−
(
R(γk)−R(γk)
)]
;
On the other hand, applying aforementioned fact (b) results in
RHS of (38) ≤ (uk − Φk(u+k )) · eR(γk)−R(γk) − 1uk + eR(γk)−R(γk) − 1 .
After rearranging, instead of inequality (38), we safely turn to deal with(
1− Φk(u
+
k )
γk
)
− (uk − Φk(u+k )) · eR(γk)−R(γk)uk + eR(γk)−R(γk) − 1 ≥ 0. (39)
Suppose uk and Φk(u
+
k ) are independent variables, then the left hand side of inequality (38) can
be viewed as an increasing function of Φk(u
+
k ), in that
1
γk
(∗)
≤ e
R(γk)−R(γk)
γk + e
R(γk)−R(γk) − 1
(⋆)
≤ e
R(γk)−R(γk)
uk + eR(γk)−R(γk) − 1
,
where (∗) follows from Lemma 28.3, and (⋆) follows as γk ≥ uk (see inequality (5)). Moreover,
recall fact (a) that Φk(u
+
k ) ≥ 1. After assigning Φk(u+k )← 1 in inequality (39), we are left with(
1− 1
γk
)
− (uk − 1) · e
R(γk)−R(γk)
uk + eR(γk)−R(γk) − 1
≥ 0.
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Apparently, here the left hand side can be viewed as decreasing function of uk. Recall inequality (5)
that uk ≤ γk, assigning uk ← γk results in(
1− 1
γk
)
− (γk − 1) ·
eR(γk)−R(γk)
γk + e
R(γk)−R(γk) − 1 ≥ 0,
which follows from Lemma 28.4 immediately. This settles Lemma 21 when p ∈ [Φk(u+k ), γk].
Analysis II: When p ∈ [1,Φk(u+k )). In this case, Lemma 21 is established on aforementioned
fact (c), Main Lemma 4 and Lemma 22.
[Lemma 21.2].
∫ γk
p
Dk(x) · e−Q(γk)dx ≥
∫ γk
p
Dk(x) · e−Q(γk)dx for all p ∈
[
1,Φk(u
+
k )
)
.
Proof. Given p ∈ [1,Φk(u+k )), for notational simplicity, let
p̂
def
= Φ−1k (p
+) ∈ [vk, uk) Fk(p̂) = Dk
(
Φ−1k (p̂)
)
= Dk(p
+). (40)
It is noteworthy that p̂ cannot reach uk, since p cannot reach Φk(u
+
k ). We claim
•
∫ γk
p
Dk(x)dx = (γk − p)−
(
p̂− p) · (1− Fk(p̂));
•
∫ γk
p
Dk(x)dx ≤ γk − F k(p̂+)− p̂ ·
(
1− F k(p̂+)
)− (p − 1) · Fk(p̂+) · e−(Q(γk)−Q(γk)).
On the one hand, the first claim follows as∫ γk
p
Dk(x)dx =(γk − p)−
∫ γk
p
(
1−Dk(x)
)
dx
=(γk − p)−
∫ ∞
p
(
1−Dk(x)
)
dx (Since Dk(x) = 1 when x ≥ γk ≥ uk)
=(γk − p)−
(
Φ−1k (p
+)− p) · (1−Dk(p+)) (By Main Lemma 4)
(40)
= (γk − p)−
(
p̂− p) · (1− Fk(p̂)).
Since Φk(p̂
+) ≤ p̂ (40)< uk
(5)
≤ γk, and Dk(x) = 1 when x ≥ γk ≥ uk, following similar steps results
in ∫ γk
Φk(p̂+)
Dk(x)dx =
(
γk − Φk(p̂+)
)− (p̂− Φk(p̂+)) · (1− F k(p̂+)). (41)
By Lemma 19 and the monotonicity of Φk, we know Φk(p̂
+) ≥ Φk(p̂+) ≥ Φk(p̂) (40)= p and thus,∫ γk
p
Dk(x)dx
(⊎)
≤
∫ Φk(p̂+)
p
Dk
(
Φk(p̂
+)
)
dx+
∫ γk
Φk(p̂+)
Dk(x)dx
(40)
=
(
Φk(p̂
+)− p) · F k(p̂+) + ∫ γk
Φk(p̂+)
Dk(x)dx
(41)
= γk − F k(p̂+)− p̂ ·
(
1− F k(p̂+)
)− (p− 1) · F k(p̂+),
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where (⊎) follows as Dk(x) is increasing when x > 0. Since p̂ belongs to half-open interval [vk, uk),
apply fact (c) to the above inequality, our second claim can be inferred easily.
Plug the two claims to the inequality in the lemma. After rearranging, it remains to certify
e−Q(γk) ·
[
γk−Fk(p̂+)− p̂ ·
(
1−Fk(p̂+)
)] ≥ e−Q(γk) ·[γk−F k(p̂+)− p̂ ·(1−F k(p̂+))], or equivalently,
γk −
[
Fk(p̂
+) + p̂ · (1− Fk(p̂+))]− (p̂− 1) · F k(p̂+)− Fk(p̂+)
eQ(γk)−Q(γk) − 1 ≥ 0. (42)
Again, notice that p̂ belongs to half-open interval [vk, uk), Lemma 22 is applicable here. After
assigning p← p̂ in Lemma 22, we have
LHS of (42) = LHS of (8) ≥ 1
κ∗
· γ∗2 ·∆∗ ≥ 0.
This completes the proof of Lemma 21 when p ∈ [1,Φk(u+k )).
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